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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the implementation of monetary policy before and after 
2007, particularly when short-term interest rates reached the zero-lower bound. 
In the first essay, we present a simple relation to capture the joint dynamics of 
the two main tools of unconventional monetary policy: large-scale asset purchases and 
forward guidance. When nominal short-term interest rates, hit the zero-lower bound, the 
existing analytical models simply failed to explain the mechanisms of unconventional 
monetary policy and became useless. Economists rushed to the drawing-board and 
produced abundant research, including models accounting separately for the 
mechanisms of both tools. 
The second essay analyses empirically the pass-through effects of 
unconventional monetary policy conducted by the Fed spanning the period 2008-15. 
Use is made of an unobservable monetary policy process, whenever possible. The 
results, relying on daily data, suggest that these policies are effective at the zero-lower 
bound in lowering yields and can be disentangled into  its main components: in Fed 
speak, quantitative and non-quantitative easing, which includes forward guidance. 
Moreover, monetary policy effects appear to be fairly persistent tapering off slowly. 
In the third essay, we study the effects of fiscal stimuli financed through 
seignorage, particularly an increase in government spending, a tax rebate, and the 
issuance of “bonus checks”. A comparison is made with conventional debt-financed 
stimuli. The results pertaining to the first hypothesis, under appropriate calibration of 
nominal rigidities, suggest that there are strong effects on real economic variables, with 
relatively mild consequences on inflation. A complementary experiment is conducted to 
capture a zero-lower bound constraint, and the results suggest that an accommodative 
monetary policy rule, under commitment, may provide a possible adequate answer, 
without relying upon fiscal stimuli. Alternatively, when nominal interest rates can be 
pushed down to negative terrain, money-financed stimuli, may lead to positive 
outcomes, provided that nominal rigidities exhibit high values. 
Keywords: conventional and unconventional monetary policy, central bank, financial crisis, zero-lower 
bound, fiscal policy, seignorage, nominal rigidities 
JEL codes: C20, E32, E40, E43, E52, E62 
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Resumo 
 
Esta tese estuda alguns elementos da condução da política monetária antes e depois de 
2007, em particular quando as taxas de juro nominais de curto prazo alcançaram o limite 
mínimo zero. 
No primeiro ensaio é apresentada uma relação simples que visa capturar as dinâmicas 
simultâneas relativas às duas principais ferramentas da política monetária não convencional: a 
compra massiva de activos financeiros e a sinalética relativa à evolução das taxas de juro de 
curto prazo (“forward guidance”). Quando as taxas de juro atingiram zero, os modelos 
analíticos existentes não permitiam explicar os mecanismos de funcionamento da política 
monetária não convencional, pelo que deixaram de ser relevantes. Na literatura surgem 
posteriormente vários modelos que descrevem em separado, mas não em conjunto, as dinâmicas 
da compra de activos e do “forward guidance”. 
No segundo ensaio é realizado um estudo empírico relativo aos efeitos da condução da 
política monetária da Reserva Federal Norte-Americana, assumida, sempre que possível, como 
um processo não observável, sobre uma série de variáveis financeiras. O período em análise 
cobre os anos de 2008 a 2015. Os resultados, com base em observações diárias, indicam que as 
medidas de política monetária levaram a uma redução das taxas de juros (ou, equivalentemente, 
ao aumento de preços) das variáveis financeiras. Adicionalmente, procede-se à diferenciação 
entre os efeitos da compra de activos e de outras medidas que incluem “forward guidance”. 
No terceiro trabalho estudam-se as consequências de estímulos fiscais financiados com 
recurso à emissão de moeda. Em particular, são considerados um aumento de gastos públicos, 
um corte de impostos e a emissão de “cheques bónus”. Procede-se também a uma comparação 
com os efeitos de estímulos fiscais financiados através da emissão de dívida pública. Os 
resultados obtidos relativos à primeira hipótese, desde que os níveis de rigidez nominal sejam 
suficientemente elevados, apontam para aumentos expressivos das variáveis reais, enquanto a 
evolução dos preços é contida. Numa experiência que visa captar explicitamente um ambiente 
de taxas de juro no limite mínimo de zero, obtêm-se resultados que sugerem que a aplicação de 
uma política monetária sob compromisso poderá ser uma solução, sem ter de recorrer a 
estímulos fiscais. Uma outra alternativa é permitir que as taxas de juro assumam valores 
negativos e, simultaneamente, efectuar estímulos fiscais financiados através da emissão de 
moeda. Um requisito é que os níveis de rigidez sejam altos, o que é expectável num cenário de 
recessão severa.  
Palavras-chave: política monetária convencional e não convencional, banco central, crise financeira, 
limite inferior-zero, política fiscal, senhoriagem, rigidez nominal 
Códigos JEL: C20, E32, E40, E43, E52, E62     
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Walking on ice: Monetary policy before and after 2007 
 
Introduction 
 
Monetary policy as implemented by most central banks in the advanced 
economies was subject to a severe disruption following the sub-prime crunch in the 
summer of 2007 and the ensuing financial crisis, which, by all accounts was the starkest 
since World War II. Up to this time, monetary policy consisted essentially of fixing a 
short-term nominal interest rate. Once, in practice, interest rates reached the zero lower 
bound, conventional monetary policy became useless. Central banks and policy makers 
were quick to undertake additional measures, such as direct credit interventions, 
targeted securities purchases and forward guidance on the path of the short-term 
nominal interest rate aiming at avoiding the collapse of the financial markets and 
reducing private sector borrowers’ interest rates and prop up economic activity. 
However, this process was not that simple; according to Smith (2016), Bernanke 
(2015) vividly describes it in his book “The Courage to Act”. A conflict arose between 
certain politicians and technocrats (the Fed is a famously technocratic institution) right 
from inception when direct interventions were implemented. Subsequently, the cleavage 
accelerated following the announcement of large-scale asset purchases; this time 
tensions arose not only from politicians but also from some economists who feared that 
such measures might lead to a drastic increase in inflation and generate artificial asset 
bubbles. Even worse, was the attempt by some politicians to audit (further) the Fed, or 
advocating discredited monetary systems like the gold standard; a proposal, which 
ultimately failed, advanced the idea that the Fed should follow a simplistic monetary 
policy rule set by the Congress. These vagrancies also took place with the ECB. Recall, 
for instance, the difficulties encountered by Mario Draghi and his colleagues when 
large-scale asset purchases were promoted. 
For economists the significance of these events has been a crisis of a different 
kind. The analytical models that had become the norm over the previous two to three 
decades were no longer able to explain these unusual significant events. They responded 
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with abundant research on these new developments and the measures undertaken, 
dubbed unconventional monetary policies. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to make a contribution to the studies on this 
new unconventional monetary policy. This particular chapter serves as an introductory 
note to our main research topics and hopefully motivates the reader to our main points 
of interest by presenting them in a broad perspective. In the following chapters, we 
narrow down our focus and adopt a more detailed approach.  
New analytical models have been studied [e.g., Gertler and Karadi (2013) on the 
subject of large-scale asset purchases and Cardani et al (2017) on forward guidance], 
however, no model has been proposed to account for the joint dynamics of these two 
main policy tools. Against this background, the author puts forward in Chapter 2, an 
unpretentious relation between the short-term interest rate under control by the central 
and “the interest rate” faced by private economic agents, a concept advanced by 
Woodford (2010). This relation is then incorporated into a set of equations based on a 
canonical New Keynesian model in order to account simultaneously for the dynamics 
of the unconventional monetary policy measures pursued, namely large-scale asset 
purchases and forward guidance over the policy interest rate. In addition, and for the 
sake of providing a theoretical-driven relation, the author discusses the role of the main 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms through which conventional and 
unconventional policies operate. 
Following the literature review presented in Chapter 2, the need to broach a 
more “palpable” topic of research, namely an assessment on the effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policy emerged; an empirical study on the behavior of 
financial variables throughout the short-term nominal interest rate zero-lower period 
could meet this purpose. This is how Chapter 3 appeared. Before 2008, the policy 
instrument used by the Fed was the federal funds rate, which implied that empirical 
studies on the evaluation of monetary policy could emphasize directly the links between 
asset prices and changes in short-term interest rates, likely with the assumption that in 
the window bracketing the monetary policy announcement, the news therein were the 
main driver of asset prices. However, with unconventional policies, there is no clear 
measure of the central bank’s policy stance. But even in this environment news still 
arise in a lumpy way; it is simply more difficult to measure. A vast literature emerged 
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over the last years to tackle this issue with a view to adapt the conventional event-study 
methodology, namely consisting of econometric regressions and vector auto 
regressions, to study the effects of monetary policy surprises in this new setup. Herein 
we extend Kiley’s (2014) paper by treating monetary policy news as an unobserved 
process and by applying his analysis, confined to equity prices, to several variables.  
A study, spanning the period 2008-2015 when the Fed Open Market Committee 
held regular meetings, is performed on the effects of the Fed’s unconventional monetary 
policies over several financial variables, ranging from government bonds, corporate 
bonds, and exchange rates to stock returns. An unobservable variable approach, 
whenever possible, is used and evidence obtained suggests that these policies were 
generally effective in bringing down the associated yields. A different methodology 
grounded on a heteroskedasticity-based approach seemingly upholds these conclusions. 
Moreover, a VAR using daily data on several variables in levels reveals that innovations 
to 10-year US Treasuries yields have persistent effects on other variables that taper off 
slowly, thus suggesting that the flow of monetary policy matters. 
In addition to most of the literature, a foray is attempted at trying to disentangle 
the effects between different types of unconventional monetary policy: large-scale asset 
purchases and other measures, including forward guidance. Use is made of multivariate 
analysis technics as well as through splitting the sample according to the classification 
of monetary policy news into the two types of policy. Results, robust to both 
methodologies, suggest that large-scale asset purchases are more effective at lowering 
yields, particularly at longer maturities, while other measures, which include forward 
guidance, not only lower both 10-years German Bunds and British Gilts yields, but also 
rotate the US yield curve pushing generally short-term rates down and long-term rates 
up. 
Chapter 3 deals with the past. But what about the future? How to build a resilient 
monetary policy, without necessarily discarding the conventional policy, which, after 
all, performed well for many years? May central banks rely on other monetary policy 
tools, if a serious recession hits again, while interest rates remain low? In order to 
answer this question, we present Chapter 4. Yellen (2016) argued that monetary policy 
will continue to be determinant in supporting a steady and healthy economy. 
Furthermore, she expects that the new unconventional monetary policy tools will 
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probably remain useful in future economic slumps; however, she does not discard the 
use of additional tools and the cooperation with fiscal policy makers in a context of low 
nominal interest rates. Buitter (2014) and Gali (2014, 2017), among (very few) others, 
study such tools, namely the use of money-financed fiscal stimuli without resorting to 
higher taxes or an increase in government debt, neither in the present nor in the future. 
This essay complements these studies and analyses the effects of fiscal stimuli 
financed through seignorage, particularly an increase in government spending, a tax 
rebate, and the issuance of “bonus checks” specifically designed for consumption 
purposes. Use is made of DSGE and DDGE (acronym for dynamic determinist general 
equilibrium) models. A comparison is made with conventional debt-financed stimuli. 
The results, under appropriate calibration of nominal rigidities and as long as the shocks 
are not anticipated, suggest that under the former policies, particularly with “bonus 
checks”, there are strong effects on real economic variables and on welfare, with 
relatively mild consequences on inflation while also leading to a reduction of the 
government net debt to output ratio. 
A complementary experiment is conducted to capture a zero lower bound 
constraint, and the results suggest that an accommodative monetary policy rule under 
commitment may provide a possible adequate answer, without relying upon fiscal 
stimuli. Alternatively, when nominal interest rates can be pushed to negative terrain 
(this may likely require, e.g., the end of paper currency) money-financed stimuli, 
namely if accompanied with the issuance of “bonus checks”, may lead to positive 
outcomes, provided that nominal rigidities exhibit high values, as should be expected 
under extreme conditions of economic duress. 
The downside to these measures is that, among other possibilities, governments 
may feel tempted to use them when in economic terms they are no longer required. 
Under such hypothesis, the outcome will likely be confined to an undesirable spike in 
inflation. This can be replicated by simply lowering the nominal rigidities in the model. 
In addition, central banks have other measures worth exploring, including 
unconventional monetary policies, should a stark recession strike again and nominal 
interest rates remain low, a scenario advanced by several authors, such as Goodfriend 
(2016) and Summers (2016). 
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Finally, Chapter 5 provides a brief discussion on some of the more general 
results obtained. By way of conjecture, we address issues ranging from how setting up 
the policy rate when interest rates are no longer at the zero-lower bound, to the 
unwinding of unconventional monetary policy, to the restraints still faced by the 
financial system, particularly in some countries of the European Union, or to the subject 
of technological innovation and secular stagnation. 
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A Simple Relation to Capture the Mechanisms of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
 
Abstract 
The conventional models of monetary policy were incapable of analyzing the actions undertaken by 
monetary policymakers in response to the 2007-9 financial crisis. The author puts forward an 
unpretentious relation between the short-term interest rate under control by the central bank and “the 
interest rate” faced by private economic agents. This relation is then incorporated into a set of equations 
based on a canonical New Keynesian model in order to account for the unconventional monetary policy 
measures pursued, such as large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance over the policy interest rate. 
Keywords: central banks, financial crisis, forward guidance, large-scale asset purchases, monetary 
policy, unconventional monetary policy 
JEL codes: E32, E40, E52 
 
1 The Great Moderation 
On the eve of the subprime crisis, macroeconomics was at peace and at ease with 
itself. A long history of internal feuding between competing paradigms seemed to have 
come to an end. A state of reconciliation was achieved, a “New Neoclassical Synthesis” 
(Goodfriend and King, 1997), or for that matter a more divulged “New Keynesian 
Synthesis” [see, for instance, Gali (2008) and Woodford (2003)], exemplified in 
macroeconomic consensual models. These models offered a framework for monetary 
policy which promised to maintain price stability and to ensure low cyclical output 
volatility. The prevalent confidence was well represented by Lucas (2003, p. 1) who 
opened his speech to the American Economic Association with the following statement: 
“Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940’s, as part of the intellectual 
response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the body of knowledge and 
expertise that we hoped would prevent the recurrence of economic disaster. My thesis in this 
lecture is that macroeconomics in the original sense has succeeded: its central problem of 
depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved 
for many decades”. 
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Short-run economics has accomplished its mission, Lucas suggested, thus, 
economists should shift their attention to more important supply-side issues of long-
term development. In a similar fashion, Blanchard (2009) argued that the state of macro 
was “good” after many years of “enormous progress and substantial convergence”. At 
the time, these statements appeared to be corroborated by more than two decades of low 
inflation and modest output oscillations in most of the developed economies. This 
period was dubbed the Great Moderation (Bernanke, 2004) and was widely credited to 
the judicious policies of central bankers (some call it sheer luck) who abode by the 
guidelines set by the New Neoclassical and the New Keynesian Synthesis models. 
 
2 The end of the happy state of affairs 
The happy state of affairs came to an abrupt end when the financial crisis 
following the subprime bubble burst in the summer of 2007, pushed the world into its 
most severe slump since at least WW II. And, much more so than in most economic 
recessions, not only did financial developments produced the downturn, but once events 
were taking place it was in the financial sector that this episode particularly stood out. 
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show financial-driven recessions exhibit more severe 
and prolonged aftershocks. The collapse of large financial institutions, the contagion 
domino-type effects, the decline in asset values and consequent destruction of paper 
wealth and collateral, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of credibility in firms and 
credit market instruments, and the fear of default by counterparties, were all 
extraordinary. Although policy makers responded swiftly and in retrospect, apparently 
with the right moves, mainstream macroeconomic policy framework was at odds with 
the unfolding of events. The forceful intervention by governments and central bankers 
opened up new ground both in scale and scope, and with hindsight, one might say that 
in most of the worst-affected economies, the emphasis of the recovery effect has been 
centered on monetary policy. 
For economists the significance of these events has been a crisis of a different 
kind. The analytical models that have become the norm over the previous two to three 
decades are not only incapable of explaining these unusual significant events, but are 
even unfitted even to integrate most of the, by now, commonly acquired understanding. 
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As of 2007, standard macro-models did not include financial variables other than a 
short-term interest rate and eventually an indicator for quantity of “money”. No 
explanatory variables were incorporated to account for impacts from the financial arena 
on the real economy other than the interest rate’s role in intertemporal consumers’ 
choice. These models simply cannot explain why the failure of firms such as the 
Lehman Brothers or AIG, in September 2008, could have such an effect on the 
economy, or why it became relevant for governments in the US and elsewhere to 
prevent firms from falling. Nor do they incorporate the explanation of why unusual 
actions undertaken by central banks would have any effect, ranging from purchasing 
targeted securities such as commercial paper and residential mortgages, to establishing 
special lending facilities referred by Bernanke (2014) as credit easing, to implementing 
forward guidance (FG), which is the management of expectations with respect to the 
future path of the short-term interest rate. 
Analogous questions arise from looking at central banks’ balance sheets. Why 
did they pursue massive unprecedented expansion of its asset holdings (see Figure 1), 
known in the economic parlor as large-scale-asset purchases (LSAP) or quantitative 
easing (QE)? 
 
Figure 1: G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets (color figure available on line)  
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Why should an economist, using the conceptual framework of a state of the art 
conventional monetary policy model, (in retrospect, as mentioned, it did not include an 
active role for liquidity, financial markets and their imperfection) have expected these 
actions to affect the financial markets and, more importantly, real activity? On the other 
hand, looking at the liability side, essentially consisting of currency and excess reserves 
[a by-product of LSAPs (Craig and Koepke, 2015)], studies relating macroeconomics to 
“high-powered” money supply would have suggested not just an increase of a few 
percentage points in these economies rates of inflation but an enormous inflation. At 
least as of time of writing (last quarter 2017), such an increase has not taken place.        
Actually policymakers are concerned about the fears of deflation, although they will 
need to be increasingly alert to the risks once more sustainable economic recoveries 
begin to emerge (see Fischer, 2015). Policymakers must also pay significant attention to 
the financial stability risks associated with the long period of extremely accommodative 
monetary policy stance. 
Goodhart (2010) notes that the standard approach in monetary economics to 
explain the supply of money, and the provision of bank credit, has been the money 
multiplier approach (see equation 1), whereby the central bank sets the high-powered 
monetary base (H), and then the stock of money (M) is a multiple of that. But when the 
monetary authorities in major developed countries attempted to use this relationship to 
expand the money stock and bank lending by force-feeding banks with base money, the 
prior relationship collapsed. As Table 1 highlights, despite huge increases in base 
money, measures of changes of broad money were mainly accounted by the former that 
is LSAPs, after materializing, represented the bulk of the Federal Reserve assets, were 
matched by increases in excess reserves 
M = H * 
(1+
𝐶
𝐷
)
(
𝑅
𝐷
+
𝐶
𝐷
)
 ← Money Multiplier      (1) 
M = Broad money supply, H = Monetary base, C/D = Currency/Deposits ratio, R/D = 
Bank reserves/Deposits ratio. 
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 M2 Reserves Currency Fed assets 
2008-09-01 7811,9 43,1 834,2 1009,4 
2015-09-01 12197,4 2649,4 1384,8 4484,7 
Δ 4385,5 2606,3 550,6 3475,3 
Table1 Tiny multiplier (ΔM/ΔH=1.39) Data relative to the US in $billions. Source: Fred 
  Furthermore, according to the standard models, once the central bank’s policy 
interest rate reached in practice the zero-lower-bound (ZLB), conventional monetary 
policy became simply useless. This financial crisis appears to have devastated the Great 
Moderation and discredited the New Neoclassical Synthesis. It would appear premature 
to relegate it to the heap of abandoned economic ideas (Woodford, 2012). After all, it 
has worked well for a long period of time during the Great Moderation. But the calm of 
that period might have induced economists into complacency which did not allow them 
to perceive how much they had limited their subject in terms of scope and methodology. 
  The experience of the crisis and the subsequent slump of the world economy 
suggest at least two general lessons for economists: 
-First, the failure of the New Neoclassical Synthesis and the New Keynesian model to 
incorporate the mechanisms conducive to the financial crisis, namely the neglect of the 
financial sector and the complacency and risk-taking nurtured by the Great Moderation 
(de Groot, 2014). 
-Second, the market system appears to follow different laws of motion in calm periods 
like in the Great Moderation and in time of crisis. This remark calls upon the 
consideration for markets non-linearity: small disturbances that push the economy not 
far away from its steady-state equilibrium may cause a more benign response, than 
large, once in a life “tsunami” (Mishkin, 2010, 2012). 
The answer to these events deserves the credit of many economists who have 
reacted to the crisis with an abundance of research on the workings of financial 
intermediation and asset holdings, and particularly on the consequence of a variety of 
financial frictions and monetary policy transmission channels. Indeed, some research 
actually preceded the crisis, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997). Subsequent to the crisis, one may mention for example, Woodford (2010 
and 2012), Gertler and Karadi (2011 and 2013), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Gilchrist 
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and Zakrajsek (2012). For a more comprehensive perspective, see Fischer (2015), 
Bernanke (2014), Mishkin and Eakins (2012), Williams (2012), and Smaghi (2009). 
Pervasive to all these papers is that no model (as far as we know), however simple, is 
advanced or referred in order to account for the “simultaneously” combined possible 
mechanisms of the two main monetary unconventional policy tools. Indeed, a thorough 
literature research revealed that models have been advanced explaining the dynamics of 
large-scale asset purchases, such as Gertler and Karadi´s (2013) seminal paper. The 
same applies to forward guidance. See for instance Harrison (2015) and Cardani et al 
(2017). However, no model is found encompassing both major unconventional 
monetary policies. There are studies on both policy tools, such as Woodford (2012) and 
Wright (2012), but they are either descriptive or empirical. This suggests that there is a 
lacuna to be filled. 
More recently, Debortoli et al (2018), advance with the hypothesis of “perfect 
substitutability” between unconventional and conventional monetary policies. This 
suggests that a refreshment of the transmission mechanisms of the interest rate policy 
may be warranted, at least as an interlude.  
The remainder of this article will delve in section 3 on the transmission 
mechanisms of conventional monetary policy setting the groundwork for the 
presentation in section 4 of a stylized model, literally a primer, enabling economists to 
grasp a conceptual framework within which one can address simultaneously how both 
main unconventional monetary policy tools (QE and FG) might work, using examples 
of measures undertaken by central bankers, which do not fit within any of the 
established models. A brief final comment concludes (section 5) 
 
3 Monetary policy transmission mechanisms 
The monetary transmission mechanisms describe how policy-induced changes in 
the nominal money stock or the short-term nominal interest rate affect real variables 
such as output and unemployment. 
Central bank liabilities include essentially both components of the monetary 
base, that is, currency and bank reserves, commonly denominated “high-power money”. 
Therefore, the central bank controls the monetary base. In fact, monetary policy actions 
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basically start when the central bank changes the monetary base through an open market 
operation, buying securities (most frequently, government bonds) to increase the 
monetary base or selling securities to reduce the monetary base. Both currency and bank 
reserves are nominally denominated in terms of the economy´s unit of account. Hence, 
if policy-induced changes in the monetary base are to have real impacts, nominal prices 
must exhibit some form of rigidity in a way that leaves the real value of the monetary 
base unaffected. Therefore, any theory of the monetary transmission mechanism must 
also assume that there exists some form of friction in the economy preventing nominal 
prices from adjusting immediately and proportionally to at least some changes in the 
monetary base. 
If, as in the United States, neither component of the monetary base pays no 
interest (reserves started being remunerated in late 2008), or if, more generally, the 
components of the monetary base pay interest at a rate that is below the market rate, 
then private agents’ demand for real base money M/P can be described as a decreasing 
function of the short-term nominal interest rate i: M/P = L (i). This function L 
summarizes how, as the nominal interest rate rises, other highly liquid assets become 
more attractive as short-term stores of value. Hence, when the price level P cannot 
adjust fully in the short-run, the central bank’s monopolist control over the nominal 
quantity of base money M also allows it to influence the short-term nominal interest 
rate.                    
There are, however, some caveats to this approach. Firstly, the measures of the 
money stock that the central bank can control tightly are not closely linked to aggregate 
demand. And the measures of the money stock that are often closely linked with 
aggregate demand, such as M2, are difficult for the central banks to control. Secondly, 
in many countries the relationship between all measures of money stock and aggregate 
demand has broken down in recent decades, weakening the case for money-stock rules 
(for a more recent review, see Timothy Lane, 2015). Because of these difficulties, 
central banks almost invariably conduct policy not by trying to achieve some target 
growth rate for the money stock, but by adjusting the short-term interest rate in response 
to various disturbances. In the background, of course, what allows them to pursue this is 
their control over the money supply. 
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3.1 The transmission channels  
Mishkin (1995, 2007) interestingly describes the various channels through which 
monetary policy actions, as summarized by changes in either the nominal money stock 
or the short-term nominal interest rate, affect real variables. 
According to the interest rate channel, a policy-induced increase in the short-
term nominal interest rate leads first to an increase in longer-term nominal interest rates, 
as agents act to arbitrage away differences in risk-adjusted expected returns on debt 
instruments at various maturities, as described by the expectations hypothesis of the 
interest rates term structure. When nominal prices are slow to adjust, these movements 
in nominal interest rates translate into movements in real interest rates. Hence, 
aggregate output and employment change. This channel lies at the heart of the 
traditional Keynesian textbook IS-LM model, dating back many years (Hicks, 1937). 
In open economies, additional real effects come through the exchange rate 
channel. When the domestic nominal interest rate rises above its foreign counterpart, 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market determines that the domestic currency 
gradually depreciates at a rate that equates the risk-adjusted returns on various debt 
instruments denominated in each of the two currencies (the condition of uncovered 
interest parity). This expected future depreciation requires an initial appreciation of the 
domestic currency that, when prices are rigid, makes domestically produced goods more 
expensive than foreign produced goods. Net exports fall; domestic output and 
employment fall as well. 
Additional asset price channels pertain to Tobin’s (1969) q-theory of investment 
and Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) life-cycle theory of consumption. Under these 
theories changes in short-term nominal interest rates impact on investment and 
consumption, hence on output and employment. Actually, some monetarists argue that 
monetary policy actions affect prices simultaneously across a wide variety of markets 
for financial assets and durable goods, but especially in the markets for equities and real 
estate. 
Two distinct credit channels, the balance lending channel and the balance sheet 
channel, also allow the effects of monetary policy actions to propagate through the real 
economy. The former posits that during monetary contractions banks restrict some 
firms’ loans, thus reducing their desired investment; financial market imperfections 
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confronting individual banks and firms, contribute in the aggregate, to the decline in 
output and employment (see Kashyap and Stein, 1993). The latter argues that a policy-
induced increase in the short-term interest rate not only acts immediately through the 
interest rate channel depressing spending, it also acts, possibly with a lag, to raise each 
firm’s cost of capital through the balance sheet channel, deepening the initial decline in 
output and employment (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
 
3.2 The New Keynesian model 
This model seeks to understand how the traditional Keynesian interest rate 
operates within the context of a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework. It 
derives the key behavioral equations from basic descriptions of the objectives and 
constraints faced by optimizing households and firms. 
More specifically, the basic New Keynesian model (see e.g., Romer, 2012) 
consists of three equations involving three variables: output 𝑦𝑡, inflation 𝜋𝑡, and the 
short-term nominal interest rate 𝑟𝑡. The first equation, which McCallum and Nelson 
(1997) dub the expectational IS curve, links output today to its expected value and to 
the ex-ante real interest rate computed by subtracting the expected rate of inflation from 
the nominal interest rate: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 – 𝜎(𝑟𝑡- 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1),      (2) 
where 𝜎, like all of the other parameters to be introduced below, is strictly positive. This 
equation corresponds to a log-linearized version of the Euler equation linking an 
optimizing household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to the inflation-
adjusted return on bonds, that is, to the real interest rate. The second equation, the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, takes the form 
𝜋𝑡 = β𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡        (3) 
and corresponds to a log-linearized version of the first order condition describing the 
optimal behavior of monopolistically competitive firms under any of a variety of 
conditions regarding imperfect price flexibility, as suggested, for instance, by Calvo 
(1983). According to Gali and Gertler (1999), this equation provides a good first 
approximation to the dynamics of inflation in the US.  
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The third and final equation is an interest rate rule for monetary policy, which 
can be derived from the optimization process of a quadratic loss function by the central 
bank, or simply represents a convenient rule of thumb such as the one proposed by 
Taylor (1992), 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟
𝑛 + 𝜙𝜋(𝜋𝑡 - 𝜋
∗) + 𝜙𝑦(𝑦𝑡 - 𝑦
∗)      (4) 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the short-term interest rate over which the central bank has control, 𝜋
∗ is the 
target rate for inflation, 𝑦∗ is the target level of output and 𝑟𝑛 is the equilibrium value of 
𝑟𝑡 for a given value of 𝜋
∗. According to Romer (2012), Taylor argues that a rule like (4) 
with 𝜙𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜙𝑦 = 0.5, and 𝑟
𝑛 = 𝜋∗ = 2% offers an adequate description of US 
monetary policy, particularly after 1985, when the Fed shifted its policy stance and up 
to 2007, one may surmise.  
In this standard workhorse New Keynesian model, monetary policy operates 
through the traditional Keynesian interest rate channel. A monetary tightening that 
increases the short-term nominal interest rate translates into an increase in the real 
interest rate as well when nominal prices move sluggishly due to costly or staggered 
price setting. This rise impacts on output as summarized by the IS curve (eq. 2). Finally 
the decline in output, through the Phillips curve (eq. 3), puts downward pressure on 
inflation. 
Importantly, however, the expectational terms embodied in the IS and Phillips 
curves imply that policy actions will differ in their quantitative aspects, depending on 
whether these actions are anticipated or not. Furthermore, by deriving these 
expectational forms from descriptions of the optimizing behavior of households and 
firms, the New Keynesian model takes advantage of the microeconomic foundations 
introduced into macroeconomics through Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) real business 
cycle model. 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003), and Gali (2008) delineate 
the New Keynesian model´s policy implications in greater detail. Obtsfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) develop an open-economy extension in which the exchange rate channel 
operates together with the interest-rate channel of monetary transmission, while 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) develop the basic model in order to account for 
the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. 
  
19 
 
4 A simple relation as the backbone of a model 
However, in essence, there appears to be a chasm between the conventional 
monetary policy, herein referred  as the central bank’s practice of setting the short-term 
interest rate to affect the market structure of interest rates, and thereby the cost of 
borrowing and the undertakings pursued by central bankers following the sub-prime 
burst in the summer of 2007. 
 
4.1 Woodford’s multiple interest rates 
We will aim at presenting a simple relation and formulating a sketch that can 
function as a conceptual framework under which one can at least formulate questions. 
With this idea in mind, we will draw upon the contribution made by Michael Woodford 
in his paper “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis (2010)”, as well as 
on asset market price literature, dating back many years ago. 
In this paper Woodford analyzes why a new outline for economic analysis is 
necessary, as the standard macroeconomic models that do not embody financial 
intermediation and frictions consistent with institutional realities, namely at the peak of 
the economic downturn in 2007-09, are incapable of explaining the recent crisis. He 
underlines the role assumed by nonbank financial intermediaries, namely in the US, to 
explain the changes that occurred in terms of sources of credit particularly as a result of 
securitization, as well as the reduced contribution of bank deposits as the main source of 
funding for the financial sector. In the case of the US as of 2015 (1
st
 quarter), only one 
third of the total credit was originated in the banking system and the remaining 
elsewhere (Fischer, 2015). In the Euro area, roughly the reverse takes place. 
The article itself is based on Curdia and Woodford (2009) which presents a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model on credit frictions and monetary policy. 
However, the model sketched here is an interesting extension of the Keynesian IS-LM 
model, or rather an IS-MP set-up which incorporates the existence of costly financial 
intermediation involving a wedge between the rate of return to primary savers, referred 
as the “deposit interest rate”, over which the central bank has control and the actual 
interest rate(s) faced by the borrowers, labeled for simplicity the “bank lending rate”. 
These elements are then used to draft an explanation for the integration of financial   
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intermediation and credit frictions into macroeconomic analysis, leading to a model that 
can be used to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of the recent crisis, as well as 
implications for conducting monetary policy. 
The extensions to the standard workhorse model, essentially based on a wedge 
between interest rates and impairments to the supply of intermediation, have a threefold 
impact upon the monetary policy actions. First, changes in credit spreads should be 
taken into consideration in the central bank’s reaction function (Curdia and Woodford, 
2009). Second, if the policy rate reached the ZLB, in the face of a sputtering (or 
declining output) economy and low inflation rates, the monetary policy function (eq. 4) 
calls for an unfeasible large negative interest rate (roughly four to five percent, if data 
pertaining to the U.S. as of the end of 2008 is plugged into the equation); under this 
scenario the central bank may extend credit to financial intermediaries on easier terms 
or engage directly in the purchase of securities, such as the purchase of commercial 
paper and mortgage-backed assets. Third, impairments to the supply of credit suggest 
adequate macro prudential measures aiming at financial stability. For details see 
Mishkin, 2012. 
 
4.2 A relation between interest rates 
We will consider again the New Keynesian model presented above, and 
reproduce it for ease of reference, with some minor changes in notation to capture the 
wedge in interest rates. 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 – 𝜎(𝑟𝑡
𝑠 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑢𝑡, 𝜎 > 0      (5) 
𝜋𝑡 = β𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡, 0<β<1, 𝛾>0   (6) 
𝑟𝑡
𝑠= 𝑟𝑛 + 𝜙𝜋(𝜋𝑡 - 𝜋
∗) + 𝜙𝑦(𝑦𝑡 - 𝑦
∗), 𝑟𝑡
𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝜙𝜋 >0, 𝜙𝑦>0    (7) 
Besides introducing disturbance terms in equations (5, and 6), an index is added 
to the short-term nominal interest rate, an idea borrowed from Woodford (2010). It now 
stands for savers’ short-term interest rate controllable by the central bank as the policy 
interest rate. 
As we have seen this model functioned reasonably well over the previous two to 
three decades preceding the crisis, but became unsuitable, particularly when the short-
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term policy interest rate reached the zero lower bound. Following Woodford (2010), we 
believe it can be adapted in order to capture the policies undertaken by the central bank, 
not only asset purchases and credit intervention, but also forward guidance. Two subtle, 
but significant changes are to incorporate in the aggregate demand function, the interest 
rate ( 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 ) that borrowers face, and not the policy interest rate, as well as, a longer time 
horizon in the expected inflation correspondent to the maturity relevant to the borrower, 
that is: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 – 𝜎[𝑟𝑡
𝑏 − 𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+)] + 𝑢𝑡, 𝜎 > 0     (8) 
In order to incorporate these changes to the aggregate demand function, we must 
abandon the assumption that all non-money assets are perfect substitutes. That is, we 
have to face financial frictions preventing arbitrage. Woodford (2010) advances for 
example with financial costs implying that 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 > 𝑟𝑡
𝑠, as well as limits to capital and 
leverage, either due to regulation on capital requirements or simply the intermediaries’ 
creditors unwillingness to supply additional funding. Another perspective is to ponder 
collateral constraints in a context where the fraction of each asset’s value that can be 
borrowed using that asset as collateral declines. A vast research on this subject has been 
developed over the last years, as previously referred. For an interesting description see 
the book by Holmstrom and Tirole, “Inside and Outside Liquidity” (2010). 
Furthermore, relying on Finance theory, the securities issued by borrowers have 
typically longer maturities and are subject to potential default as opposed to central 
banks’ short-term policy interest rates, which are essentially for risk-free liabilities, such 
as claims on banks’ reserves held at the central banks; under these conditions (maturity 
and default risk) the obligations associated with the policy interest rate and the 
obligations issued by private borrowers are not perfect substitutes when investors are 
risk adverse. If, in addition, there is a serious financial crisis, then the difference 
between these rates increases significantly. 
One may wonder why a section was dedicated to the description of transmission 
mechanisms of the conventional monetary policy as well as the transmission channels; 
these concepts were by then consensual (and still are). Well, once the federal funds rate 
reached the zero level in December 2008, the conventional monetary policy simply 
became non-operational and the Fed was constrained to the role of lender of last resort 
and a rescuer of collapsing financial markets. However, the rates actually available to 
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economic agents spiked up and the transmission channels conveyed to the economy the 
consequences of the financial shock. Literally, all the channels mentioned previously 
performed as expected, bringing down real variables and inflation. See equation 8, 
again. Hence, the implementation of radical different measures proved to be of essence, 
and became known as unconventional monetary policies. In retrospect, one might say 
that bringing down Woodford’s 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 was now determinant, in a similar fashion as the 
traditional central bank’s reaction function in the face of a more common milder 
recession. 
In order to get a flavor for these statements, the picture below is fairly 
elucidative. It is clear that at the peak of the recession (shaded area) the federal funds 
rate spirals down towards zero, while other securities’ spreads (𝑟𝑡
𝑏) jump up. 
 
 
Figure 2: Some securities option-adjusted spreads and the federal funds rate (Source: Fred) 
For the record note that an option-adjusted spread is a measurement of the 
spread of a fixed income security rate and the risk-free rate of return, which is adjusted 
to take into account an embedded option. Typically, the analyst would use the 
Treasuries securities yield for the risk-free rate. The spread is added to the fixed-income 
security price to make the risk-free bond price the same as the bond.  
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So, summing up ideas, we have a central bank determining 𝑟𝑡
𝑠, according to 
equation (7); on the other hand we have private agents making investment or spending 
decisions according to (8). How can we relate these two rates: 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 and 𝑟𝑡
𝑠, and 
simultaneously try to capture the actions undertaken by the Fed at least in regards to 
forward guidance and the early stages of LASP. We believe that a simple relation, the 
key element of this paper meets these objectives. Moreover, as far as we know, no 
relation has been advanced capturing at the same time the joint dynamics of the two 
main unconventional monetary policy tools. 
𝑟𝑡
𝑏 = α𝑟𝑡
𝑠 + (1-α)𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+
𝑠  + f (
𝑅
𝑇
)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , 0< 𝛼 ≤ 1     (9) 
In this relation the first two terms on the right-hand side are set to replicate the 
yield curve, which is a weighted average of the short-term interest rates; specifically it 
attempts to reproduce the expected policy rate over a time frame corresponding to the 
maturity of the investment decision. For example, in the case that α is equal to unity, 
than the maturity of the investment corresponds to the duration of the policy interest 
rate. The proportion R/T is the ratio of risky assets to total assets required for the asset 
market to clear (𝑓𝑅>0), and 𝜀 is a disturbance term. The basis for the third term f (
𝑅
𝑇
)𝑡 in 
the equation is the standard asset-market equilibrium relationship. For the market to 
clear, the expected return on each asset must be such that the amount demanded by 
investors equals the amount of that asset in the market (the supply). If investors, or at 
least the marginal investor, are risk averse, the market-clearing expected return for each 
risky asset, relative to the return on the risk-free asset, depends on the fraction of the 
market portfolio that the risky asset comprises. If all assets are gross substitutes in 
investors’ portfolios (a condition that in turn requires familiar regularity in the 
covariance structure of the respective risks of different assets) this relationship is 
positive: the greater is the share of the market portfolio consisting of any one risky 
asset, the greater will be the market-clearing expected return on that asset compared to 
the risk-free return. This is standard in the asset-pricing literature dating back many 
years and readily available in key reference manuals, such as Bodie et al (1996). For a 
more recent description, see Gagnon et al (2011) and the references therein. Indeed, 
evidence collected by these authors, shows, as expected that that assets subject to large 
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scale purchases are the ones that increase more in price, therefore, translating into 
subjacent lower interest rates. 
This very simple model appears to provide us with an adequate interpretation of 
the mechanisms of unconventional monetary policy. The expression  𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+
𝑠  allows us to 
take into consideration the effects of central bank’s forward guidance, which obviously 
is only effective if investors believe it. Research suggests that that it is the case, in 
particular when thresholds are associated with the central bank’s communications 
(Femia et al, 2014). The expression f (
𝑅
𝑇
)𝑡 allows embodying the effects of asset 
purchases; while buying private-sector securities, such as commercial paper and 
mortgage-backed assets, or through direct credit intervention, the central bank reduces 
the ratio of risky to risk-free assets that private investors hold, thus permitting a decline 
in the spreads, as was evident in the first quantitative program (see again Figures 1and 
2). The disturbance term 𝜀𝑡 permits us to account for exogenous shocks impacting on 
the private-sector interest rate 𝑟𝑡
𝑏, such as financial disruptions, credit market collapses, 
losses of financial intermediaries, systemic deterioration of borrowers’ net worth.  
Combining equations (6), (7), (8), and (9) we obtain a very simple framework 
relating aggregate income to the borrowers’ interest rate and the effects of monetary 
policy. For intuitive and simplicity sake, this can be represented in a two-dimensional 
graph.  
 
Figure 3: Output as a function of interest rate given other variables  
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Figure 3, contains a downward sloping IS curve, relating output y to the 
borrowers’ interest rate, the relevant rate, for given values of the other variables. The 
horizontal line in red shows the level of the policy interest rate (𝑟𝑠) set by the central 
bank (for the record, in the US, near zero percent between December 2008 and 
December 2015). The horizontal green line denotes the borrowers’ interest rate, given 
the value of 𝑟𝑠 and also for given values of the other variables. The main message to 
retain is that the output is obtained at the intersection of curve IS with 𝑟𝑏, rather than 𝑟𝑠, 
as advanced by Woodford (2010). While, not depicted in this figure, should there be a 
negative disturbance, it will raise the borrowers’ interest rate and therefore reduce the 
output. In the case that the policy interest rate is positive, conventional monetary policy 
can be likely conducted to reduce or suppress the negative impact, by reducing 𝑟𝑠. 
This last action was no longer possible, as mentioned, when central banks and 
policy makers were confronted with a ZLB, a severe economic downturn and a collapse 
in the financial markets. 
 
Figure 4: LSAP policy following a financial shock 
 
Many central banks turned to purchases of private sector assets. In terms of 
equation (9), these actions translated into a reduction of R, the supply of potentially 
defaultable and longer-term assets that the market had to hold, without changing T, the 
total supply of securities; hence, we have a reduction in the ratio R/T and a tapering of 
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the spread between 𝑟𝑏 , the borrowers’ interest rate, and 𝑟𝑠, the “risk-free” policy 
interest rate, presumably near the zero level. 
This is depicted in Figure 4. First, due to a shock, output falls from Y1 to Y2, 
following the increase in the borrowers’ interest rate to 𝑟2
𝑏. Then, a purchase program is 
undertaken and output bounces back to an assumed higher level of output Y3 as the 
“relevant” interest rate drops to 𝑟3
𝑏. 
This mechanism can be seen from the perspective of the dynamics of privately 
intermediated assets (𝑆𝑡
𝑝
 ) as described by Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013). In the event 
that these are insufficient to meet the demand for intermediate assets (𝑆𝑡), assuming of 
course financial frictions and restrictions to the private intermediary financial sector, 
then, a central bank intervention (𝑆𝑡
𝑔
 ) is likely warranted in order to fill in the gap and 
reduce spreads (or simply prevent possible credit rationing), that is: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡
𝑝 + 𝑆𝑡
𝑔
           (10)  
Aside, asset purchases, central banks also undertook forward guidance. For 
example, following the December 12
th
, 2012, meeting the FOMC indicated it 
considered appropriate to abide by a ZLB rate “at least as long as the unemployment 
rate remains above 6.5 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is 
projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2-percent 
longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well 
anchored” (FOMC, 2012). 
Rather than overruling the monetary reaction policy function (7), one may 
interpret this public disclosure as a policy revealing that expectations’ with respect to 
both output and inflation when compared to the desired levels remain low, and therefore 
the level of 𝑟𝑠 in that function would continue to be in the zero lower area. The likely 
impact, provided that the disclosure is taken as credible, is that the term 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+
𝑠  in (9) will                        
remain low or fall. Should this be the case, we will have a downward pressure on the 
borrowers’ interest rate. Graphically, this measure can be depicted as in Figure 4. A 
message to retain is that unconventional monetary policy tools at the ZLB aim at 
boosting a weak economy in recession by lowering financial costs, a goal shared by 
conventional monetary policy. 
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While such a graphic should suffice, one can obtain more revealing dynamics, 
though still sketchy, by drawing upon Jung et al (2005) who answer the question “What 
should a central bank do when faced with a weak aggregate demand function even after 
reducing the short-term interest rate to zero?” To address this question, they solve a 
central bank´s intertemporal loss minimization problem, in which the non-negativity 
constraint on nominal interest rates is explicitly considered. They argue that the best 
path for the nominal interest rate is defined by policy inertia, herein labeled Taylor rule 
under commitment (TRC), as opposed to a Taylor rule under discretion (TRD), in the 
sense that a zero interest rate policy should be continued for some time even after the 
natural rate of interest returns to a “normal” positive value. 
For additional details with respect to the model, calibrations, and the definition 
of the exogenous negative shock, please see Chapter 4 (Sections 3.4 and 6). In practical 
terms, the solution to the problem is given by the minimization of 
∑ 𝛽𝑡∞𝑡=0  (𝜋𝑡
2 + v 𝑦𝑡
2)   (10), 
where v stands for the relative weight attributed to the output gap (y), subject to a 
sequence of constraints defined by the IS and the New Keynesian Philips curves 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 – 𝜎(𝑟𝑡
𝑠 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑢𝑡, 𝜎 > 0      (5) 
𝜋𝑡 = β𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡, 0<β<1, 𝛾>0   (6) 
 After running the model, one obtains the following graphs for the output gap and 
the short-term interest rate, under the control of the central bank. 
 
Figure 5: Forward guidance policy following a financial shock 
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 Figure 5, clearly shows that a TRC policy under a liquidity trap, following a 
negative shock (- 1 percent of output) that materializes in period t = 0 and lasts for six 
periods, up to t = 5, may lead to a better outcome than a TRD policy, as well as, to 
nominal interest rates remaining low for a more prolonged period of time. Obviously, 
the success of such a policy is contingent upon agents believing on such a commitment. 
 
5 Main conclusions 
Monetary policy as implemented by most central banks in the advanced 
economies was subject to a severe disruption following the sub-prime crunch in the 
summer of 2007 and the ensuing financial crisis, which by all accounts was the starkest 
since World War II. Up to this time, monetary policy consisted essentially of fixing a 
short-term nominal interest rate. Once, in practice, these interest rates reached the zero 
lower bound, conventional monetary policy became useless. Central banks and policy 
makers were quick to undertake additional measures, such as direct credit interventions, 
targeted securities purchases and forward guidance on the short-term nominal interest 
rate aiming at avoiding the collapse of the financial markets and reducing private sector 
borrowers’ interest rates and, thereby, propping up economic activity. 
As in conventional monetary policy, unconventional policy operates by trying to 
reduce financial costs. Hence, there are similarities between the transmission 
mechanisms to the real economy. More recently, Debortoli et al (2018), advance with 
the hypothesis of “perfect substitutability” between unconventional and conventional 
monetary policies. 
 Additionally, there is no quantity theory of money associating the amount of 
base money to inflation provided of course that the economy is fragile and the banking 
system does not draw the excess reserves. Policymakers’ decisions, and whatever 
economic developments ensued, have been a matter of the asset side of the central 
banks’ balance sheets, not their liabilities. 
Economists and researchers responded with vigor with the objective of 
understanding the workings of monetary policy operating under this different 
framework. The very simple relationship set forth here cautiously offers theoretical 
underpinnings and a synthetic model to explain simultaneously the mechanisms of 
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targeted asset purchases and forward guidance, which as far as we know, has not yet 
been put forward. Indeed, this relation calls upon the concept of actual interest rates 
faced by economic agents, which in turn depends on the present and expected short term 
interest rate (controllable by the central bank; the latter at least in terms of signaling) as 
well as on quantitative easing (also controllable by the central bank in terms of 
signaling and (or) in terms of actual targeted purchases). 
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Assessing the Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices 
Following the Zero-Lower Bound 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses empirically the pass-through effects of unconventional monetary policy conducted by 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) spanning the period 2008-15. Use is made of an unobservable monetary policy 
variable, whenever possible. The results, relying on daily data, suggest that these policies are effective at 
the zero lower bound in lowering yields and can be disentangled into its main components: in Fed speak, 
quantitative and non-quantitative easing. Moreover, the effects appear to be fairly persistent tapering off 
very slowly. 
  
 Keywords: central banks, financial crisis, forward guidance, large-scale asset purchases, unconventional 
monetary policy, zero-bound. 
  
JEL codes: C20, E40, E43, E52 
 
1 Introduction 
During the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed) sharply lowered the 
target for the federal funds rate. In December 2008, the federal funds rate was set to the 
zero lower bound (ZLB), more specifically to a target range from zero to 25 basis 
points, where it remained up to December 2015. With monetary policy trapped at the 
ZLB, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) started using other, less 
conventional, measures to further stimulate aggregate demand. This involved statements 
signaling that the funds rate would be kept at the zero bound for a long period of time, 
programs geared towards supporting some critical credit markets that became non-
operational, namely at the early stages of the financial recession. It also included 
providing additional stimulus to the economy through large-scale asset purchases 
(LSAP) of Treasury securities and other high-grade bonds, a policy known in Fed speak 
as quantitative easing (QE). A fundamental motivation for these purchases was to try to 
lower the interest rates being paid by households and firms, so as to support 
consumption and investment spending. The justification, put forth by Fed officials, 
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relies, essentially, on a preferred habitat paradigm as described by Vayanos and Villa 
(2009) and, more recently, by Greenwood and Vayanos (2014), and also on the 
empirical work of Hamilton and Wu (2012), in which markets are segmented, investors 
demand securities of a specific type and the interest rate is determined by the demand 
and supply of that particular type of assets. LSAP could also operate in other ways, such 
as by impacting upon agents’ expectations on the future path of monetary policy. 
Before 2008, the policy instrument used by the Fed was the federal funds rate, 
which implied that empirical studies on the evaluation of monetary policy could 
emphasize directly the link between asset prices and changes in short-term interest rates 
as to verify the association with monetary policy measures (e.g., Gurkaynak et al – 
2005), likely with the assumption that in the window bracketing the announcement, the 
news therein were the main driver of asset prices. However, with unconventional 
policies, there is no clear measure of the central bank´s policy standpoint, and no easy 
way to establish policy expectations. But even in this environment news still arise in a 
lumpy way; it is simply more difficult to measure. A vast literature emerged over the 
last years to tackle this issue with a view to adapt the conventional event-study 
methodology, namely consisting of econometric regressions and vector auto regressions 
(VAR), to study the effects of monetary policy surprises in this new setup. Table 1 lists 
some empirical studies, where we highlight the estimated decline in 10-year Treasury 
yield, expressed in basis points. 
QE1: 12/5/2008 -3/31/2010 
($1,25 trillion mortgage backed securities purchases, $300 billion Treasury security purchases, 
$172 billion debt security purchases) 
Gagnon et al (2011) 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
D’Amico and King (2013) 
D’Amico et al (2012) 
91 (Event studies); 36 to 82 (Regressions) 
100 
20 to 30 (Treasury security purchases) 
35 (Treasury security purchases) 
QE2: 11/12/2010 – 6/30/2011 
($600 billion Treasury security purchases) 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
D’Amico et al (2012) 
25 
55 
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Meaning and Zhu (2011) 
Swanson (2011) 
21 
15 
Maturity Extensions Program: 10/3/2011 – 12/30/2012 
($667 billion Treasury security purchases, $667 billion Treasury security sales/maturities) 
Hamilton and Wu (2012) 
Meaning and Zhu (2012) 
22 
17 
QE3: 9/14/2012 – 10/31/2014 
($823 billion purchases, $790 billion Treasury security purchases) 
Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015) 60 
Table 1: Summary of some empirical studies (1
st
 column) and the correspondent estimated declines in 10-
Year Treasury yields in basis points (2
nd
 column)   
 
In the first round of studies, some authors have identified announcements that 
they claim to represent complete surprises, and then simply summed up the changes in 
asset prices taking place around statement days. This approach hinges on the entire 
announcement being unanticipated, as was arguably the case for some important news 
released by the Fed in 2008 and 2009. However, in fact, some announcements had 
already been, at least partially, expected and incorporated into the agents’ reaction 
function. Other authors, such as Cahill et al (2014) relied upon survey expectations to 
measure the monetary policy surprises. However, surveys have limited data availability 
and are not necessarily perfect measures of investors’ beliefs. For example, the 
announcement following the June 2013 FOMC meeting about the timeline for ending 
LSAPs was not far from survey expectations and yet agitated the fixed income markets. 
Herein, we take a different approach, which is limited to measuring the relative 
effects of monetary policy on different asset prices. Following Kiley (2014), we model 
monetary policy surprises as an unobserved process, by first extending his analysis 
(confined to the association between equity prices and long-term interest rates) to other 
sets of assets, in a similar vein as Wright (2012) and Swanson (2016) propose. Kiley 
(2014) argues that simple regressions may be conducive to inaccurate inferences on the 
comovement of equity prices and interest rates subsequent to monetary policy actions. 
In particular he shows that an instrument variable (IV) approach offers accurate 
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inference. We define the monetary policy surprise, whose scale is unobservable, as the 
daily change in US Treasury yields around the day of announcement. The assumption 
that the scale of the action is not quantifiable seems reasonable, as it is difficult to 
consider a scalar able to incorporate the degree of surprise in forward guidance (FG), 
the other major unconventional monetary policy tool, or for that matter changes in the 
pace or course of LSAPs. There are two important considerations to be made about this 
strategy. First, it only measures the pass-through effects, from the monetary policy 
actions, onto other asset prices, not the effectiveness of monetary policy in affecting 
government bond yields. But this is still important, as some authors have questioned the 
ability of declines in government bond yields to be transmitted into other asset prices 
(e.g., Eggerston and Woodford, 2003; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson, 2013). 
Second, it only measures the combined effects of monetary policy on asset prices, 
without decomposing it into the effects of specific policies, namely LSAPs and other 
measures, such as FG. It is not easy to separate the effects of different types of 
unconventional policy, as many announcements are literally hybrid as they covered 
simultaneously policies of different types. However, we also try to identify the effects 
of different types of unconventional policy news; moreover, we also broach the subject 
of persistency of news effects. An attempt, at separating the different types of 
unconventional monetary policies is advanced by Swanson (2016), but the 
methodologies that we use are different and include longer-term financial variables. The 
subject of persistency is dealt, among others, by Wright (2012) and Neely (2015), who 
arrive at different conclusions. The methodology that we employ, following Neely 
(2015) is based on a VAR and not a structural VAR (SVAR), as we find that is difficult, 
even spurious, to advance with dynamic specifications identifying relationships among 
the financial variables.    
In this particular environment, the event study methodology is of far more 
interest than merely an academic perspective. Policymakers have seen the immediate 
effects of news announcements on markets and asset prices, and we dare to suggest that 
this has, in turn, helped to persuade them of the advantages of some unconventional 
monetary policies. A particular revealing example involves, for example, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the incumbent president, at the time of writing, Mario Draghi. 
Recall, for instance, his intervention at the Global Investment Conference in London on 
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July 26, 2012, stating that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro”. This speech delivered at the height of the currency bloc’s sovereign debt woes, 
was followed by the containment of spiraling sovereign debt yields of perceived weaker 
peripheral countries of the Eurozone.  
The plan for the remainder of this paper is the following. Section 2 describes the 
data, the methodology and proposes daily measures of monetary policy surprises. Use is 
made, whenever possible, of an instrumental variable(s) approach under the assumption 
that the relevant explanatory variable is not observable, as opposed to the usual event 
studies ranging normally from econometric regressions and VAR’s to SVAR’s. The 
results on the assessment of the impacts on several asset prices are presented and 
analyzed. Another methodology, which, as far as I know, has not been used before in 
the format presented (use is made of the US 10-year Treasuries), based on a volatility or 
heteroskedasticity approach and covering a larger data set (used to distinguish FOMC 
days observations from non- FOMC days) is then advanced and investigated. A foray is 
made (however without success) trying to detect different laws of motion in the early 
phases of unconventional monetary policies, when compared with later stages. 
Additionally, an experiment is performed comparing monetary “tightening vs. easing” 
outcomes during the ZLB period. Section 3 extends Swanson’s (2016) analysis by 
trying to discriminate and measure the effects of different types of unconventional 
monetary policy segregated into its two main components, calling upon two 
multivariate analysis techniques and judgmental grounds. In section 4 we delve into the 
subject of news persistency. Section 5 broaches policy implications. Section 6 presents 
the main conclusions. 
 
2 Assessment of the effects following the announcements by the FOMC  
2.1 Data and methodology 
The period under analysis initiates in 2009, following the ZLB reached in late 
2008, up to the end of 2015, coinciding with the raise of the federal funds rate to the 25-
50 basis points bracket on December 16, 2015. Throughout this timeframe the FOMC 
held fifty six regular meetings. While, one might have considered other days, namely 
pertaining to important public interventions by central bank policymakers, we focus as 
Kiley (2014) on meetings’ observations. The objective is to study the financial market 
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effects of these specific announcements. While many of these announcements were 
either not very consequential (because, e.g., were largely anticipated) others, on the 
other hand, came out as big surprises, which is of crucial interest for identification 
purposes. Figure 1, below, illustrates the change in the US Treasury yield curve on four 
selected occasions, deliberately chosen to underline stiff changes in US Treasury 
interest rates. 
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in the Treasury yield curve on selected days (Source: US Treasury and author’s own calculations) 
As a positive surprise we have the Fed’s announcement on March 18, 2009, of 
Treasury purchases. This led to the highest decrease in 10-year US Treasuries since 
Black Monday in 1987 (75 basis points), to the time of writing. Likewise, news on 
September 18, 2013, that the pace of the LSAP program would not change and on 
March 18, 2015, when it was decided to postpone a likely increase in the federal funds 
rate led to significant downward shifts in yields. As a reverse surprise, the Fed signaled 
on June 19, 2013, a possible earlier-than-expected end of LSAPs and investors brought 
forward the expected time of the beginning of monetary policy tightening, thus leading 
to an upward change in the Treasuries yield curve. Besides the fact that these 
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announcements produced significant changes at the five-year-ahead horizon and beyond 
(on June 19, 2013, it was somewhat more front-loaded), there are some reasons for 
thinking that some of these yield curve changes represent swings in term premium. 
First, surveys have shown no evidence of long-term expectations of futures rates 
moving much; in this regard see, for instance, the White House report on long-term 
interest rates (2015). Second, in these and other instances, it was the specific securities 
that the central bank bought or intended to buy whose prices changed the most, as 
argued, for example, by D’Amico et al (2012).  
In this analysis, we use a number of asset yields, namely government securities, 
comprising, besides the federal funds rate, constant maturity US Treasuries (2, 5, 10 , 10 
inflation-adjusted, 20, and 30 years), British Gilts (10 years), and German Bunds (10 
years), as well as US investment-grade corporate bonds (AAA, BBB), some exchange 
rates (dollar/euro, dollar/pound, and yen/dollar), a stock index (S&P 500), and the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange´s volatility index (VIX, also known as the “investor 
fear gauge”), which measures the level of a wide range of options based on the S&P 
500. The data set was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Fred), with 
the exception of the British Gilts and German Bunds, which were collected from 
Bloomberg. The yields on constant maturity government securities interpolated from the 
daily yield curve are based on the closing market bid yields on actively traded 
government securities in the over-the-counter market and are released daily, in the case 
of the US by the Fed. The corporate bonds indexes, reflecting the respective effective 
yields are made available on a daily basis by Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Many 
authors advocate the use of intraday or high-frequency data, such as Kiley (2014), and 
more recently Gertler and Karadi (2015), as it is potentially helpful to zero in on the 
window where monetary policy is theoretically the only information coming out. 
However, announcements are sometimes complicated, and take time to be 
absorbed by agents. Therefore, the assumption that the monetary policy surprise can be 
directly measured from the swings in government bond yields in short windows around 
the news time is debatable. While a too narrow a window may miss part of the monetary 
policy announcements’ effects, a too wide window may lead to contamination of data 
by other than pure announcements factors. Bearing in mind this caveat, we will be using 
daily data. 
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 In order to get a flavor for the data expressed in differences or differences of 
logarithms, we divide it into three groups for simplicity and homogeneity sake, which 
are consistent with the results obtained and shown ahead. The first group contains ten 
variables pertaining to government securities and corporate bonds (top-left panel). The 
second group consists of the three exchange rates (top-right panel), and the third 
includes the S&P 500 and the VIX indexes (bottom-left panel), as depicted in Figure 2 
below. As it can be seen, the variables in the first group, while the graph is somehow 
crowded, appear to move in tandem and are cointegrated; moreover, they exhibit high 
positive correlation coefficients in particular among the US securities. In the second 
group the exchange rates are also cointegrated, but the correlation is somewhat smaller, 
while in the third group the “investor fear gauge” moves in counter cycle with the stock 
index displaying a high negative correlation and the variables are also cointegrated. 
Note for the record that, while not reported, to check for cointegration, use is made (and 
will be, henceforth) of the Johansen cointegration test. 
In Figure 2 a histogram for the federal funds rate (in differences) is also shown; 
the median is zero and the average nearly zero, which is tantamount to discard this 
variable. 
               
 
              
Figure 2: Surprises in interest rates, exchange rates, equity return and volatility index around FOMC meetings 
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We next discuss the identification strategy. The main assumption is that the scale 
of monetary policy actions is not observable; nonetheless it is taken for granted that 
policy actions are disclosed by FOMC releases or, for that matter, by relevant 
policymakers’ statements (not considered at this stage). In fact, it is difficult to attribute 
a scalar to the degree of surprise to many of these announcements, though some authors 
have relied upon dummy variables (e.g., Rosa, 2012). Prior to the ZLB, it was common 
to consider that the surprise in short-term interest rates was the observable surprise in 
monetary policy. 
Let the unobservable monetary policy surprise be ∆X(t) and assume that this 
surprise affects the 10-year Treasury interest rate [R (t) - this yield has received the 
most attention in the literature and as it is shown below an association can be traced 
with any other variable, even if indirectly] and equity prices SP(t), with some 
independently distributed errors, as follows: 
∆R (t) = α.∆X (t) + u (t)    (1) 
∆ln SP (t) = β.∆X (t) + v (t)   (2) 
The objective here is to determine the association between a change in the 10-
year Treasury yield due to a shift in monetary policy and equity prices, which is the 
change in equity prices, caused by a variation of the monetary policy of size 1/α. The 
shift in equity prices is equal to β/α. However, as the scale is not quantifiable equations 
(1) and (2) cannot be solved; but, one can plug (1) and (2) and obtain: 
∆ln SP (t) = (β/α) ∆R (t) + w (t)     (3) 
This equation should not be estimated by least squares, as the error term w (t) is 
a combination of the other error terms; therefore the estimator β/α is bound to be biased 
and/or inconsistent. A conceivable solution calls upon the use of IVs with an instrument 
correlated with the change of ∆R (t), but uncorrelated with w (t). As in Kiley (2014), we 
use yields on the 2-year and/or 5-year Treasuries as it seems reasonable that within  
daily observations, the joint movement with the 10-year Treasury yield is explained by  
monetary policy news; but in any event, the use of an instrumental variable 
methodology, be it two-stage least squares (2SLS) or generalized method of moments 
(GMM) among others, requires attention to the appropriate selection of instruments, the 
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satisfaction of orthogonality conditions, overidentifying restrictions and the endogeneity 
of the regressor (in this case, as indicated, the yield on the 10-year Treasury). We 
complement Kiley’s analysis and methodology by extending it to other variables, some 
of which are not domestic, applying daily windows. The idea of measuring monetary 
policy surprises from asset prices was also carried out, among others, by Gurkaynak et 
al, (2005) during the period of conventional monetary policy and Glick and Leduc 
(2012) using longer-term Treasury futures following the ZLB. 
 
2.2 Impacts on financial variables 
As Figure 1 suggests, the Fed was able, on the selected days, to produce 
immediate substantial effects on the US treasuries at different maturities, which most 
likely reveal modifications in term premia. This is corroborated by the results displayed 
in Table 2, where we are considering several variables. Column (1) contains least square 
estimates (LS), while columns 2 through 4 show the estimates using GMM, with 2 and 
5-year treasuries [GMM (2&5)], 2-year Treasuries [GMM (2)] and 5-year Treasuries 
[GMM (5)] as IVs. 
 LS GMM(2&5) GMM (2) GMM (5) 
AAA 0.58 (0.03) *** 0.72 (0.06) *** 0.82 (0.05) *** 0.77 (0.06) *** 
BBB 0.65 (0.02) *** 0.60 (0.03) *** 0.65 (0.05) *** 0.62 (0.04) *** 
BUND 0.38 (0.07) *** 0.37 (0.06) *** 0.42 (0.08) *** 0.38 (0.06) *** 
GILT 0.65 (0.08) *** 0.43 (0.14) *** 0.47 (0.18) *** 0.44 (0.15) *** 
DGS2 0.39 (0.04) *** - - 0.48 (0.05) *** 
DGS5 0.91 (0.04) *** - 1.08 (0.10) *** - 
DGS10 1.00 - 0.92 (0.09) *** 2.09 (0.23) *** 
DGS20 0.74 (0.03) *** 0.71 (0.02) *** 0.67 (0.02) *** 0.71 (0.02) *** 
DGS30 0.68 (0.04) *** 0.59 (0.03) *** 0.52 (0.04) *** 0.58 (0.03) *** 
DFII10 1.00 (0.04) *** 1.01 (0.10) *** 0.92 (0.09) *** 1.04 (0.10) *** 
JPUS 1.99 (0.59) *** 1.64 (0.38) *** 1.62 (0.39) *** 1.47 (0.40) *** 
USEU -1.06 (0.51)** -0.21(0.52) -1.67(0.39) *** -0.66(0.50)  
USUK 1.44 (0.78) ** 0.80 (0.46) * 0.46 (0.49) 1.11 (0.49) ** 
SP500 -0.55 (1.49) -3.37(1.83) * -3.68(1.83) ** -3.37(1.82) * 
Table 2: Response of financial variables to unconventional policies 
Note: This table shows the estimates and standard errors (in brackets), for the impact of a 100 basis point shift in the 
10-year US Treasury yield (DGS10). One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. All variables, with the exception of the last four, represent variations in yields. The 
latter (three exchange rates and a stock index) are measured in percentage points, that is 100 times log price changes. 
Some IV estimates are highlighted in italic, meaning that besides being statistically significant, they meet the 
endogeneity, orthogonality, overidentifying restrictions where applicable and weak instruments tests. These statistics 
and p-values are not shown. All regressions are estimated without an intercept, as we are dealing with variables in 
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differences. DGS10 GMM regressions use alternatively DGS 2 and DGS5 (2 and 5-year Treasuries) as explanatory 
variables and IVs. Parameters in LS are estimated by robust regression. 
 
Here we estimate LS regressions by robust regression to avoid excessive 
influence of outliers. In most cases, OLS estimations lead to similar results, but there 
are some coefficients where restricting the influence of outliers makes a considerable 
difference. In respect to GMM estimations, in particular when they satisfy the tests of 
endogeneity, orthogonality, overidentifying restrictions when the number of IVs 
exceeds the number of explanatory variables and weak instruments, the estimated 
parameters are generally lower, with respect to private and government bonds, than 
those estimated under LS. This is consistent with the hypothesis advanced that monetary 
policy surprises are not quantifiable and the error term w (t) in equation (3) is correlated 
with the explanatory variable (10-year Treasury). There is one particular exception: 
high-grade corporate bonds (AAA) but, in this case, we detected a borderline 
endogeneity test, being accepted at the 10% significance level. Furthermore, when 
running an OLS regression the parameters do not differ that much. We were particularly 
concerned with the size of the sample (56 observations, though larger than Kiley’s 32 
observations), as GMM test statistics are only asymptotically valid. In any event care 
was taken in the selection of IVs in order to ensure a high correlation with the 
explanatory variable. Looking at Table 2, one can see that, generally, GMM regressions 
appear to be more suited, assuming the bias /inconsistency issue, than LS regressions, 
with the exception of German and British government bonds (BUND and GILT), as 
well as US investment-grade corporate bonds (BBB). Here, data suggests the use of LS. 
 From the table, one can infer that an easing of monetary policy significantly 
lowers corporate bond yields, but the drop in yields is less than one-for-one. This means 
that the yield spread of corporate bonds over their sovereign counterpart increases, 
though what should matter for the economic activity is the rate, not the spread. Yet, 
considering that LSAPs involve, namely, the purchase of government securities, it is 
important to be clear that the risk premium which is possibly falling is the term 
premium on government bonds, not the risk premium part of the corporate-government 
spread. One can also see that monetary policy news drop the US government bonds 
yield curve in particular at the 5 and 20-year horizon, and as expected (inflation 
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remained low throughout this time period) the fall in the 10- year constant maturity 
inflation-adjusted bond (DFII10) is nearly one-for-one. 
 Looking at the last row in Table 2, it can be seen that regardless of the IVs used, 
or for that matter of the choice of some of the weighting matrices, monetary policy 
easing based in this sample is associated with a raise in the stock price (SP500) in the 
vicinity of 3.5%. This is similar to the results obtained by Kiley (2014), though when 
using separately the 2 and 5-year Treasury securities this author arrives at lower values 
(1.7% and 2.2%, respectively) than the ones we obtained. Considering pre-ZLB data, 
Gurkaynak el al (2005) find that a 100 basis points surprise reduction in the federal 
funds rate was followed by a fall in the 10-year Treasury yields of some 40 basis points 
while equity prices rose by about 8%, thus revealing that the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods 
estimates are quite different. This suggests that conventional and unconventional 
policies are operating in different segments of the yield curve term structure. The 
former has large effects on short-term interest rates, while the latter impacts on long-
term interest rates. Furthermore, as Kiley (2014) suggests, a given reduction in long-
term interest rates (100-bp) triggered by monetary policy had a larger impact on equity 
prices (6-9% increase) in the era of conventional policy than during the unconventional 
policy period. Kiley (2014) argues that the attenuation in the ZLB period may not 
necessarily represent a change in the interrelations between equity prices and long-term 
Treasury yields but, instead, originates from the binding ZLB and the importance of 
both short and long-term interest rates in establishing the effects on equity prices of 
monetary policy news. Indeed, Kiley (2014) obtains significant parameters when 
estimating with IVs the association between changes in equity prices and changes in the 
federal funds rate and the 10-year Treasury in the pre-ZLP period (July 1991 through 
December 2008, with 157 observations). 
 The effects of monetary policy news by the Fed on exchange rates and German 
and British government bonds are also revealing, as they represent (presumably) 
unintended policy spill-overs. Indeed, the sample used displays that monetary policy 
easing is accompanied by significant shifts in the yields of bunds and gilts (38 and 65 
basis points, respectively), while the dollar depreciates against the euro (1.65%) and the 
yen (1.6%), a trend found by Wright (2012). But, with respect to the pound, the data 
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shows the opposite: an appreciation of the dollar by a little over 1%, thus compounding 
the effect of the reduction of the 10-year gilt yield. 
  Deliberately, no results were presented pertaining to the volatility index (VIX). 
No significant associations could be found with the 10-year Treasury. In respect to this 
variable, we detected a highly significant inverse relation with equity prices regardless 
of the method applied. However, notwithstanding the association revealed by data 
between equity prices and the 10-year Treasury using IVs, no association could be 
established between the variable VIX and the latter. Interestingly, significant results and 
with the expected sign are obtained for these two variables (SP500 and VIX), as shown 
below, when using a principal component as an explanatory variable. Likewise, 
applying a technique (described below) called identification through heteroskedasticity 
yields significant results. 
 
2.3 Alternative methodology: Identification through heteroskedasticity 
 In this section we extend the IV approach where the 10-year Treasury is the 
explanatory instrument to account for the impacts upon the other variables. Use is made 
of a technique developed by Rigobon (2003) that allows dealing with the two of the 
main problems in estimating the interactions between monetary policy and the variables 
of interest. One is the possible unobservability and endogeneity of variables, dealt in a 
similar way as in the subsection above through an IV approach; the other is the eventual 
existence of omitted variables, a more difficult task to undertake, requiring data mining 
and additional studies. Assume that the daily changes in the financial variables, 
considering two variables at a time (∆𝑥1 and ∆𝑥2) can be characterized by a system of 
linear equations, whose reduced form is: 
(∆𝑥1  ∆𝑥2)’ = D. (𝑧1 𝑧2 𝑧3 … )’ + (𝜀1 𝜀2)’, or in matrix form,  (4) 
∆x’ = D. Z’ + Ε’ (4a) 
where the matrix Z denotes the common factors affecting the financial variables, 
including the unobservable factor 𝑧1 pertaining to the impact of monetary policies; the 
matrix Ε represents idiosyncratic shocks, while matrix D relates the direct impacts of 
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the common factors on the financial variables. The elements of this matrix are denoted 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 and stand for the impact of the jth factor on the ith financial variable (i = 1, 2). The 
first column in matrix D represents the effect of the monetary policy factor on the two 
variables. The impact of this factor is normalized to unity to ensure that the scale of this 
factor is determined, and its impact on the second variable is captured by the coefficient 
𝑑21. This is the parameter to estimate for a set of variables. 
If the common factors in matrix Z were all observable, then equation (4) could 
be estimated employing a LS regression. However, some of the common factors, 
including monetary policy are not observable. Rigobon (2003) proposes a 
heteroskedasticity-based methodology to estimate the impact of the monetary policy. 
This method only requires that a set of dates can be established on which the variance of 
the monetary policy factor is assumed higher than on other dates. This was already 
established when selecting the 56 FOMC meetings, which appears reasonable, even 
though the effects may precede the FOMC days (based for instance on expectations), or 
trickle out on the following days if, for example, the news are harder to “digest”. The 
identification rests upon the assumption that it is only the variance of monetary policy 
factor that changes on those days, while other factors notwithstanding being present 
exhibit the same volatility as on other days. Another assumption required is that the 
monetary policy factor be orthogonal to other shocks. 
  Consider now computing two variance-covariance matrices of the two financial 
variables as defined in equation (4). One matrix, denoted 𝜓𝐻  is calculated using 
observations on FOMC days. The other matrix 𝜓𝐿 is calculated using non-FOMC days 
(the indices H and L stand for high and low variance, respectively). Under the 
identification assumptions, the difference in the variance-covariance matrices between 
this two sets of observations Δ𝜓 = 𝜓𝐻 - 𝜓𝐿, is entirely explained by the change in the 
variance of the monetary policy factor, expressed as ∆𝜎2(𝑧1). Specifically: 
Δ𝜓 = ∆𝜎2 (𝑧1) . [
1 𝑑21
𝑑21 𝑑21
2 ]    (5) 
 As equation (5) reveals, the shift in the variance-covariance matrix between 
FOMC days and non-FOMC days is determined by the relative responsiveness of the 
financial variables to that factor. Consequently, one can compute the parameter of 
interest 𝑑21, as indicated: 
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?̂? = ∆𝜓21 / ∆𝜓11  (6) or ?̂? = ∆𝜓22 / ∆𝜓21 (7) 
 These estimates would be asymptotically equal if the assumptions advanced held 
perfectly, namely that the factors other than monetary policy reveal the same 
heteroskedasticity over the two sets of periods (highly unlikely) and that the system of 
equations is linear. At this stage we can calculate these estimators; all that is required is 
to define a set of non-FOMC days. We chose the days before each Fed meeting, for a 
total of 56 observations (for that matter one can choose other set of days, such as for 
instance the days following the meetings), on the assumption that they will exhibit a 
different variance-covariance matrix. Indeed, they do, but we cannot establish their 
statistic value. In order to overcome this limitation, we rely upon Rigobon (2003), and 
Rigobon and Sack (2004) who show that these estimators can be implemented, applying 
an IV methodology. 
These authors define as instrument a stacked variable consisting of the FOMC 
days’ observations and the negative value of the observations pertaining to non-FOMC 
days, with respect to variable ∆𝑥1. Denote this instrument as 𝜙1. A regression of ∆𝑥2𝐶 
is then estimated on ∆𝑥1𝐶, over both set of days (totaling 112 observations), using this 
instrument. The standard IV estimate is 
𝑑1̂ = inv. (𝜙1’ *∆𝑥1𝐶)*( 𝜙1’ *∆𝑥2𝐶),    (8) 
which is equal to 
𝑑1̂ = [𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐻(∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2) - 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐿(∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2)] / [ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐻(∆𝑥1) - 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐿(∆𝑥1)],  (9) or, 
𝑑1̂ = (∆𝑥′1𝐻*∆𝑥2𝐻 - ∆𝑥′1𝐿*∆𝑥2𝐿) / (∆𝑥′1𝐻*∆𝑥1𝐻 - ∆𝑥′1𝐿*∆𝑥1𝐿)   (10) 
where the subscripts H , L and C denote respectively, the set of FOMC days, non-
FOMC days and complete observations over the two sets of days. Note that the 
coefficient above is identical to the estimate in equation (6). 
 In a similar manner, one can consider an alternative instrument 𝜙2 defined in the 
same way but in terms of ∆𝑥2. With this instrument, the standard IV estimate is 
𝑑2̂ = [ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐻(∆𝑥2) - 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐿(∆𝑥2)] / [𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐻(∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2) - 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐿(∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2)]  (11) or, 
𝑑2̂ = (∆𝑥′2𝐻*∆𝑥2𝐻 - ∆𝑥′2𝐿*∆𝑥2𝐿) / (∆𝑥′1𝐻*∆𝑥2𝐻 - ∆𝑥′1𝐿*∆𝑥2𝐿), (12) 
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which is identical to the estimate in equation (7). Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack 
(2004) show that these two IVs are valid instruments for estimating  𝑑1̂ and 𝑑2̂ , under 
the assumptions that have been made. They further demonstrate that these estimates are 
consistent even if the shocks exhibit heteroskedasticity over time, as long as the 
volatility of the monetary policy shock accounts for the shift in the variance-covariance 
matrix on FOMC days. 
 We now turn to the application of these estimators using the 10-year US 
Treasury as ∆𝑥1and run an IV regression on this variable. The criterion to choose this 
variable is the same as the one presented in the sub-section above. The results are 
shown below. 
 
 IV𝜙1 (1) IV𝜙2 (2) LS (3) 
AAA 0.78 (0.06)*** 0.78 (0.06)*** 0.72 (0.04)*** 
BBB 0.62 (0.05)*** 0.69 (0.06)*** 0.63 (0.04)*** 
BUND 0.46 (0.10)*** 0.40 (0.14)*** 0.37 (0.06)*** 
GILT 0.56 (0.12)*** 0.96 (0.19)*** 0.42 (0.08)*** 
DGS2 0.49 (0.06)*** 0.44 (0.07)*** 0.41 (0.04)*** 
DGS5 0.98 (0.06)*** 1.08 (0.06)*** 0.92 (0.04)*** 
DGS10 0.93 (0.05)*** 0.93 (0.05)*** 0.97 (0.05)*** 
DGS20 0.66 (0.06)*** 0.73 (0.07)*** 0.77 (0.04)*** 
DGS30 0.52 (0.08)*** 0.70 (0.11)*** 0.66 (0.05)*** 
DFII10 1.10 (0.08)*** 1.24 (0.09)*** 0.99 (0.06)*** 
JPUS 1.94 (1.01)* -5.16(5,26) 2.14 (0.56)*** 
USEU -1.06(1.25) 8.65(13.07) -1.06(0.51)** 
USUK 1.61 (1.13) 2.43 (4.76) 1.57 (0.71)** 
SP500 -6.27(2,73)** -14.80(8.12)* -1.35(1.67) 
VIX 8.43 (4.58)* 43.60(25.81)* 1.72 (3.04) 
Table 3: Responses of financial variables to unconventional policies applying volatility- based 
approach 
Note: This table shows the estimates and standard errors (in brackets), for the impact of a 100 basis point shift in the 
10-year US Treasury yield (DGS10). One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. All variables, with the exception of the last four, represent variations in yields. The 
latter (three exchange rates and a stock index) are measured in percentage points, that is 100 times log prices changes. 
Columns 1 and 2 represent IV 2SLS regressions using as instruments, respectively,   𝜙1 and 𝜙2, while in column 3 an 
OLS is applied. No intercepts are used, as the variables are expressed in differences. DGS10 estimates are calculated 
using DGS5. 
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 In Table 3, we present the estimates, using the first IV (𝜙1), the second IV (𝜙2) 
and a LS regression for comparison purposes. Note that the volatility-based estimates 
converge to the traditional event-study estimation if the shift in the variance following 
monetary policy shocks is infinitely large. Under this hypothesis the changes in the 
variance from non-FOMC dates to FOMC dates converges to the variance on FOMC 
days, even though no such a strong assumption is required to arrive at consistent 
estimates. For the record note [compare with equation (9)] that the standard event-study 
estimate is given by: 
𝑑3̂ = inv. (∆𝑥1’ *∆𝑥1)*(∆𝑥1’ *∆𝑥2) = cov(∆𝑥1, ∆𝑥2) / var (∆𝑥1)  (13) 
The two IV regressions, applying a 2SLS method lead to estimates, in some 
cases quite apart. Rigobon and Sack (2004), in their empirical paper use the equivalent 
to 𝜙1 as IV, allegedly for simplicity. However, when performing the weak instrument 
test (results not shown), one is steered to prefer 𝜙1 over 𝜙2 for this specific data set. 
We now proceed to compare the estimates obtained employing 𝜙1and displayed 
in Table 3 with the estimates shown in Table 2, above. With respect to investment-grade 
corporate bonds and government securities for a total of ten financial variables, 
notwithstanding the data sets being different, one arrives at the same conclusions and 
the estimated parameters are not actually that different. Moreover, computations made 
with GMM regressions and using a Newey-West weighting matrix (not shown), lead to 
identical estimates when using 2SLS, although with different statistics. This is 
explained by the fact that the IV equations are just-identified. 
In regards to the exchange rates, the estimates though not statistically significant, 
exhibit the same sign and magnitude, as those shown on Table 2. Applying a plain-
vanilla regression the estimated parameters are now statistically significant at least at 
the 5% level. Furthermore, they remain similar. The reverse happens with the equity 
and volatility indexes. The 2SLS regression (not the OLS) yields statistically significant 
estimates, which exhibit the expected signs and are larger in absolute value than those 
reported on Table 2.  Table 4 provides some intuition for this volatility-based 
methodology. 
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 Variance 
~FOMC 
Variance 
FOMC 
Covariance 
~FOMC 
Covariance 
FOMC 
Estimates 
IV reg: 𝜙1 
R-squared 
AAA 16.71 62.31 17.23 74.66 0.78 0.78 
BBB 16.44 48.31 18.90 64.53 0.62 0.80 
BUND 21.81 33.56 4.13 37.19 0.46 0.16 
GILT 14.65 54.35 3.10 43.39 0.56 0.14 
DGS2 4.10 26.20 6.57 41.84 0.49 0.50 
DGS5 20.78 97.41 23.31 94.90 0.98 0.87 
DGS10 30.14 103.31 23.31 94.90 0.93 0.88 
DGS20 32.89 68.08 30.47 79.33 0.66 0.86 
DGS30 33.82 59.94 30.38 68.75 0.52 0.70 
DFII10 20.53 120.23 21.34 101.87 1.10 0.77 
JPUS 0.29 0.21 0.77 2.24 1.94 0.13 
USEU 0.37 0.28 0.40 -0.35 -1.06 -0.05 
USUK 0.29 0.30 0.45 1.66 1.61 0.05 
SP500 0.93 1.48 3.24 -1.29 -6.27 -0.36 
VIX 2,57 4.84 -4.45 1.60 8.43 -0.23 
Table 4: Variances and covariances on FOMC and non-FOMC dates, IV and R^2 estimates 
Note: This table uses daily changes in basis points (investment-grade and government bonds), daily percent changes 
in percentages points (exchange rates and the stock index) and daily changes (volatility index). 
 Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics on daily changes in the policy rate 
(DGS10) and other asset prices on FOMC dates and non-FOMC dates. With respect to 
investment-grade corporate bonds and government bonds there is a significant shift in 
terms of both variances and covariances with the policy rate. Using these values one can 
calculate directly the estimates of the IV regression (column 5 in Table 4) according to 
equation (9), which are identical to those reported in column 1 (Table 3), as expected. 
With respect to the exchange rates the difference in variances and covariances is not 
quite clear cut. For instance, the shift in variances is negative or hardly discernible. 
Furthermore, these three IV regressions fail to meet the endogeneity tests criteria; hence 
we calculate the associations relying upon LS, leading to similar, but significant, 
estimates. Note, as well that the statistic R-squared is particularly low for the 
dollar/pound and the dollar/euro exchange rates and high with respect to the US dollar 
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denominated assets. The reverse happens with the stock and volatility indexes. The 
change in variances, in relative terms, is patent, whereas there are changes of sign in the 
covariances from one set of dates to the other set. The test statistics in terms of 
significance, endogeneity and weak instruments suggest the use of the IV with  𝜙1 as an 
instrument. These estimates are higher in absolute value than those reported on Table 2 
and exhibit the expected sign. 
 These results suggest, as in the previous subsection, that there is some, although 
modest, bias in the traditional event-study estimates, using LS regressions. Specifically, 
the volatility-based estimates reveal smaller impacts on bond yields; whereas the 
reverse happens with the two indexes, while the results for the exchange rates are not 
that different. Obviously, care should be taken, at least in terms of the selection of non-
FOMC days. Some authors, such as Wright (2012) have implemented this approach 
using a SVAR over a much larger sample and then focusing on the reduced form 
residuals. An alternative, advanced by Rigobon and Sack (2004) is to use a set of non-
FOMC dates larger than the FOMC dates. Anyway, the objective here is to provide a 
robustness test. Besides, the volatility or heteroskedasticity-based estimates, by 
requiring weaker assumptions than the traditional event-study estimate, may possibly 
deliver a more accurate measure between various financial variables and monetary 
policy. 
 
2.4 Unconventional monetary policy at different stages 
 One may wonder if the effects of monetary policy news were dissimilar during 
the early phases of the ZLB and the following stages. Some authors, for example, the 
IMF Staff Report (2013) argue that LSAPs may have been more effective in the early 
phases when arbitrage capital was scarcer and markets were not operating normally. 
The question, then, is: are the spill-overs different according to the stages of 
unconventional monetary policy?  In order to obtain an answer, an empirical method is 
used as well. The sample is split into two groups, one encompassing the observations 
spanning the period 2009 through 2011, the second including the remaining years. 
Regressions analogous to the ones used to obtain the estimators in Table 2 are applied, 
leading to the results shown on Table 5. No clear pattern emerges from this table with 
regards to the magnitude of the pass-through effects; however, the t-statistics tend to be 
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bigger in the first sample, possibly reflecting that it was in this period that greater 
monetary policy surprises took place. Similar results were obtained (not shown) when a 
clearer distinction between the recession period (2008-9) and the following years, 
representing the non-crisis sample, was applied. Note that, according to the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, the last recession started at the peak of the business 
cycle (2007 – IV Quarter) and ended at the through (2009 – II Quarter). In short, this 
data does not differentiate the pass-through effects at the different stages, the exception 
being the stock index. However, when comparing the variances and covariances in the 
two periods, the values relative to the first period are systemically higher, as a mere 
visualization of Figure 2 clearly suggests. Hence, in spite of an important change in 
volatilities, it appears that the relative weights of the associated matrixes do not change 
that much. Hence, no conclusion can be obtained on the structural dynamics over the 
two periods. 
 2009 - 2011 2012 -  2015 
AAA 0.84 (0.06)*** 14.74 0.81 (0.09)***  9.51 
BBB 0.63 (0.06)***  9.92 0.62 (0.04)*** 16.70 
BUND 0.34 (0.05)***  7.45 0.44 (0.12)***  3.78 
GILT 0.32 (0.09)***  3.47 0.69 (0.15)***  4.68 
DGS2 0.40 (0.03)***  7.87 0.63 (0.14)***  4.58 
DGS5 0.95 (0.05)*** 19.25 1.34 (0.10)*** 13.66 
DGS10 1.06 (0.05)*** 19.25 0.75 (0.05)*** 13.66 
DGS20 0.66 (0.03)*** 25.42 0.67 (0.03)*** 23.12 
DGS30 0.49 (0.05)***  9.40 0.60 (0.06)***  9.76 
DFII10 1.08 (0.14)***  7.63 1.21 (0.05)*** 25.53 
JPUS 1.96 (0.72)**   2.79 2.61(0.99)**     2.65 
USEU -1.92(0.41)*** -4.63 -1.19(0.59)**   -2.05 
USUK 1.29 (1.09)*     1.87 1.18 (0.96) 1.23 
SP500 -5.26(2.61)**  -2.17 -3.15(2.51) -1.25 
   
Table 5: Comparison of effects on financial variables from unconventional monetary policies over two 
different periods: 2009-11 in column 1 and 2012-15 in column 2.  
Note: This table shows the estimates, standard errors (in brackets) and t-statistics, for the impact of a 100 basis point 
shift in the 10-year US Treasury yield (DGS10). One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. All variables, with the exception of the last four, represent variations in 
yields. The latter (three exchange rates and a stock index) are measured in percentage points, that is 100 times log 
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prices changes. Whenever possible regressions are estimated using an IV (highlighted in italics), meaning that besides 
being statistically significant, they meet the endogeneity, orthogonality, and weak instruments tests; otherwise they 
are estimated by LS. All regressions are estimated without an intercept. DGS10 GMM regressions use DGS5 and 
DGS2 (2 and 5-year Treasuries) as explanatory variable and IV, respectively.  
 
 2.5 Monetary easing versus monetary tightening 
 Here we attempt to analyze, using the 56 observations, whether there are 
differences in terms of effects of monetary policy news. This possibility has been 
explored in a conventional policy setting leading to inconclusive evidence (Kuttner, 
2001) whether monetary policy easing effects contrast with monetary policy tightening 
in terms not only of sign but also level of impact. Throughout this period, it would 
appear that the Fed took predominantly an accommodative stance. Yet, this may be 
difficult to investigate, as within the framework of unconventional monetary policy 
many of the announcements led to monetary easing, but in other cases the opposite took 
place. See again Figure 1. 
 Nevertheless, in an attempt to separate and measure a possible difference, we 
generated two dummy variables. As a proxy for monetary easing we consider all 
scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield change is negative, ending with 21 events. 
As a proxy for monetary tightening we consider the reverse occurrence, i.e. when the 
change in 10-year Treasury yield is either zero or positive. There are 35 events, under 
this criterion. This may seem surprising, but that is what this data set reveals. Recall that 
many decisions following the FOMC meetings did not reveal surprises and might 
actually have been anticipated. Then we consider the following equation: 
∆ Y(t) = α D1(t) + β D2(t) + u(t)     (14) 
Estimates of these parameters for several financial variables are shown in Table 6. 
 D1 D2 
AAA  -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01) ** 
BBB -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
BUND -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01) 
GILT -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01) ** 
DGS2 -0.04 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)  ** 
DGS5 -0.09 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
DGS10 -0.10 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
DGS20 -0.07 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
DGS30 -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 
DFII10 -0.10 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 
JPUS -0.22 (0.08) ** 0.30 (0.01)*** 
USEU 0.07 (0.12) 0.21 (0.09) ** 
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USUK -0.13 (0.11) 0.27 (0.09)*** 
SP500 0.12 (0.27) 0.52  (0.20)** 
VIX -0.31 (0.48) -0.87 (0.38)** 
Table 6: Monetary easing vs. tightening 
Note: This table shows the estimates and the standard errors (in brackets) obtained by LS regression of a vector of 
financial variables, in differences, on two dummy variables D1 and D2. D1 takes the value of one when the change in 
the 10-year Treasury is negative and zero otherwise; the reverse happens with D2. 
Looking at the investment-grade corporate bonds and government securities, 
with the exceptions of 10-year German bond in regards to D2 are all statistically 
significant and exhibit the expected sign. Furthermore the coefficients in D1 are 
systematically greater in absolute value than the coefficients in D2, whenever the 
regressions are statistically significant. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is 
that impact from monetary easing actions is larger in magnitude than the negative 
impact of monetary tightening announcements, in conformity, we surmise, with the 
stance assumed by the Fed throughout this period. On the other hand, the more volatile 
variables, specifically the exchange rates (the exception being the yen/dollar), the equity 
and the stock-implied volatility indexes exhibit non-significant α estimators, though the 
β coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level. This means that the dollar 
appreciates against the yen, depreciates against the euro and the pound, the stock index 
price falls marginally, while the volatility index change is negative (this behavior does 
not appear to be consistent) on D2 days. The depreciation of the dollar against the yen 
on D1 days is smaller than the appreciation on D2 days. Note that, as the regressors are 
dummy variables, these estimates represent averages. 
The common practice when running a regression on dummy variables is to 
assign the dummy variables in such a way that if a variable has m categories, one 
introduces (m – 1) dummies. In this particular example two different specifications 
could be considered: 
∆ Y (t) = c1 + η D1 (t) + u (t) or ∆ Y (t) = c2 + ρ D2 (t) + u (t)  (15) 
The results obtained are the same as those under equation (14), but under a 
different garb. The advantage of these schemes is that they allow comparisons of results 
in terms of a reference category; however the main objective here is to compare the 
coefficients α and β, which are obtained directly from equation (14). Please note that it 
can be easily shown that: α = c2 = c1 + η and β = c1 = c2 + ρ. For instance, on D1 days 
(monetary easing) the yields on AAA bonds fall on average 6 basis points, whereas on 
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D2 days (monetary tightening) increase on average 3 basis points. Running the 
regressions specified in equation (15) with respect to AAA corporate bonds, the 
following outputs are obtained: 
∆ AAA = 0.03 – 0.09.D1 and ∆ AAA = -0.06 + 0.09.D2 (α = -0.06 = 0.03 – 0.09 
and β = 0.03 = -0.06 + 0.09) 
 
 3 Tentative disentanglement of unconventional monetary policy  
 In the previous section, we analyzed the effects of general unconventional 
monetary policy, without segregating it into its components, namely forward guidance, 
LSAPs, maturity extension programs, direct interventions to prevent particular markets 
from collapsing, namely at the early stages of the financial recession, and so forth. By 
now, it is broadly accepted that interventions in certain markets will translate into 
higher impacts upon the variables pertaining to the specific markets. As examples, 
consider, for instance, the commercial paper and the interbank money markets. In this 
section we will attempt at discriminating the effects of different types of monetary 
policy announcements. We will follow two different methodologies in order to try to 
accomplish decomposition. 
 
3.1 A multivariate analysis approach 
The first methodology that we rely upon in order to disentangle the effects of 
unconventional monetary policy is multivariate analysis. The main focus is to study the 
pass-through effects of monetary policy, assuming as an identifying strategy that the 
monetary policy is not observable, or at least, not quantifiable. Use was made of the 10-
year Treasury yield changes and of 2 and /or 5-year Treasury yield changes to arrive at 
the results displayed on Table 2. As alternative IVs we have also used 20 and/or 30-year 
Treasury yield changes and the results obtained are generally consistent with those in 
Table 2 (results not shown). These results seem to indicate that these set of variables 
may assume a relevant role in the attempt to account for the impacts of an unobservable 
monetary policy variable on other variables, including themselves. 
 Indeed, these variables are co-integrated and display significant correlations, as 
shown in table 7.  
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 DGS30  DGS20 DGS10 DGS5 DGS2 
DGS30 1.00     
DGS20 0.97 1.00    
DGS10 0.87 0.95 1.00   
DGS5 0.73 0.83 0.95 1.00  
DGS2 0.58 0.67 0.80 0.89 1.00 
Table 7: Correlation matrix among US Treasuries yield changes 
As an the identifying strategy, we propose now, based on the correlation matrix, 
the smallest number of unobservable common factors (i.e., the most parsimonious factor 
model) that best explain or account for the correlations or for that matter, covariations 
among the indicators. This is factor analysis, which yielded two latent factors, latent 
factor 1 and latent factor 2, accounting, respectively, for 78% and 22% of the total 
variance. One may find detailed explanations in reference manuals, such as Sharma 
(1996). According to Luciani (2009), factor models are a common tool for many 
sciences but did not achieve success in economics until more recently. Authors using 
this technique or derivations thereof include names such as Forni et al (2000) and 
Bernanke et al (2005). The factor loadings obtained show, as displayed in Table 8, that 
longer-term Treasury yield changes load mostly on the first latent factor, whereas 
shorter-term Treasury yield changes load relatively more on the second latent factor. 
Our interpretation is that the first latent factor represents LSAP, while the second latent 
factor represents other measures, which includes FG. This hypothesis rests upon the 
observation that LSAP focus on the purchase of longer-term securities, whereas other 
measures, such as FG, emphasize that shorter-term interest rates are expected to remain 
low, thus likely affecting mostly the near-side of the yield curve. 
 Latent Factor 1 Latent Factor 2 
DGS30 0.98 -0.03 
DGS20 0,99 0.11 
DGS10 0.91 0.39 
DGS5 0.76 0.65 
DGS2 0.60 0.66 
Table 8: Treasuries yield changes unrotated loadings 
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In order to highlight this interpretation and obtain a better visualization an 
oblique ax rotation is shown in the Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Factor Scores 
 
For comparative purposes a factor analysis is performed over the same variables, 
but in levels and spanning daily observations over the period 2007 through 2015. Figure 
4 suggests, notwithstanding, weaker test statistics, that a similar interpretation is 
applicable. A similar exercise covering data preceding the ZLB period was also 
performed by Swanson (2016) as a starting pad for the ensuing period where short-term 
interest rates hovered near zero. 
 
Figure 4: Factor scores on Treasuries daily data in levels 
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 Having identified two factors that are responsible for the correlation among the 
US Treasury yield changes, we then proceed with the application of another 
multivariate technique that should uphold the interpretation suggested. Following 
Gurkaynak et al (2005) and Swanson (2016) we apply a principal component analysis (a 
different dimension-reduction process) to this data set consisting of Treasuries in order 
to detect those principal components. The orthonormal loadings are shown in Table 9.  
 
 PC1 PC2 
DGS30 0.43 -0.56 
DGS20 0.46 -0.37 
DGS10 0.48 -0.02 
DGS5 0.46 0.34 
DGS2 0.41 0.66 
Table 9: Principal components scores 
 Similarly to factor analysis the eigenvectors loading into the first principal 
component (PC1) have roughly the same magnitude and may be viewed as an index, 
however the loadings in the second principal component (PC2) display a negative sign 
with respect to longer-term Treasuries yield changes and a positive sign for the shorter-
term Treasuries yield changes. Note that these two principal components account for 
respectively some 86 and 11 percent of the total variance in the data set, which for 
practical purposes is more than adequate. Figure 4 is fairly elucidative. 
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Figure 5: Principal Components’ loadings biplot 
Drawing from factor analysis, the interpretation is that PC1 characterizes LSAP 
measures, whereas PC2 represents other measures. The intuition behind this 
interpretation is actually quite simple. Surprise LSAP announcements, focusing on the 
purchase of longer-term securities, are anticipated to impact mostly on the far side of 
the yield curve, while it is unlikely that other measures, comprising FG news, are 
capable of affecting this segment of the yield curve. 
Other authors, for other reasons, such as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) used the 
first principal component of surprises in short-term interest rates to assess the impact on 
some financial variables in the conventional monetary policy era. In the ZLB period 
Wright (2012) uses the first principal component of 2, 5, 10 and 30-year bond futures. 
One must remember that principal components, by linking the information in a variety 
of interest rate measures, lower the influence of possible measurement errors. 
Additionally, in the presence of multicollinearity in the data, it leads to the formation of 
“new” variables, which are linear combinations of the original variables, such that the 
new variables are uncorrelated among themselves, thus permitting the development of a 
regression model. We consider the following specification: 
∆Y (t) = α PC1 (t) + β PC2 (t) + u (t)     (16) 
where ∆Y (t) is the vector of yield changes and returns of the financial variables. The 
results are reported in Table 10. 
  
-10.0
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
-10.0 -7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
DGS30_DVALUE
DGS20_DVALUE
DGS10_DVALUE
DGS5_DVALUE
DGS2_DVALUE
2009M01
2009M03
2010M11
2011M09
2014M03
LSAP (86.1%)
F
G
 (
1
1
.2
%
)
Orthonormal Loadings Biplot
61 
 
 PC1 PC2 Single PC 
AAA 0.35 (0.01)*** 0.26 (0.04)***  
BBB 0.34 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.04)***  
BUND 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.25 (0.13) **  
GILT 0.37 (0.05)*** 0.23 (0.15) 0.27(0.05)***(PC1) 
DGS2 0.27 (0.01)*** 0.50 (0.03)***  
DGS5 0.57 (0.01)*** 0.53 (0.04)***  
DGS10 0.55 (0.01)*** -0.08(0.03)***  
DGS20 0.42 (0.01)*** -0.42(0.01)***  
DGS30 0.36 (0.01)*** -0.62(0.02)***  
DFII10 0.53 (0.03)*** 0.34 (0.08)***  
JPUS 1.05 (0.35)  ** -2.00(1.10)  *  
USEU -0.58(0.32)  * -1.70(1.01)   *  
USUK 0.77 (0.43)  * -3.40(1.37) **  
SP500 -1.18(0.89) -11.01(2.83)*** -9.96(2.52)***(PC2) 
VIX 1.60 (1.71) 15.22(5.41)*** 14.13(3.10)***(PC2) 
Table 10: Impacts of the first and second principal components on financial variables 
Note: This table shows the estimated parameters estimated by robust least squares, in equation 16. The last column 
displays regressions onto only one the principal components, whenever one of the estimates was not statistically 
significant. 56 announcement days are considered. The two principal components account for 97% of the total 
variance. 
 The first principal component positive surprise (herein signed with a negative 
value) lowers all rates, in particular at maturities over two years, which appears to be 
consistent with LSAP easing measures. The second principal component positive 
surprise rotates the yield curve, pushing generally short rates down and long rates up, 
which can be construed as other measures. Looking at the exchange rates a positive PC1 
leads to a depreciation of the dollar against the yen and the euro, and an appreciation 
versus the pound. A positive PC2 on the other hand depreciates the dollar against the 
euro and the pound, appreciates the dollar versus the yen, while leading to a statistically 
significant increase in the stock index return. A particular item draws the attention, 
which is the association between PC2 and the equity-related volatility index. An 
expansionary PC2 shock leads to a substantial reduction in the VIX index. This suggests 
that this type of policy (recall that PC2 includes FG and its main constituent is the 2-
year Treasury yield changes) may reveal dynamics conducive to a reduction in 
uncertainty and an increase in the stock index return. Indeed, a close relation can also be 
found between the 2-year Treasury yield changes and the stock/volatility indexes.  
There is a good deal of overlap in terminology and goals between principal 
components analysis and factor analysis. Much of the literature on the two methods 
does not distinguish between them, and some algorithms for fitting the factor analysis 
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model involve principal component analysis. In this regard, see, for instance, Sharma 
(1996). Both are dimension-reducing techniques, in the sense that they can be used to 
replace a larger set of observable variables with a smaller set of new variables. They 
also often give similar results. However, the two methods are different in their goals and 
in their underlying models. Roughly speaking, principal components analysis is 
appropriate to summarize or approximate data using fewer dimensions (to visualize it, 
for example), while factor analysis is suited to obtain an explanatory model for the 
correlations among a given data set. There appears to be some caveats to factor analysis, 
in this particular case. One has to do with the factor rotation indeterminacy, as described 
by Sharma (1996). Another stems from the fact that it is sensitive to the ordering of the 
variables. These two limitations led us not to present the results of the regressions of the 
various variables on the two latent factors. While several regressions revealed to be 
significant, the estimators differed substantially from those using principal components. 
 
3.2 An attempt to classify monetary policy news 
 In this subsection we attempt to classify monetary policy announcements into 
two baskets. One contains news characterized by the prevalence of LSAP measures, 
while the second represents a mixture of policy actions; for lack of a better expression it 
is dubbed as non-LSAP or simply “others”, which includes FG measures, as well as 
other relevant unconventional policy. From reading the transcripts of the FOMC 
meetings, it becomes apparent that many of the announcements contain a mixture of 
policies, which may blur the classification proposed. Nevertheless, bearing in mind this 
caveat, Table 11 reports this separation of policy measures, which is similar to that of 
Gilchrist et al (2015). Additionally, a few more observations are considered, to be 
specific, eight more observations, one preceding the ZLB, other associated with some 
speeches by Ben Bernanke which triggered market turbulence. This option is twofold. 
Firstly, it increases the database in order to be able to arrive at more robust results; 
secondly, it adds volatility to the data, which is what one wants for identification 
purposes. The final outcome leads to 19 observations classified, mainly, as LSAP and 
45 observations treated as non-LSAP measures. The intuition behind this segregation is 
actually quite simple and was presented in the subsection above. 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
LSAP 11/25 
12/01 
12/16 
1/28 
3/18 
8/27 
9/21 
10/15 
8/26 6/20 
9/13 
5/22 
6/19 
7/31 
9/18 
10/30 
12/18 
6/18 
7/30 
 
Other  4/29 
6/24 
8/12 
9/23 
11/4 
12/16 
1/27 
3/16 
4/28 
6/23 
8/10 
11/3 
12/14 
1/26 
3/15 
4/27 
6/22 
8/9 
9/21 
11/02 
12/13 
1/25 
3/13 
4/25 
8/01 
8/31 
10/24 
12/12 
1/30 
3/20 
5/1 
1/29 
3/19 
4/30 
9/17 
10/29 
12/17 
1/28 
3/18 
4/29 
6/17 
7/29 
9/17 
10/28 
12/16 
Table 11: Dates of US monetary policy announcements. 
Note: Non-FOMC announcements, consisting of Ben Bernanke’s speeches and a FOMC meeting, are signaled in 
italics. 
 
Then we estimate separately Equation (3) using LS and IVs regressions.  The 
results are shown in Table 12. 
 LSAP IV (1) LSAP LS (2) OTHER IV (3) OTHER LS (4) 
AAA 0.80 (0.06)*** 0.75 (0.04)*** 0.62 (0.06)*** 0.57 (0.05)*** 
BBB 0.67 (0.01)*** 0.67 (0.03)*** 0.51 (0.06)*** 0.59 (0.03)*** 
BUND 0.43 (0.06)*** 0.39 (0.06)*** 0.44 (0.13)*** 0.44 (0.11)*** 
GILT 0.39 (0.15) ** 0.42 (0.11)*** 0.68 (0.14)*** 0.61 (0.12)*** 
DGS2 0.44 (0.12)*** 0.43 (0.04)*** 0.60 (0.12)*** 0.36 (0.07)*** 
DGS5 0.91 (0.03)*** 0.90 (0.04)*** 1.31 (0.11)*** 0.89 (0.07)*** 
DGS10 1.10 (0.03)*** 1.07 (0.05)*** 0.77 (0.06)*** 0.89 (0.07)*** 
DGS20 0.72 (0.04)*** 0.71 (0.03)*** 0.66 (0.05)*** 0.83 (0.04)*** 
DGS30 0.64 (0.08)*** 0.61 (0.05)*** 0.53 (0.09)*** 0.76 (0.06)*** 
DFII10 1.18 (0.03)*** 1.20 (0.06)*** 0.74 (0.15)*** 0.77 (0.07)*** 
JPUS 2.94 (1.16) ** 2.96 (0.85)*** 1.78 (0.80) ** 2.38 (0.89)*** 
USEU -1.39(0.70)  * -0.93(0.69)N/S -1.44(0.78)  * -0.34(0.87) 
USUK -0.76(1.36) -0.42(0.83)N/S -0.14(1.28) 2.57 (1.29) ** 
SP500 -6.88(2.58) ** -4.38(2.21) ** -2.97(4.86) 5.56 (1.99) ** 
VIX 7.86 (3.07) ** 4.12 (3.57) 10.07(11.39) -6.19(2.96) ** 
Table 12: Impacts on financial variables from disentangled unconventional monetary policy 
news 
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Note: This table shows the estimates (standard errors in brackets) for the impact of a 100 basis point shift in the 10-
year US Treasury yield (DGS10). One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. All variables, with the exception of the exchange rates and the equity index, 
represent variations in yields or differences. The latter (three exchange rates and a stock index) are measured in 
percentage points, that is 100 times log price changes. Some IV estimators are highlighted in italic, meaning that 
besides being statistically significant, they meet the endogeneity, orthogonality, overidentifying restrictions where 
applicable and weak instruments tests. These statistics and p- values are not shown. All regressions are estimated 
without an intercept. DGS10 GMM regression uses DGS5 as explanatory variable and DGS2 as IV. Parameters in LS 
are estimated by robust regression. The first two columns display estimators for the LSAP sample (19 observations), 
while the last two columns apply to the sample under “other” (45 observations). 
 The results reveal that LSAP easing impacts mostly (in terms of higher 
coefficients) upon the high-end of the US Treasury yield curve, at the investment-grade 
corporate bonds and the stock index, whereas other measures, which include FG, affect 
mostly the lower end of the Treasury yield curve and British gilts. The exchange rates, 
the exception being the US/UK, exhibit similar values with the expected sign. A 
surprise takes place with respect to the stock and volatility indexes under other 
measures; they reveal unexpected signs.  
Some considerations should be made regarding the data. Firstly, we are using 
daily data; therefore highly volatile variables such as VIX and SP500L, as well as 
exchange rates may be tainted with other factors. Secondly the data set is different and 
its classification is based on judgement. Thirdly, there is the data size issue (19 
observations classified as LSAP). This may raise robustness concerns, in particular 
when relying on IVs as the estimators are asymptotically valid. In this regard 
bootstrapping was applied to all the regressions in Table 12. The output (omitted) 
reveals that generally the resampled standard errors and associated t- statistics indicate 
that the relationships between the variables appear to be not accidental, whenever the 
original regressions were statistically significant. 
More importantly though, considering the various exercises performed thus far, 
is that the type of data used appears to be determinant whether one should use intraday 
or daily observations. Variables such as foreign exchange rates, stock and volatility 
indexes are subject to very active trade on exchanges; thus the intraday option, which 
was not available, may likely be the appropriate choice. The tally of this limitation 
appears to be that generally one could not obtain “adequate” estimators. On the other 
hand, bonds and Treasuries, though liquid, trade on over the counter markets and are not 
subject to high volatilities. This may explain why more “adequate” estimators were 
derived for these instruments. 
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4 Monetary policy persistency  
 The methods employed in the preceding two sections aim at measuring the 
immediate effects of monetary policy news on a set of financial variables. This begs the 
question of assessing how persistent these impacts are. A common conjecture in the 
event study literature is that effects are long-lasting. However some authors argue (e.g., 
the IMF Staff Report, 2013) that the evidence suggests that bond purchases were 
particularly effective in the US in reducing yields in the early LSAP stages. In fact, 
many of the important monetary policy shocks occurred at a time when markets were 
weakened, and subsequently effects of asset purchases may have been particularly 
expressive. Furthermore, LSAP and maturity extension measures might have induced 
additional issuance of long-term securities (Stein, 2012), which would tend to push up 
long-term rates, thus reducing the stimulus effect.  
 In order to try to answer empirically how persistent are the monetary policy 
effects, we draw upon a dataset consisting of daily observations of “well behaved” 
instruments negotiated over the counter, particularly, US investment-grade corporate 
bonds and constant maturity Treasuries (2, 5, 10, 10 inflation indexed, 20, and 30-year), 
straddling the  period 2008 through 2015. A pictorial view of this data in levels is 
elucidative (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Interest rates of some US securities (the suffix I indicates variable in levels)  
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Figure 6 suggests that these variables move in similar wavelengths, with the 
exception of 2008-09, where there is a run for safer assets and corporate bonds yields 
spike up. However, throughout the period under analysis they are cointegrated. Hence, 
relations can be calculated between these variables in levels and the 10-year Treasury as 
shown in the Table 13. 
 
 IV LS 
AAA 0.75 (0.04)*** 0.76 (0.02)*** 
BBB 0.73 (0.03)*** 0.70 (0.01)*** 
DGS2 0.65 (0.05)*** 0.50 (0.01)*** 
DGS5 1.16 (0.07)*** 0.92 (0.01)*** 
DGS10 0.84 (0.05)*** 0.93 (0.01)*** 
DFII10 0.81 (0.04)*** 0.73 (0.01)*** 
DGS20 0.86 (0.02)*** 0.93 (0.01)*** 
DGS30 0.79 (0.03)*** 0.89 (0.01)*** 
Table 13: Impacts on financial variables in levels using IV and LS regressions 
Note: The table shows the estimates (and standard errors in brackets) from the impact of a 100 basis point shift in the 
10-year US Treasury yield (DGS10). One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. These regressions follow an ARIMA (1, 0, 1) process, with the exception of DGS20 (1, 0, 0). 2 and/or 
5-year Treasuries are used as IVs. All ARMA processes are stationary. The DGS10 coefficient is estimated using the 
5-year Treasury. 
As one is dealing with time series in levels, serial correlation has to be accounted 
for. It was found that an ARIMA (1, 0, 1) describes the process more adequately, with 
the exception of DGS20 where use was made of an ARIMA (1, 0, 0). Invariably a very 
tight fit was obtained and all the coefficients are statistically significant. The estimators 
derived for the autoregressive term are in the vicinity of one, thus suggesting that the 
effects are persistent. A method for evaluating this persistence more properly is to apply 
a VAR with this data set, as applied by e.g. Neelly (2015). A VAR (2), as determined 
by the Schwarz information criterion and satisfying the stability conditions, was fitted to 
this daily data set and the pairwise Granger causality test indicates that the 10-year 
Treasury is a common denominator in Granger causing the other variables, while the 
joint significance of all other endogenous variables in each of the eight equations 
estimated is not rejected by the Wald statistic. 
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With this information on hand, we then estimate the impulse response of a shock 
(a generalized one standard deviation innovation equal to approximately 5 basis points) 
to the 10-year Treasury. This innovation is then transmitted to all the other endogenous 
variables through the dynamic (lag) structure of the VAR. The 10-year Treasury 
variable was signed (DGS10in) so that a positive surprise represents an easing of 
monetary policy – the surprise is the relevant yield change multiplied by minus one. The 
impulse responses obtained are depicted in Figure 7; they should, obviously be 
interpreted with caution due to the limited predictability of asset prices in dynamic 
relations.  
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Figure 7: Impulse responses from investment grade bonds and US Treasuries to one standard deviation 
innovations in the 10-year US Treasury   
Note: These graphs plot the daily responses to an innovation of a monetary policy easing consisting of 5 basis points 
reduction in the 10-year US Treasury. Two standard errors bands about the responses are also shown in dashed lines. 
The yield changes are in basis points. 
 The effects of the monetary policy innovation (one standard deviation 
orthogonal shock) on the securities are noteworthy up to a three-month horizon, in 
particular with respect to the investment-grade corporate bonds. The persistence then 
subsides at a very slow pace.  
 
 5 Some remarks 
 The empirical investigation presented herein suggests that monetary policy news 
during the US ZLB period have significant effects on Treasury yields which, in turn, 
impact upon other asset prices. This may sound unexpected considering the rising 
issuance of US Treasuries, as depicted on Figure 8. Total federal public debt raised by 
some US $10 trillion between 2007 and late 2015, compared to an increase of less, but 
obviously massive, than US $4 trillion in the Fed’s total assets consisting mainly of 
Treasuries. While this may reflect a run for safe-haven assets, the net impact is larger 
than the Fed’s LASPs and has the opposite sign. Therefore, it would appear that LSAPs 
have effects over and above the direct effects of reducing the supply of bonds in the 
market; as mentioned, for instance, in Gertler (2013) and described in Gertler and 
Karadi (2013), LSAPs are regarded as influencing prices (or yields) by reducing the 
supply of securities in the market. Arguably, central bank news about LSAPs signal that 
they will undertake asset purchases and other measures as much as necessary to push 
term premia and risk premia down and to restore financial stability, namely in the early 
stages of unconventional monetary policy. See Figure (5) 
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Figure 8: Evolution of public Federal debt and Fed’ assets (in US $ trillion and $ million). Source: Fred
  
When the Fed, or for that matter, a central bank purchases long-term securities in 
an attempt at enhancing demand, the spill-over effects to other asset prices is crucial to 
the policy achieving  its objectives. Some authors such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgenson (2013) argue that these pass-through effects are small. The evidence 
presented herein suggests otherwise.  
Looking ahead, unconventional monetary policies may continue to be warranted. 
They were discontinued in the US in late 2014, but are still being implemented in the 
Euro area and Japan at the time of writing (late 2017), though overall global economic 
conditions after an extended period appear to loom brighter. Nevertheless, their growing 
scale raises some risks. A key concern is that monetary policy is called upon to do too 
much, and that the breathing space it allows is not used to engage in needed fiscal, 
structural, and financial sector reforms. These reforms are crucial to safeguarding 
macroeconomic stability and entrenching the recovery. Losses to central banks upon 
exiting are likely to stem from a mismatch between assets and liabilities. Hall and Reis 
(2017) argue favorably with respect to the unwinding process, at least in the sense that a 
central bank, in practice, does not go bankrupt. Similarly does Fischer (2015). One can 
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envisage that a monetary policy tightening will have similar effects to the ones 
presented, but with a different sign. The evidence collected with the data in this paper 
points to larger effects from monetary easing than from monetary tightening. A possible 
interpretation is that with regards to monetary policy easing, the central bank will do 
whatever it takes to ensure accommodation, whereas downsizing the balance sheet is 
unlikely to be part of a correspondingly deliberate effort to constrict financial 
conditions. But, this issue remains an open question. Fischer (2015) claims that the Fed 
has the tools necessary to remove monetary policy accommodation at the appropriate 
time and at the appropriate pace. The fact, however, is that while the ZLB was breached 
in December 2015, the Federal Reserve total assets remain approximately at the same 
level (some US $4.5 trillion). 
 
6 In conclusion  
The events triggered by the 2007-9 crisis have proved to be some of the most 
significant economic phenomena observed in high-income economies since, at least, 
World War II. The main central banks were forced to bring down short-term rates to the 
zero lower bound, eventually even marginally below. They faced a deflationary vicious 
vortex as described by several authors, such as Shiller (2013). Furthermore, political 
and debt restraints substantially reduced the possibility of relying upon fiscal stimulus, 
thus limiting the options available to monetary and macro prudential policies. 
Fortunately, as many authors argue (Bernanke, 2014, Fischer, 2015), monetary 
policy proved not to be powerless in the face of the zero lower bound. In this paper we 
study the effects of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies on several financial 
variables, ranging from government bonds, corporate bonds, and exchange rates to 
stock returns. An unobservable variable approach, whenever possible, was used and the 
evidence obtained suggests that these policies were generally effective in bringing down 
the associated yields. A different methodology grounded on a heteroskedasticity-based 
approach was also implemented, seemingly upholding these conclusions. An exercise 
based on a simple dichotomy between easing and tightening monetary policy news is 
performed; it suggests that monetary easing has higher pass-through effects than 
monetary tightening, which, as expected, exhibits the opposite sign.  
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A foray is attempted at trying to disentangle the effects of different types of 
unconventional policies. Use is made of two multivariate analysis technics. 
Additionally, we tried to classify the monetary policy events into two separate baskets. 
Results suggest that LSAP measures are more effective at lowering yields, particularly 
at longer maturities, while non-LSAP measures, which incorporate FG, lower both 
Bunds and Gilts yields, and rotate the US yield curve pushing generally short-rates 
down and long-rates up.  
A VAR was fitted to data encompassing several variables in levels (daily 
observations) and stretching the period 2008-15. Innovations on the 10-year US 
Treasuries were found to have persistent effects on the other variables that tapered off 
very slowly, thus suggesting that the flow of monetary policy measures matter 
At the time of writing (winter, 2017), the US has ended its unconventional 
monetary policy programs, but other major high-income countries, particularly in the 
Euro Area and Japan are still implementing it. This begs the question: What to do if an 
economic recession hits again, when policymakers have no fiscal maneuver and interest 
rates remain low or even continue at or slightly below the zero lower bound?  
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Walking on ice: Monetary policy before and after 2007 
 
 The Cases for Money Financed Stimuli and Negative Nominal Interest Rates 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of fiscal stimuli financed through seignorage, particularly an increase in 
government spending, a tax rebate, and the issuance of “bonus checks”. A comparison is made with 
conventional debt-financed stimuli. The results, under appropriate calibration of nominal rigidities and as 
long as the shocks are not anticipated, suggest that under the former policies, particularly with “bonus 
checks”, there are strong effects on real economic variables and on welfare, with relatively mild 
consequences on inflation and also leading to a reduction of the government net debt to output ratio. An 
experiment to capture a zero lower bound constraint, through an exogenous negative shock to the 
economy, is performed and the results suggest that an accommodative monetary policy rule under 
commitment may provide a possible adequate answer, without relying upon fiscal stimuli. Alternatively, 
money-financed stimuli associated with a policy that brings down nominal short-term interest rates to 
negative terrain, namely if accompanied with the issuance of “bonus checks”, may lead to positive 
outcomes, provided that nominal rigidities exhibit high values, as should be expected under extreme 
conditions of economic duress. 
  
 Keywords: fiscal and monetary policy, multiplier effects, seignorage, New Keynesian and Classical 
models, nominal rigidities, zero lower bound, deterministic and stochastic shocks 
 
JEL codes: E32, E52, E62 
 
1 Introduction 
“Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and drops an 
additional $1,000 in bills from the sky, which is, of course, hastily collected by members of 
the community. Let us suppose further that everyone is convinced that this unique event 
which will never be repeated.” (Milton Friedman, 1969) 
  Janet Yellen (2016) said in her concluding remarks of a speech delivered in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that monetary policy will continue to be determinant in 
supporting a steady and healthy economy. Furthermore, she expects that the new 
unconventional monetary policy tools, which were introduced to cope with the Great 
Recession, are probably to remain useful in future, economic slumps; however, she does 
not discard the use of additional tools and the cooperation with fiscal policy makers. 
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Indeed, she acknowledges that according to the FOMC projections for the federal funds 
rate settling at about 3 percent in the longer run, may lead to a lack of maneuverability 
by the Fed, as on average the fed funds rate dropped by some 5 percent in previous 
recessions. In this respect, Sims (2016) argues that several recent monetary policy 
issues can be understood more clearly if the traditional inclusion of the government 
budget constraint from economic models is relaxed, and calls upon the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy. Moreover, Summers (2016) advances that the 
prevailing low interest rates in most of the developed economies may be attributed to 
what he dubs the “secular stagnation”. 
  Against this background, one may discuss the toolkits that the Fed might use to 
counter a future slowdown in the US economy. We mention specifically the US, as 
among the major developed economies is the one that has overcome, thus far, the 
interest rate lower zero-bound on December 2015; (another exception is the UK that 
maintains an interest rate in the vicinity of 25 basis points- a reduction from 50 basis 
points following the Brexit referendum- since August 2016). The ECB, in spite of 
positive news in terms of a still stuttering economic growth in the EU, maintains at the 
time of writing (December 2017), a quantitative easing program and the reference 
deposit facility interest rate remains at -.40 percent. Bernanke (2016) argues that as long 
as people have the option of holding currency, there are limits to how far the Fed, or for 
that matter, any major central bank can lower interest rates. Furthermore, this author 
also suggests that the advantages of low rates may erode over time, while the costs are 
likely to increase. Consequently, he says, at some point in time, monetary policy may 
face weakening returns. The scenario of entering into negative interest rates, a reality in 
some European countries [Rogoff (2014) presents the pros and cons of phasing out 
paper currency], is an option worth considering and exploring. One can also think of 
long-term interest rates capping, a practice followed after the World War II by the Fed 
and studied by Eichengreen and Garber (1991). This last hypothesis is outside this 
paper’s scope. 
When monetary policy alone is insufficient to promote economic recovery or to 
prevent deflation or too-low inflation, fiscal policy may reveal to be a potentially potent 
alternative, at least, for possible reoccurrences of the recent crisis. The purpose of this 
paper is to analyze the effectiveness of an alternate policy, specifically, a fiscal stimulus 
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financed through money creation without resorting to higher taxes or an increase in 
government debt, neither in the present nor in the future. We consider four types of 
money financed stimuli: a tax rebate, an increase in government spending, and the 
issuance of two types of “bonus checks” impacting differently upon the Euler equation 
for consumption. We study their effects on several variables, and compare them to the 
corresponding effects from a conventional debt or tax financed stimulus, with monetary 
policy decision makers pursuing independently a price-output stability mandate, either 
through a Taylor rule regime or an inflation targeting process. 
  The objective of this paper is not to provide an accurate account on the impacts 
of a money-financed stimulus, but rather to offer a qualitative analysis on the dynamics 
of such a process, as well as, to arrive at a better understanding of its repercussions, 
namely when comparing with more orthodox, debt financed methods. Bearing this in 
mind, we perform the analysis below using very simple frameworks encompassing both 
a New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets and 
staggered prices and wages, and a frictionless Classical model, characterized by perfect 
competition and fully flexible prices and wages. Moreover, for simplicity purposes, it is 
assumed a closed economy with no capital accumulation. 
   In terms of literature dealing with this topic, the book by the Nobel laureate 
Friedman (1969), cited above, does not necessarily support the implementation of such 
measures (but raises the issue); moreover the contexts in the 50s throughout the 90s 
differed considerably from the present one. More recently, Bernanke (2003) delivered a 
speech at the Japan Society of Monetary Economics, where he advocated the 
implementation in Japan, of money-financed fiscal stimulus. Lord Turner (2015 and 
2016/7) shares the idea of the potential benefits of monetary financing of fiscal deficits 
and states that its implementation is essentially a political issue. These authors, 
however, do not use formal models. Other authors, such as, Reichlin et al (2013) also 
broach qualitatively this subject. Buiter (2014) develops a mathematical formulation 
and emphasizes the importance of irredeemably of fiat currency; that is, fiat money is an 
asset for the holder and not a liability for the issuer. He argues that, with money 
financed boost available, deflation, too-low inflation and secular stagnation, are in 
practice, policy choices. Galí (2014) develops a DSGE model to study the effects of an 
increase in government purchases entirely financed through seignorage and concludes 
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that under certain conditions and adequate calibration, a money financed increase in 
government spending has very strong effects on economic activity. Tsuruga and Wake 
(2016) draw significantly on Galí´s paper (2014) and show that the success of these 
policies are dependent upon not being anticipated,  otherwise, at the end, the result may 
be a recession rather than a boom. More recently Galí (2017) reviews his previous 2014 
paper to incorporate tax cuts, as well as a ZLB scenario where nominal interest rates are 
brought down to zero (they cannot fall below this constraint, so he assumes) while real 
variables fall abruptly due to a large exogenous negative shock to the economy. English 
et al (2017) comment on the possible shortcomings of money financed fiscal programs. 
This topic on seignorage financed government purchases boost has been referred several 
times by the press over the last couple of years, such as, The Economist, The New York 
Times, and Expresso. 
  One of the main contribution of this study is to complement Buiter (2014) and 
Galí’s studies (2014 and 2017), by extending their analyses to include the issuance of 
two types of “bonus checks”. Moreover, we compare the effects of each of the stimulus 
under money-financing and debt-financing considering both a Taylor rule regime and 
inflation targeting regime. Additionally, we extend Galí’s (2017) liquidity trap and ZLB 
constraint analysis by considering as well a monetary policy rule under commitment, 
following closely Jung et al (2005). An experiment is also performed, which combines 
simultaneously a money financing process with inflation control, or simply considering 
high levels of frictions that may be attributed to a severe aggregate demand downfall 
ensued by spiking unemployment; this procedure may be viable under very specific 
conditions and may (or not) possibly lead to negative nominal interest rates expressed as 
a deviation from steady state. This may lead to the case for relying upon a less intrusive, 
when compared with unconventional policies, orthodox policy rule, an hypothesis 
advanced by Goodfriend (2000, 2016) as delivering the first best measure when dealing 
with a liquidity trap. Moreover, extending these studies, it is argued that the 
combination of negative nominal interest rates coupled with fiscal stimuli, in particular 
in the form of “bonus checks”, may prove to be effective in overcoming the zero lower 
bound constraint, provided that the use of paper money is discontinued. This subject, as 
far as I know, has not been previously proposed.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the fiscal 
and monetary framework to be used in the subsequent analysis, and broaches some 
analytics on money financed stimuli. Section 3 presents the specifications of a standard 
key horse New Keynesian Model with price and wage nominal rigidities, as well as, a 
summary of the main equations entering a frictionless classical model. Section 4 briefly 
analyzes the effects of money financed stimuli under a frictionless set up. Section 5 
extends the previous analysis under a New Keynesian framework and compares them 
with the results under debt-financing. Section 6 presents a scenario of a liquidity trap 
under a ZLB constraint. Section 7 considers alternatives available under such a setup 
including money-financed stimuli and the possibility of implementing negative nominal 
interest rates associated (or not) with fiscal boosts; moreover it is presented the case for 
precautionary measures. Section 8 advances some final remarks, summarizes the main 
findings, and concludes. 
 
2 Fiscal and monetary policy framework 
 In this section, we present, following Galí (2014) the fiscal and monetary policy 
context to be included in a simple general model. First, we define the fiscal and 
monetary decision makers’ budget constraints. Then we describe four types of fiscal 
stimuli under alternative types of financing. 
 
 
  2.1 Budget constraints for policy authorities 
     The fiscal authority’s budget constraint, in real terms is defined by 
𝐺𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡−1𝑅𝑡−1 =  𝑇𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡
𝑔
 + 𝐵𝑡   (1) 
where 𝐺𝑡 and 𝑇𝑡 stand for government expenditures and lump-sum taxes, in real terms,  
𝐵𝑡 represents the stock in real terms of one period  nominally riskless government debt 
issued in period t and yielding a return 𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝑡
𝑔
 is the real transfer  from the central bank 
to the government, and 𝑅𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑡)(
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
), where 𝑃𝑡 denotes price. The central bank‘s 
budget constraint, where 𝐵𝑡
𝑚 stands for government debt held by the central bank, is 
𝐵𝑡
𝑚  +  𝑆𝑡
𝑔
 =  𝐵𝑡−1
𝑚 𝑅𝑡−1 + 
Δ𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
   (2) 
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where  
Δ𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 is the seignorage obtained in period t. In turn, the amount of debt held by 
households is  
𝐵𝑡
𝐻 =  𝐵𝑡 - 𝐵𝑡
𝑚, expressed in real terms   (3) 
  The net government debt, by combining the tree previous equations, is given by 
𝐺𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡−1
𝐻 𝑅𝑡−1 = 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡
𝐻 + 
Δ𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
   (4) 
which may also be seen as an equation in differences describing the path of net 
government debt in real terms. Consider now, equilibria around the steady state with 
zero inflation and money growth, no trend growth, and constant net government debt, 
taxes, and government expenditures. This leads, based on equations (4) and (2), 
respectively to 
T = G + ρ𝐵𝐻   and  𝑆𝑔 = ρ𝐵𝑚   (5) 
where ρ stands for the families’ psychological  time discount rate, or neutral rate, which 
in the zero inflation steady state equals the interest rate i  = R – 1. Thus, in steady state, 
taxes equal government expenditure plus the cost of servicing the debt, while the central 
bank revenue from holding debt is transferred to the government. 
  A key element is to specify the level of seignorage as an expression of steady 
state output, around zero inflation steady state. In continuous time it can be expressed as 
S/Y = (?̇?/M) (1/V)   (6) 
where S is seignorage, Y is steady state output, and V = PY/M is the steady state 
income velocity of money. Thus seignorage is a proportion of money growth.  In 
discrete time, it can be approximated by 
(
Δ𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)(1/Y) ≃ (1/V) Δm𝑡   (7), where 𝑚𝑡 = log𝑀𝑡 
  Define 𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (𝐵𝑡
𝐻 - 𝐵𝐻)/Y, 𝑔?̂? = (𝐺𝑡 – G)/Y, and 𝑡?̂? = (𝑇𝑡 – T)/Y as, respectively, 
deviations of net government debt, government purchases and taxes from their steady 
state values, specified as a fraction of steady state output. A first order approximation of 
the consolidated budget constraint (4) around the zero inflation steady state produces a 
discrete dynamic equation defining the path of net government debt in real terms, 
articulated as a percentage of steady state output, 
𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖̂𝑡−1 - 𝜋𝑡) + 𝑔?̂? - 𝑡?̂? – (1/V) Δm𝑡   (8) 
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where 𝑖̂𝑡−𝑖  = log((1 + 𝑖𝑡−1)/(1 + ρ)), 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡−1, and 𝑏
ℎ  = 𝐵𝐻/Y is the steady state 
ratio of net government debt to output. 
  The specification (8) is bound to lead to indeterminacy, as the coefficient on 
lagged debt is greater than unity, unless, the discount factor (β) equals one. Note that ρ 
= (1 – β)/β. Thus, as advanced by Galí (2017), consider defining a tax path for 𝑡?̂?, with 
an endogenous component pertaining to deviations of the steady state of the ratio of 
government debt to output from its targeted state, and an exogenous independent 
component capturing external shocks, such as, an unanticipated tax rebate also 
expressed as a net deviation identified as a fraction of steady state output. Specifically, 
consider the following equation 
𝑡?̂?  = 𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑡 ∗?̂?   (9)   
Combining the last two equations one obtains 
𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡) + 𝑔?̂? - 𝑡 ∗?̂? – (1/V) Δm𝑡   (10) 
  As long as, 𝜌𝑏>ρ, this equation satisfies the Blanchard and Khan’s conditions 
and is convergent, as we will see, based on these assumptions, in all the specifications 
presented below 
 
 2.2 Money-financed and debt-financed fiscal stimuli  
  As in, e.g., on Galí (2014), we assume that a government spending stimulus, 
denoted as 𝑔?̂?, expressed as a percentage of steady state output, takes the form of an 
exogenous process, as specified below 
𝑔?̂? = 𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑡−1̂ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑔
   (11) 
where 𝜌𝑔, the persistence coefficient, is contained in the  interval [0, 1]. Assuming that 
exogenous lump-sum taxes remained unchanged throughout this period, while there is a 
money financed boost to government spending, then 
Δm𝑡 = V𝑔?̂?   (12) or equivalently  𝑔?̂? = Δm𝑡/V   (12a) 
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  In other words, the growth of money supply is a multiple of the fiscal stimulus, 
an exogenous component. A common calibration for the parameter V, the velocity of 
money in a quarter, is in the vicinity of four.  Inserting (12a), into (10), and setting 𝑡 ∗?̂? 
= 0, then the net debt ratio evolves as follows 
𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡)   (13) 
  Consider, alternatively, a tax rebate 𝑡 ∗?̂?. Note that taxes enter negatively in the 
government debt ratio, as expected, thus, the exogenous process is defined as a negative 
shock, capturing the equivalence of a reduction in taxes 
𝑡 ∗?̂?   =  𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∗𝑡−1̂ - 𝜀𝑡
𝑡   (14) 
  Assuming that 𝑔?̂? stays at zero, then 
Δm𝑡 = -V𝑡 ∗?̂?   (15) or equivalently  −𝑡 ∗?̂? = Δm𝑡/V   (15a) 
  Note that, from (14) 𝑡 ∗?̂? is < 0, hence −𝑡 ∗?̂? > 0, and the debt ratio equation (13) 
remains unchanged, though, not the tax path (9).  
  Besides a boost in government spending and a tax rebate, we also consider two 
other fiscal stimuli, in the form of an issuance of “bonus checks” which, in practice, are 
treated as money financed unexpected increases in government spending; hence they 
can be treated as specified in equations (11) through (13), switching the term 𝑔?̂?  by 𝑐ℎ?̂? 
where this last expression stands either for 𝑏𝑐𝑠?̂? or 𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂? detailed below in (16a) and 
(16b). The difference lies on the assumption that rather being a drop of e.g., $100 bills, 
the checks are payable to named specific households, or for that matter, individuals. The 
expected increase in aggregate consumption, coupled with sticky prices and wages, will 
then trigger a variety of general equilibrium effects. 
  The first type of “bonus check” that we designate bonus check with a shifter [the 
concept of shifter is described by Galí (2015)], and herein referred as 𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡 [a 
percentage deviation as a fraction of the steady state output and assuming that in steady 
state, BCs = 0, defined in such a way that its logarithm will yield approximately the 
percentage deviation of the bonus check in terms of output; formally one may consider 
𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡 = [(Δ𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡 + Y)/Y] is interpreted as a preference shifter entering multiplicatively 
the households’ utility function, in the form   
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U (𝐶𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡, 
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 )𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡   (16) 
where C, stands for consumption, and N is labor. Further details on this function are 
shown below. It is also considered that 𝑏𝑐𝑠?̂?  follows an AR(1) process, where 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠𝜖 
[0,1]. 
𝑏𝑐𝑠?̂? = log 𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠 𝑏𝑐𝑠𝑡−1̂ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑐𝑠   (16𝑎), 
  The second type of “bonus check”, which we refer as 𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑡  for adjusted bonus 
check (also expressed as a percentage deviation as a fraction of the steady state output 
and as before, BCa = 0 in steady state), is taken as impacting directly and additively 
upon the household’s Euler equation for consumption. The rationale for this proposition 
rests upon the assumptions made on this type of check. It is an unanticipated, non-
transferrable, bonus for the individual, not a liability for the issuer and it contains an 
expiry date. It must be spent in consumption and serves no other purpose. Thus, it is a 
rational decision for the individual to do so and “disregard” the Ricardian equivalence 
constraint embedded in the ensuing DSGE models. Furthermore, computationally, one 
obtains, as expected, a closed and convergent solution. Note that we are considering that 
the log of BCa also follows an AR (1) process as in (16a), specifically 
 
𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂? = log 𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑡 = 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑎 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑡−1̂ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑏𝑐𝑎   (16b), where 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑎𝜖 [0,1], or alternatively define 
it as 𝑔?̂? 
𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂? =  (𝐵𝐶𝐴𝑡 – BCA)/Y = 𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑡 – BCa = ∆ 𝐵𝐶𝑎𝑡   (16c), following an identical AR 
(1) process 
 
  A more prosaic approach, as advanced later, is merely assuming that 𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂? = 𝜌
𝑡, 
where ρ ϵ (0,  1) is the persistence factor (t = 0, 1, 2…) and the path of the variable, 
herein interpreted as an unanticipated shock to the economy by private economic 
agents, is deemed, once it occurs, to be deterministic. 
  Let us now consider a more conventional scenario, whereby the fiscal stimuli are 
carried out through the issuance of debt without raising taxes, while an independent 
central bank executes its mandate to stabilize inflation and output. Assume that the 
central bank follows a Taylor-type rule 
 
𝑖?̂? = 𝜙𝜋 𝜋𝑡   (17) 
85 
 
where the coefficient 𝜙𝜋 > 1, sets the central bank stance with respect to deviations of 
inflation from its target level. Alternatively, consider an inflation targeting rule (IT); say 
𝜋𝑡 = 0 (17a), which is equivalent to the interest rate Taylor rule, with a very  high 
dislike for inflation or in other words setting the policy coefficient   𝜙𝜋 particularly high 
(in the limit ∞). Note that under either debt-finance regime, money growth is no longer 
set by the stimuli but, instead by the rule chosen, however, indirectly. Under this 
background, the net debt ratio evolves according to 
 
𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡) + 𝑔?̂? - (1/V) Δm𝑡   (18) 
 
where, this equation can be adjusted according to the stimulus decided, assumed not to 
overlap, specifically 𝑔?̂?, 𝑏𝑐𝑠?̂? or 𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂? . For ease of reference, in the case of a tax rebate 
(18) takes the form 
 
𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡) - 𝑡 ∗?̂? - (1/V) Δm𝑡   (19) 
 
3 A New Keynesian and Classical models 
3.1 The New Keynesian model 
We will now consider, borrowing from Woodford (2003), Galí (2008, 2015), 
and Walsh (2010) a standard key horse New Keynesian model with price and wage 
rigidities. 
 Assume a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms indexed by i 𝜖 [0, 1]. 
Each firm produces a differentiated good, but they all use the same technology. 
Likewise, the economy is populated by a large number of identical households. Each 
household is made up of a continuum of members, each specialized in specific types of 
labor is indexed by j  𝜖 [0, 1]. Each period only the workers specialized in a randomly 
drawn subset of labor services manage to adjust their nominal wage. In a similar 
fashion, only a fraction of firms can adjust their prices independently of when they were 
last reset. As a result, the staggered setting of aggregate nominal wages and prices 
respond sluggishly to shocks leading to distortions. Next, the problems faced by 
households and firms, under this setup are described. 
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3.1.1 Households 
 An infinitely living representative household tries to maximize its objective 
utility function    
E0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡U (𝐶𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡,
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 ) ∞t=0 = E0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡U(log𝐶𝑡  −  ∫
𝑁(𝑗)𝑡
1+𝜑
1+𝜑
1
0
 +  𝜒 log
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 )  ∞𝑡=0    (20) 
where 𝐶𝑡 = (∫ 𝐶(𝑖)𝑡
𝜖𝑝−1
𝜀𝑝 𝑑𝑖)
1
0
𝜀𝑝
𝜀𝑝−1
  stands for aggregate consumption index, 𝑁(𝑗)𝑡 is 
employment (or working hours) of j-type  labor (with 𝑊(𝑗)𝑡 the corresponding wage), 
𝑀𝑡 is money, 𝑃𝑡 =(∫ 𝑃(𝑖)𝑡
1−𝜖𝑝
1 𝑑𝑖)
1
0
1
1−𝜀𝑝
 is the aggregate price level, 𝜑 determines the 
curvature of the disutility of labor, β is the psychological discount factor, 𝜀𝑝  (or 𝜀𝑝)   is 
the elasticity of substitution among different goods, while 𝜒  stands for the weight 
attributed to real money holdings. Households are subject to a sequence of flow budget 
constraints and a non-Ponzi scheme 
∫  𝑃(𝑖)𝑡𝐶(𝑖)𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖  + 𝑄𝑡𝐵𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 ≤ 𝐵𝑡−1+ ∫  𝑊(𝑗)𝑡𝑁(𝑗)𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖   + 𝑀𝑡−1  (21)  
and lim𝜏⟶∞ 𝐸𝑡(𝐵𝜏 + 𝑀𝜏 )≥0   (22), for all t 
where 𝑄𝑡= 1 / (1+𝑖𝑡), and 𝐵𝑡 represents the stock of one period  nominally riskless 
government debt issued in period t and yielding a return 𝑖𝑡. Note that each household 
takes as given labor income (= ∫  𝑊(𝑗)𝑡𝑁(𝑗)𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑗 ), as, individually, it has no influence 
on wages or employment, which are set by unions and firms, respectively. Hence, the 
only decisions available to households are the optimal allocation of consumption among 
different goods, the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption, and the choice of 
money holdings. The resulting optimal choices are  
𝐶(𝑖)𝑡  = ( 
𝑃(𝑖)𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)−𝜀𝑝 𝐶𝑡   (23); furthermore, conditional on this behavior 
∫  𝑃(𝑖)𝑡𝐶(𝑖)𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡   (24) 
𝑄𝑡 = β 𝐸𝑡 {
𝑈𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑈𝑐,𝑡
 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
}   (25) 
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 = 𝜒𝐶𝑡 
1+𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡
    (26)  
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where (25) and (26) can be represented in log-linearized  form as 
𝑐?̂? = 𝐸𝑡{𝑐𝑡+1̂  } – (𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
} - ρ) (27), where 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
 = 𝑝𝑡+1 - 𝑝𝑡   (28) 
𝑚𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 - 𝜂𝑖?̂?  + log (𝜒)  (29), where 𝜂 = 
1
(1+𝑖)𝑖
 ≈ 
1
𝜌
  (29a) is the semi-elasticity of 
money demand and ρ = - log (β)   (30) 
 Next the problem of wage setting and inflation dynamics is presented. 
 
 3.1.1.1 Wage setting and wage inflation dynamics 
  Consider that each period the nominal wage for workers of any given type 
remains unchanged with probability 𝜃𝑤 𝜖 [0, 1]. Hence, these workers renegotiating 
wages in period t, will seek to choose a new wage (𝑊𝑡
∗) in order to maximize their 
utility function, subject to the sequence of labor demand schedules and flow budget 
constraints that are effective while 𝑊𝑡
∗ lasts, specifically 
maximize 𝐸𝑡 { ∑ (𝛽𝜃𝑤)
𝑘∞
𝑘=0  U( 𝐶𝑡+𝑘|𝑡, 𝑁𝑡+𝑘|𝑡, 
𝑀𝑡+𝑘|𝑡
𝑃𝑡+𝑘|𝑡
)}   (31) 
subject to 𝑁𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 = (
𝑊𝑡
∗
𝑊𝑡+𝑘
)−𝜀𝑤 𝑁𝑡+𝑘   (32) and 
𝑃𝑡+𝑘 𝐶𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡+𝑘{𝑄𝑡+𝑘,𝑡+𝑘+1 𝐵𝑡+𝑘+1|𝑡} + 𝑀𝑡+𝑘  ≤ 𝐵𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 +  𝑊𝑡
∗ 𝑁𝑡+𝑘|𝑡  + 𝑀𝑡+𝑘−1   
(33) 
where the subscripts t +k |t denote the value of the respective variable in period t + k 
pertaining to a household that had its wage last reset in period t, while 𝑁𝑡+𝑘 = ∫ 𝑁𝑡+𝑘
1
0
(i) 
di stands for aggregate employment in period t + k; 𝜀𝑤 or 𝜀𝑤, used interchangeably, 
stands for elasticity of substitution among labor varieties. The solution to this problem 
yields the following equation in logs, expressing the optimal wage setting dynamics 
𝑤𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝜃𝑤 𝐸𝑡 {𝑤𝑡+1
∗ } + (1 - 𝛽𝜃𝑤) (𝑤𝑡 – (1 +  𝜀𝑤 𝜑)
−1 𝜇𝑡
?̂?)   (34) 
where 𝜇𝑡
?̂? = 𝜇𝑡
𝑤 - 𝜇𝑤 represents the deviations of the economy´s (in logs) average wage 
markup 𝜇𝑡
𝑤 = (𝑤𝑡 – 𝑝𝑡) - 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑡 from its steady state 𝜇𝑤, where 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑡 denotes marginal 
rate of substitution. Should one not incorporate wage rigidities in the model, one can 
obtain the following optimality condition 
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𝑈𝑛,𝑡
𝑈𝑐,𝑡
 = - 
𝑊𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 ⇒ 𝑤𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐?̂?  – 𝜑𝑛?̂?  = 𝑚𝑟𝑠𝑡   (35) 
Letting 𝑊𝑡 = (∫ 𝑊(𝑗)𝑡
1−𝜖𝑤
1 𝑑𝑗)
1
0
1
1−𝜀𝑤
   (36) 
define the aggregate wage index, then the path of wages, given the described wage 
setting framework, can be defined (in logs) as an equation in differences, specifically: 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝜃𝑤 𝑤𝑡−1 + (1 - 𝜃𝑤) 𝑤𝑡
∗   (37) 
  Using equations (34) and (37), and defining wage inflation as 𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑤𝑡 - 𝑤𝑡−1, 
the baseline wage inflation dynamics is given by 
𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = β 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 } - 𝜆𝑤 𝜇𝑡
?̂?   (38) 
where 𝜆𝑤 = (1 - 𝜃𝑤)(1 - β𝜃𝑤)/[𝜃𝑤(1 + φ𝜀𝑤)]. Note that equation (38) replaces the 
optimality condition expressed in equation (35), as the average real wage will not 
move one for one with the marginal rate of substitution. 
  Now let us consider the problem of firms. 
 
 
 3.1.2 Firms 
  A representative monopolistic competitive firm is assumed to have a technology 
described by a Cobb-Douglas production function of the type 
𝑌(𝑖)𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁(𝑖)𝑡
1−𝛼   (39) 
where 𝑌(𝑖)𝑡 denotes the output of good i, 𝐴𝑡 stands for the level of technology common 
to all firms, and 𝑎𝑡 = log 𝐴𝑡 evolves exogenously as a stochastic process (?̂?𝑡 =
 𝜌𝑎?̂?𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡
𝑎) (40), 𝑁(𝑖)𝑡  is an index of labor input used by firm i in period t and 
defined by 
𝑁(𝑖)𝑡 = (∫ 𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑡
𝜀𝑤−1
𝜀𝑤 𝑑𝑗)
1
0
𝜀𝑤
𝜀𝑤−1
   (41) 
where 𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗) represents the quantity of type j labor working for firm i in period t. 
  Letting 𝑊(𝑗)𝑡 denote the nominal wage for type j labor prevailing in period t 
one can derive the demand schedule for each firm i and labor type j, given the firm’s 
total employment, as well as, the wage bill 
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𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑡 = (
𝑊(𝑗)𝑡
𝑊𝑡
)−𝜀𝑤 𝑁(𝑖)𝑡   (41a)   ∫ 𝑊(𝑗)𝑡
1
0
 𝑁(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑡 dj = 𝑊𝑡 𝑁(𝑖)𝑡   (42) 
  Assuming that in each period a fraction of firms (1 - 𝜃𝑝 ) manages to change its 
prices, a firm adjusting its price in period t, conditional on an optimal allocation of the 
wage bill determined by (42), will face the following profit maximization problem 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑡∗ ∑ 𝜃𝑝
𝑘∞
𝑘=0  𝐸𝑡{ Λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 (1/𝑃𝑡+𝑘) (𝑃𝑡
∗ 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 - 𝜚𝑡+𝑘 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡)}   (43) 
subject to a sequence of demand functions 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 =( 
𝑃𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝑘
)−𝜀𝑝 𝐶𝑡+𝑘   (44) 
where Λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽
𝑘 𝑈𝑐,𝑡+𝑘 / 𝑈𝑐,𝑡 is the stochastic discount factor, 𝜚𝑡 (.) is the nominal 
cost function, and 𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝑡 represents output in period t + k for a firm that last reviewed its 
price in period t. The solution to this problem yields to a first order approximation 
around a zero inflation steady state an equation for price inflation 𝜋𝑡
𝑝
  = 𝑝𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡−1   (45), 
the log difference of prices, as follows 
𝜋𝑡
𝑝
 = β 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
} - 𝜆𝑝 𝜇𝑡
?̂?
   (46) 
 where 𝜆𝑝 = 
(1−𝜃𝑝) (1−𝛽𝜃𝑝)
𝜃𝑝
  
1−𝛼
1−𝛼+𝛼𝜀𝑝
 and 𝜇𝑡
?̂?
 is the deviation of the average price markup 
in logs from its flexible rule counterpart. 
 
 3.1.3 Equilibrium 
  In equilibrium goods market clearing requires that 𝑌(𝑖)𝑡= 𝐶(𝑖)𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 
=(∫ 𝑌(𝑖)𝑡
𝜖𝑝−1
𝜀𝑝 𝑑𝑖)
1
0
𝜀𝑝
𝜀𝑝−1
. It is assumed for simplification purposes and without loss of 
generality that in steady state G = 0. It follows that 𝑌𝑡=  𝐶𝑡 +  𝐺𝑡 and in deviations from 
steady state, as a fraction of steady state output 
?̂?𝑡 =   ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡   (47) 
  Aggregate output can be derived from equation (39) and yields up to a first order 
approximation an equation relating output and labor demand, given technology 
𝑦?̂? = (1 – α) 𝑛?̂? + 𝑎?̂?   (48) 
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 Next introduce the concepts of output gap and real wage gap. The former is 
defined as the difference between output and natural output, which is to be interpreted 
as the equilibrium level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities  
𝑦?̃? = 𝑦?̂?  - 𝑦𝑡
𝑛   (49) and 𝑦𝑡
𝑛 = Ψ𝑦𝑎 𝑎𝑡 + Ψ𝑦   (50) 
where Ψ𝑦𝑎 = 
1+𝜑
(1−𝛼)+𝜑+𝛼
 and Ψ𝑦 = (1 – α) 
log (1−𝛼)
1+𝜑
 
Likewise, the real wage gap is described as the difference between the real wage 
and natural real wage, where 𝜔𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡. Formally 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡 - 𝜔𝑡
𝑛   (51) 
where 𝜔𝑡
𝑛 = Ψ𝑤𝑎 𝑎?̂?  + Ψ𝑤, Ψ𝑤𝑎 = Ψ𝑦𝑎, and Ψ𝑤 = 
(1−𝛼+𝜑)log (1−𝛼)
1+𝜑
 
The introduction of these two variables (output gap and real wage gap) allows us 
to write (38) and (46) respectively as: 
𝜋𝑡
𝑝
 = β 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
 + 𝑘𝑝 ?̃?𝑡 + 𝜆𝑝?̃?𝑡   (52) 
𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = β 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤  + 𝑘𝑤 ?̃?𝑡 - 𝜆𝑤?̃?𝑡  (53) 
where 𝑘𝑝 = 
𝛼𝜆𝑝
1−𝛼
 and 𝜅𝑤 = 𝜆𝑤(1 + 
𝜑
1−𝛼
) 
  Additionally, consider the following identity: 
?̃?𝑡= ?̃?𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑤 - 𝜋𝑡
𝑝
 – Δ 𝜔𝑡
𝑛   (54) 
  In order to complete the non-policy block of the model, equilibrium conditions 
(52), (53), and (54) must be supplemented with a dynamic IS equation, which can be 
derived by combining the goods market clearing condition ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 (47) with Euler 
equation (27). The resulting equation is rewritten in terms of the output gap as  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ?̃?𝑡+1 -  (𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
 - 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)   (55) 
where the real interest rate 𝑟?̂?  = 𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡 𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
(56) and the natural interest rate 𝑟𝑡
𝑛 = ρ +  𝐸𝑡 
Δ𝑦𝑡
𝑛 (57) 
  Finally, in order to close the model, one has to specify how the nominal interest 
rate is determined. In this regard, assume an interest rate rule of the form 
𝑖𝑡  = ρ + 𝜙𝑝𝜋𝑡
𝑝
 + 𝜙𝑤𝜋𝑡
𝑤 + 𝜙𝑦?̃?𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡   (58) 
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where 𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑤, and 𝜙𝑦 ≥ 0 are coefficients defined by the monetary authority, while 
𝑣𝑡  is an exogenous variable, possibly a function of 𝑟𝑡
𝑛 and Δ𝜔𝑡
𝑛, and normalized such 
that its mean is zero. 
  In order to arrive at computational treatment (Dynare / Matlab), the following 
log linearized equations (dropping isolated constants) can be used under a TR process: 
(28), (29), (40), (47), (48), (49), (50), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56), (57), and (58). Under 
the IT regime, use equation (17) instead of (58). These two hypotheses correspond to a 
debt-financed fiscal stimulus consisting of an unannounced tax rebate or government 
spending, each considered separately. Therefore, two equations specifying the AR (1) 
process for each of them have to be added to the model, specifically (11) and (14). The 
net debt ratio can also be incorporated using equation (18) that has to be adjusted for the 
type of stimulus being applied.  
  Should one want to consider money-financed government spending or tax rebate 
instead, simply drop (58) or (17) and insert (12) adjusted accordingly; equation (18) 
should also be replaced by (13). 
  In the case of issuance of either money or debt financed “bonus checks”, 
additional specifications are required. Under a “milder” scenario the “bonus check” is 
treated as a shifter affecting multiplicatively the representative household’s utility 
function as follows 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡U (𝐶𝑡 , 𝑁𝑡 ,
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 ) ∞𝒕=𝟎 BCst=𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡U(log𝐶𝑡  −  ∫
𝑁(𝑗)𝑡
1+𝜑
1+𝜑
1
0
 +  𝜒 log
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 )  ∞𝑡=0 BCst   
(59) 
  One of the household’s optimality conditions resulting from the maximization of 
this equation subject to a budget constraint (22) is given by 
𝑄𝑡 = β 𝐸𝑡 {( 
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡+1
 
𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡+1
𝐵𝐶𝑠𝑡
)}   (60) 
which can be expressed as a log-linear approximation around a steady state with 
constant rates of inflation and consumption growth, as shown 
𝑐?̂? = 𝐸𝑡 {𝑐𝑡+1̂  } – (𝑖𝑡 - 𝐸𝑡 {𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
} – ρ) + (1 - 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠) 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡   (61); thus the output gap 
becomes 
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?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{ ?̃?𝑡+1} - (𝑖𝑡 - 𝐸𝑡 {𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
 } - 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)   + (1 - 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠) 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡   (62), which replaces (55) in 
the script 
  Note that the way this preference shifter enters the utility function, it affects only 
the intertemporal choices through 𝑈𝑐,𝑡+𝑘 / 𝑈𝑐,𝑡, the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution, and has no bearing on intratemporal choices as 𝑈𝑐,𝑡 / 𝑈𝑛,𝑡 and 𝑈𝑐,𝑡 / 𝑈𝑚,𝑡 
remain unchanged. 
  In the case of a “stronger bonus check” version, it is assumed that it impacts 
directly and additively on the consumer’s Euler equation. He or she simply has no 
choice, but to spend it immediately (it has no storage value), no matter how trivial the 
options might be. Thus (61) and (62) become 
𝑐?̂? = 𝐸𝑡 {𝑐𝑡+1̂ } – (𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡 {𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
} – ρ) + 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡    (63) 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 {?̃?𝑡+1} - (𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡 {𝜋𝑡+1
𝑝
 }- 𝑟𝑡
𝑛)   +  𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡   (64), which replaces (55) in the script. 
Additionally, note that Δ𝑚𝑡 = V 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 (65) and Δ𝑚𝑡 = V 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 (66), while both 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 and 
𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 follow an AR (1) process subject to exogenous shocks. Thus, these specifications, 
as well as (65) and (66) (separately) should be added to the model. 
   And this completes the basis for the computational scripts. All that is required to 
make it running is to specify the shock, which has been calibrated invariably at 1 
percent of steady state output, the exception being the tax rebate stimulus, which by 
definition enters with a negative sign. 
 
 
3.2 Classical frictionless model 
 
Here we consider the summary of a simple model covering an increase in 
government spending in a classical monetary economy set up (for other stimuli, simply 
adjust accordingly), exhibiting perfect competition and fully flexible prices in all 
markets. As it will be seen below, many of the results and predictions of such an 
economy are strongly at odds with the empirical evidence; thus, this model mainly 
serves for comparison purposes as a limit case of a New Keynesian set up.  
The departing functions, namely the utility, production, and budget constraint 
functions are similar to those above, adjusted obviously for the new assumptions 
concerning perfect competition. Consumers’ and firms’ optimality conditions yield 
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equations (I) through (IV) (all variables are expressed in logs or percentage deviations 
from the steady state, represented by lower case letters with a hat, while isolated 
constants are dropped) 
 
 
𝑐?̂? = 𝐸𝑡 {𝑐𝑡+1̂ } – (𝑖?̂?- 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1})   (I); adjust accordingly 
𝜔?̂?= 𝑐?̂?+ 𝜑 𝑛?̂?   (II) 
𝑚𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐?̂?   – 𝜂  𝑖?̂?  (III) 
𝜔?̂?= 𝑎?̂? – α 𝑛?̂?  (IV); additionally consider 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 - 𝑝𝑡−1   (V): definition of inflation 
?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡   (VI): market clearing 
𝑦?̂?=  𝑎?̂?+ (1 – α) 𝑛?̂?  (VII): production function mapping 𝑛𝑡 
𝑟?̂?= 𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1}   (VIII): Fisher identity 
𝑎?̂?= 𝜌𝑎 𝑎𝑡−1̂ + 𝜀𝑡
𝑎   (IX): assumption 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝜌𝑔 ?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑔
   (X): assumption; adjust accordingly 
Δ𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 - 𝑚𝑡−1   (XI) definition 
Δ𝑚𝑡 = V ?̂?𝑡   (XII): money financed stimulus (adjust accordingly). Or instead, 
𝑖?̂?= 𝜙𝜋 𝜋𝑡   (XIII): debt financed stimulus with a Taylor rule. Or instead, 
𝜋𝑡 = 0   (XIV): debt financed stimulus under IT 
  This completes the model, which can now be submitted to exogenous shocks. 
Other specifications may be included, such as the net debt ratio, nominal wages, and the 
explicit money demand, among others. 
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3.3 Calibration and the inclusion of other variables 
 The default calibrations, unless stated otherwise, follow essentially Galí (2014, 
2015, 2017), and are common in the literature. The discount factor β is set somewhat 
higher at 0.995, which entails an annualized steady state real return on financial assets 
in the vicinity of 2 percent, more in consonance with the prevailing environment. It is 
assumed that σ = 1, which means that it is considered a logarithm function for 
consumption in the utility definition. The curvature of labor disutility, φ, is 5, which 
means that Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.2. Parameter α (decreasing returns to 
labor) equals 0.25, while the ratio G/Y designated 𝜎𝑔 is assumed to be 0 in steady state 
(for simplicity sake, at least in terms of algebraic calculation, G = 0). 𝜂 (interest rate 
semi-elasticity of money demand) is set at 7 (consistent with quarterly interest rates as 
used in the model) and V (quarterly velocity of money) is set at 3, while  𝑏ℎ = 2.40, 
corresponds to a 60 percent ratio of debt to annual output. The persistence ratio 𝜌𝑥 for 
all the variables subject to a shock equals 0.5, a setting associated with a moderately 
persistent shock, while 𝜌𝑏 = 0.105 used in the tax path (9) and in the net debt ratio 
equation of motion (10), allows the first coefficient on the right hand side of (10) to 
equal 0.90; that is 1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏 = 0.90, which is reasonably close to the derivation obtained 
in (8), equaling (1 + ρ = 1.005). In practical terms this means that roughly one-third of 
the deviation of the debt ratio from target is corrected over four periods, which appears 
to be ambitious if the net debt ratio is high; formally 𝜌𝑏 it is the solution to the equation 
[1 + ρ (= 0.005) - 𝜌𝑏 ] = (1 −
1
3
)1/4; see for instance, Anderson et al (2014). 
 In respect to 𝜃𝑝, and 𝜃𝑤, the indexes of prices and wages rigidities, they are both 
set at 0.75, meaning that prices and wages have an average duration of four quarters. 
Considering the wage elasticity of substitution for labor (𝜀𝑤 ) and price elasticity for 
goods (𝜀𝑝), it is assumed that they take the values of 4.5 and 9, respectively. 
Consequently wage (𝜇𝑤) and price gross markups (𝜇𝑝) equal respectively 1.28, and 
1.125, entailing an unemployment level of 5 percent and an average 12.5 percent price 
markup in steady state (see Galí, 2015, for the derivation of these values). Obviously, in 
the classical setting, the markup equals unity and rigidities are zero. Finally, 𝜙𝜋 in the 
Taylor rule, is set at 1.5. 
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 Following Galí (2014), we incorporate in the models another function designated 
welfare, which aims to capture the impacts of the fiscal stimuli on the well-being of 
households measured by the utility function. With that in mind, a first order Taylor 
approximation around the steady state is carried out, as follows 
 
𝑈?̂?  = 𝑈𝑐C𝑐?̂? + 𝑈𝑛N𝑛?̂?  +  𝑈𝑚(M/P)𝑙?̂? 
𝑈?̂?  =  𝑈𝑐C [𝑐?̂? – MRS(N/C) 𝑛?̂?   + 
𝑈𝑚
𝑈𝑐
(
𝑀/𝑃
𝐶
) 𝑙?̂?] 
𝑈?̂?  =  𝑈𝑐C [𝑐?̂? - (
𝑀𝑅𝑆
𝑀𝑃𝑁
)(
1−𝛼
1
) 𝑛?̂? + (
1−𝛽
𝑉
) 𝑙?̂?] 
𝑈?̂?  =  𝑈𝑐C [𝑐?̂? – (
1−𝛼
𝜇
) 𝑛?̂? + (
1−𝛽
𝑉
) 𝑙?̂?]   (67) 
where MRS is marginal rate of substitution, MPN is marginal productivity of labor, 𝜇 is 
the composite markup 𝜇𝑝𝜇𝑤, and 𝑙?̂? = 𝑚𝑡- 𝑝𝑡 denotes money demand in deviation from 
steady state. 
While this indicator is dependent upon the paths of consumption, labor, and 
albeit marginally, money demand, one may question the effectiveness of the shocks in 
terms of consumption (call it dynamic consumption multiplier, DCM), while assessing 
the effects in terms of benefits (additional consumption) versus the costs proxied by 
increases in inflation (call it the inflation-consumption tradeoff ratio, CTO). These 
statistics are calculated as follows 
DCM (k) = (∑
𝜕?̂?𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑥𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=0 ) / (∑
𝜕𝑥𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑥𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=𝑜 )   (68) 
where x stands for the four types of stimuli, k = 0, 1, 2,… . The tradeoff ratio is 
computed as 
CTO (k) = (∑
𝜕?̂?𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑥𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=𝑜 ) / (∑
𝜕𝜋𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑥𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=𝑜 )   (69) 
Note that the higher the values of these statistics, the better off are households, in a 
comparable manner as the welfare indicator shows (67). Similarly, one can calculate 
analogous statistics for other relevant variables, such as output, net debt ratio, and 
welfare. 
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4 The effects of fiscal stimuli in a classical frictionless model 
         We will now consider separate shocks of 1 percent in each of the four fiscal 
stimuli, under the three different financing regimes. The first is a money financed boost, 
while the other two are debt financed under a Taylor rule and an inflation targeting 
frameworks. What immediately captures the attention is that the equilibrium dynamics 
of the real block of the model, consisting of variables such as consumption, 
employment, and output are determined independently of the financing regime, though 
not of the type of stimulus. Thus, the financing regime is neutral as it should be 
expected based on the specifications of the model. For illustrative purposes, see Figure 
1 below, where the fiscal stimuli are designated BCa, BCs, G, and TR. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Effects of Four Fiscal Stimuli on four Different Real Variables in a Classical Economy 
  At a first glance, figures 1.2 and 1.4 are deceptive, because responses are raised 
to the power of at least 10−15. In turn, figures 1.1 and 1.3 reveal that the path of real 
rates and employment are the same. Another message to retain is that, under these 
specifications, with the exception of a boost in government spending, output, 
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consumption, and employment (a linear log combination of output) simply do not bulge 
under the other three stimuli. A tax rebate does not enter in the output definition; hence 
it does not affect it, as well as neither employment nor consumption. The issuance of 
“bonus checks” of either type, while entering output through the component [(1 - 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠) 
𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 or 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡] in the Euler equation for consumption is exactly offset by the increase in 
the real interest rate. Consider the case of a “bonus check with a shifter”. Then, 
Δ𝑐𝑡+1̂= 𝑟?̂? - (1 - 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠) 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 = 0   (70), as 𝑟?̂? = 𝑖?̂? - 𝐸𝑡{𝜋𝑡+1} = (1 - 𝜌𝑏𝑐𝑠) 𝑏𝑐?̂?𝑡 
  With respect to an increase in government spending, there are, however small, 
some effects. For instance, one can establish a relation between employment, output, 
and consumption as a function of government spending as follows 
𝑛?̂?= ?̂?𝑡 /(1 + 𝜑) > 0 (= 0.17) (71) ⇒ 𝑦?̂? = (1 – α) 𝑛?̂?> 0 (= 0.125) ⇒ ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 - ?̂?𝑡 < 0 (= -
0.875) 
  In short, real variables can be calculated independently of the nominal variables, 
which have to be pinned down, in order to avoid multiple equilibria. This is 
accomplished directly through the definition of the money financing regime, or 
indirectly, through the monetary policy rule. Once, this is done, it can be seen that 
money financed fiscal stimuli, flow mainly through the nominal variables, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Effects of Four Money-Financed Fiscal Stimuli on Selected Nominal Variables in a Classical 
Economy 
  On impact, money raises by 3 percent (that is money velocity times the shock) 
reaching 6 percent by the seventh period, while prices grow by a multiple of money 
ranging from some 5 percent under a tax rebate to near 7 percent under an unadjusted 
“bonus check”, and converge to a new platform at 6 percent. This translates into a spike 
in the annualized inflation rate ranging from some 24 percent to 28 percent, which then 
falls precipitously in the second period. These impacts bring down vigorously the net 
debt ratio, which falls between 3 and 4 percent, at the onset, and then moves up 
gradually according to the equation of motion (13), adjusted for quarterly values. 
Furthermore, the path of inflation entails that nominal interest rates move up by 1 to 2 
percent before stabilizing at zero by seventh period. On the other hand, welfare, which 
is included as a nominal variable due to the presence of money holdings, remains flat, 
with the exception of a boost to government spending; in this case it falls due mainly to 
a decrease in consumption and an increase in employment (see 71). 
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  Should one consider a debt financed boost, then the paths of the nominal 
variables are brought “under control”, particularly under an inflation targeting regime, 
while real variables as indicated remain unchanged. 
  To summarize, under the unrealistic assumption of a frictionless classical set up, 
money-financed fiscal stimuli merely translate into higher prices, more money in 
circulation, and an inflation scare. There is only one set of good news: the fall in the net 
debt ratio and some information to be used for comparison purposes, with a more 
feasible scenario, where prices and wages do not move immediately or fully, following 
an exogenous impact.   
 
        5 The effects of fiscal stimuli in a New Keynesian model 
 
5.1 An adjusted “bonus check” 
Consider now, a New Keynesian model with staggered prices and wages a la 
Calvo, which will translate into meaningful dynamic impacts on some relevant 
variables. In this subsection it will be covered the impact of the increase in government 
spending of 1 percent of output taking the form of an adjusted “bonus check” issued, 
unanticipatedly, to households. Recall that the rationale for this type of instrument, is 
that, it is meant strictly for consumption and nothing else but consumption, to be used 
within a limited time frame. Hence, it is appended directly into the consumption Euler 
equation; there is no omnipresent, omniscient representative agent who could foretell an 
unanticipated bonus of this type and fails to react. It is the equivalent of a higher net 
worth circumscribed by a time factor. A comparison is made for the three financing 
regimes, as shown on Table 1 and Figure 3. 
 Dynamic Consumption Multiplier Consumption Tradeoff Ratio 
k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
MF 6.24 11.86 19.40 9.64 8.34 7.29 
DF-Taylor 1.89 1.84 1.78 48.73 35.62 26.95 
DF-IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 1:The Effects of a Bonus Check (Adjusted) in the New Keynesian Economy: Money vs. Debt 
Financing 
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  The introduction of rigidities in the specification of this model translates into 
significant changes when comparing with the classical setup as depicted in Figure 3. 
There is now a dynamic interaction between real and nominal variables, particularly 
noticeable under a seignorage process. 
   The effect of an unannounced money-financed increase in government 
expenditures on output, welfare, and employment is larger than in a classical economy 
set up, with multipliers reaching on impact, respectively, some 6, 2, and 8 percent. 
These multipliers are higher than those found in the literature (see, e.g., Ramsey 2011, 
for a study and review of fiscal multipliers), though the model advanced here, as far as I 
know, does not have an empirical counterpart in recent history. Moreover, these 
multipliers taper off slowly; for instance, looking at Table 1, it can be seen that the 
dynamic consumption multiplier (accumulated diminishing ratios) increases from about 
6 percent in the first period to around 19 percent in the fifteenth period. This comes at 
an acceptable cost: inflation moves up by 2.60 percent (annualized), however a much 
lower value than the one arrived under the classical model (25 percent) and in line or 
closer to the levels pursued by major central banks (2 to 2.5 percent on average). One 
year after the boost, inflation drops to 2 percent. Overall, however, the consumption 
tradeoff ratio reveals positive values 
  Note also that the path of money remains the same, but prices, due to stickiness, 
evolve slower and only reach a steady value (6 percent increase) by the thirtieth period. 
Gradualism in the pace of prices seems to play a main part in the in the transmission 
process of the money financed lift. Indeed, there is a persistent reduction in the real 
interest rate, which is conducive to higher levels of consumption (and investment not 
included in the model) and thus, to a large fiscal multiplier. On the other hand the 
increase in the nominal interest rate coexists with a reduction in the real interest rate. 
This increase is due to higher consumption bounded by a higher money demand (m > 
p). The difference between the two rates is explained by a persistently higher level of 
inflation, which is accounted for by the gradual adjustment in prices, as opposed to the 
classical economy, which exhibits one-off jump in inflation. 
  Additionally, it can be seen that the debt ratio while decreasing, does not reach 
the levels as in the classical economy. This is can be explained by the difference in the 
inflation rates, which account for the change in the erosion of debt, as well as by lower 
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real rates leading to smaller costs of servicing the debt. With regards to welfare, it peaks 
at 2 percent at the very inception and subsequently tapers off slowly to zero. The pattern 
of this behavior is mainly explained by the paths of consumption (+) and employment (-). 
  Under debt-financing, inflation targeting pins down to zero output, consumption, 
welfare, employment, prices, and inflation. In order to reach these values the real and 
nominal interest rates climb to about 4 percent; thus money growth starts in negative 
territory. Under a standard Taylor rule, output, consumption, employment, welfare, 
money, and money demand present positive values, while inflation, price levels, 
nominal interest rate, and real interest rate are brought down to near zero. As opposed to 
money-financing, the debt ratio enters into positive values, obviously an unfavorable 
upshot. If one increases the coefficient in the Taylor rule, then the outcomes approach 
those with inflation targeting, as expected (not shown). With respect to the statistics in 
Table 1, they exhibit zero values under inflation targeting, while under a Taylor rule 
they may be misleading by construction, namely the trade-off ratio, which reveals 
“better” values than under a money financed option.   
 
Figure 3: Effects of a Bonus Check (adjusted) over selected variables: Money vs. Debt Financing 
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  5.2 A “bonus check” with a shifter   
   Consider now a 1 percent increase in terms of output in government spending 
taking the form of a “bonus check” issued, unanticipatedly, to households. Bear in mind 
that under the assumption advanced, this instrument enters multiplicatively as a shifter 
in the households’ utility function and is treated as a stochastic shock. Hence the 
mechanisms of transmission and motion in this system are quite similar to those using 
what we labeled an adjusted “bonus check”. The key difference rests solely upon the  
other variables, all converging to a zero value steady state. The exceptions are obviously 
money and prices, particularly patent under money financing, which stabilize at 6% 
after several periods (limit p = limit m → 
𝑉(=3)
1−𝜌(=0.5)
). 
  Table 2 and Figure 4 below provide us with the two statistics being considered 
and the graphical depiction of some selected variables. The consumption multiplier and 
the trade-off ratio reveal positive values with money financing, albeit slightly lower; 
again care should be taken interpreting the latter under a Taylor rule. With money 
financing, real variables, such as output, employment, and welfare start at 5.5, 7.5, and 
1.7, respectively, while annualized inflation stands at 2.5 in the first period, not quite 
different from the previous section, as expected. The same happens with most of the 
variables, though a reference should be made to the paths of the nominal scale of the 
impact on the consumption Euler equation, now lower, which filters through all and real 
interest rates under debt financing, namely inflation targeting. The monetary policy rule, 
with this definition, responds swiftly and lowers both rates by half from some 4% to 
about 2%.  
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  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio 
k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
MF 5.48 11.13 18.75 8.61 7.89 7.06 
DF-Taylor 0.95 0.92 0.89 48.73 35.62 26.95 
DF-IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 2: Effects of a Bonus Check with a shifter in a New Keynesian Economy: Money vs. Debt 
Financing 
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Figure 4:  Effects of a Bonus Check with a Shifter over selected variables: Money vs. Debt Financing 
 
5.3 A tax cut 
 Consider now a decrease of taxes taking the form of a tax cut or a tax rebate. As 
in the previous two sections it is assumed that the cut is equivalent to 1 percent of 
output and follows an AR (1) process. As Figure 5 and Table 3 clearly show, a debt-
financed tax cut simply has no effects on either real or nominal variables, the exceptions 
being the net debt ratio and taxes (the latter not shown). This neutrality can be 
0 5 10 15
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Nominal Interest Rate  Annualized
 
 
MF
TR
IT
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 s
te
a
d
y
 s
ta
te
Exogenous Shock
 
 
MF
TR
IT
0 5 10 15
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Welfare
 
 
MF
TR
IT
0 5 10 15
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Money
 
 
MF
TR
IT
0 5 10 15
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 s
te
a
d
y
 s
ta
te
Money Demand
 
 
MF
TR
IT
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Prices
 
 
MF
TR
IT
106 
 
accounted for by the Ricardian equivalence. As we are assuming lump-sum taxes, the 
tax cut would be matched by future increases in taxation, leaving their present 
discounted value unchanged, while the household’s intratemporal budget constraint 
remains unaffected. Moreover, note that, under debt-financing no other equilibrium 
condition is changed by the tax cut and the increase in the net debt ratio; all the other 
variables (nominal and real) remain the same.  
 However, the results are totally different if the tax cut is money financed. It 
leads to a substantial increase in economic activity. Negative real interest rates fuel 
consumption, which implies an increase in output and employment. Inflation also rises, 
following the shock, to an acceptable 2.5 percent but, thereafter, is bounded by the paths 
of prices and money as determined by nominal rigidities. Likewise, the nominal interest 
rate rise is bounded and reverts to zero by the fifth period, much faster than inflation, 
which lingers down more slowly. Indeed, to the extent that the discounted sum of real 
seignorage is raised by the tax cut and current prices do not spike to compensate that 
increase, current tax cuts may be interpreted as net wealth by the representative 
household, leading to an increase in consumption, which associated with nominal 
rigidities and given prices, will then elicit a variety of equilibria that can be interpreted 
as positive.  
 
  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio 
k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
MF 4.70 10.40 18.10 7.55 7.44 6.83 
DF-Taylor 0 0 0 indeterminate indeterminate indeterminate 
DF-IT 0 0 0 indeterminate indeterminate indeterminate 
Table 3: Effects of a Tax Cut in a New Keynesian Economy: Money vs. Debt Financing 
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Figure 5:  Effects of a Tax Cut over selected variables: Money vs. Debt Financing 
 
5.4 An increase in government spending 
 We will now assume a fiscal stimulus represented by an increase in government 
spending equivalent to 1 percent of output. No specific use is identified for this 
particular boost. 
 The results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 6 below. Under a seignorage 
process, similar dynamics as described for the other three stimuli take place. Nominal 
rigidities determine positive outcomes in terms of real variables, as there are 
interactions between real and nominal variables, as opposed to a frictionless setup. The 
latter, particularly inflation, the nominal interest rate, and the path of prices are also 
bounded, thus an increase in money filters through consumption, output, and welfare, 
while the net debt ratio evolves satisfactorily into negative ground, even though no 
specific use is assigned to fiscal spending. Theoretically it could be anything. 
 Under debt-financing, either using a Taylor rule or inflation targeting with the 
default parameters settings, the outcomes are identical. Several variables ranging from 
inflation, prices, nominal interest rate, and output are pinned down to zero. As 
government expenditures enter the equilibrium condition where, by definition, output is 
the sum of consumption and government expenditures, we have consumption following 
the path of the fiscal boost, but with a negative sign. Hence, the statistic dynamic 
consumption multiplier equals -1 throughout all the periods. The same applies, as 
expected, to other variables, particularly money, money demand, and welfare.   
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  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio 
k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
MF 3.93 9.61 17.29 6.26 6.85 6.52 
DF-Taylor -1 -1 -1 ∞ ∞ ∞ 
DF-IT -1 -1 -1 ∞ ∞ ∞ 
Table 4: Effects of an Increase in Government Spending in a New Keynesian Economy: Money vs. Debt 
Financing 
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Figure 6:  Effects of an increase in government spending over selected variables: Money vs. Debt 
Financing 
 
  5.5 Money-financed fiscal stimuli   
  In this section we compare across money-financed fiscal stimuli considering the 
two types of “bonus checks”, as well as a tax cut and an increase in government 
spending.  The reason is simple: the results obtained suggest that overall, money-
financed policies appear to be more effective than a debt-financed option. The outcomes 
of this particular experience are presented in Table 5 and Figure 5 below. 
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 Let us then look at the Table 5, where it is inserted, for comparison purposes, a new 
statistic designated dynamic welfare multiplier, defined as 
Θ(k) = (∑
𝜕𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=𝑜 ) / (∑
𝜕𝑥𝑡+𝑗
𝜕𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=𝑜 )   (72),  k = 0,1,2… and 𝓍 denotes type of fiscal 
stimulus.     The numbers confirm positive outcomes and are actually not that far apart 
under the four different fiscal stimuli. They suggest a somewhat better “performance” 
with the issuance of “bonus checks”, namely in the first periods following the shock. 
 
  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio  Dynamic Welfare 
Multiplier 
 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
BCa 6.24 11.86 19.40 9.64 8.34 7.29 1.93 3.67 6.01 
BCs 5.48 11.13 18.75 8.61 7.89 7.06 1.69 3.45 5.81 
TR 4.70 10.40 18.10 7.55 7.44 6.83 1.46 3.22 5.61 
G 3.93 9.61 17.29 6.26 6.85 6.52 0.53 2.28 4.67 
Table 5: Effects of Money Financed Fiscal Stimuli in a New Keynesian Economy 
 
  The graphs of some selected variables corroborate these findings. Note that 
money growth, a multiple of the shocks, is identical under the four different stimuli, so 
is money supply, money demand, prices, and price inflation from the second period 
onwards. The key differences lie in the real variables such as output, consumption, 
employment, and welfare (if one discards the reduced effects of its monetary 
component), which exhibit differences in the first four to five periods as a result of how 
the shocks filter through the system of equations. Note, for instance, that taxes impact 
directly only upon money growth and the debt ratio (one might add the tax path, which 
is not shown). With respect to the interest rates, they respond to higher values in output 
as money demand is identical under the four scenarios. The difference in the paths of 
the debt ratios is mainly accounted for by the differences in the real interest rates over 
the first periods and its smooth and protracted (by construction) evolution towards its 
steady state at zero. 
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Figure 7:  Effects of Money Financed Fiscal Stimuli 
 
  The results differ from those obtained by Galí (2017), which are much more 
subdued. Even though, the model specifications are slightly different (he does not 
consider nominal wage rigidities), the main explanation falls upon an assumption that 
he puts forward. The author considers a regime under which seignorage is designed in 
such a way that the real debt (𝐵𝑡
𝐻)  remains unchanged. Specifically, for ease of 
reference recall equation (10) and assume, as implied, that 𝑏𝑡
?̂? = 0. 
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𝑏𝑡
?̂? = (1 + ρ - 𝜌𝑏) 𝑏𝑡−1
?̂?  + 𝑏ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡) + 𝑔?̂? - 𝑡 ∗?̂? – (1/V) Δm𝑡   (10) 
This means that Δm𝑡 = V [𝑔?̂? - 𝑡 ∗?̂? + 𝑏
ℎ(1 + ρ)(𝑖𝑡−1̂ - 𝜋𝑡)]   (73) 
 We use, instead the specification defined in (12a) and (15a); that is Δm𝑡 = V 𝑔?̂? = -
V 𝑡 ∗?̂? . Recall as well that, by definition, V 𝑔?̂? = V 𝑏𝑐𝑠?̂? =  V 𝑏𝑐𝑎?̂?. This means, as we 
have seen, that a money-financing regime leads to a fall in the net debt ratio and a 
higher impact on real variables, while a debt financing hypothesis determines an 
increase in the net debt ratio and hardly has any effect on real variables.  
 
 5.6 An experiment and sensitivity analysis 
  There are multiple options available to combine fiscal shocks with alternative 
financing regimes, more so, if one associates them with alternative parameter settings. 
For instance, a change in the level of persistence of the shocks, though not monotonic, 
has substantial effects on the variables. Other experiments were tried ranging from the 
interest rate semi elasticity of money demand (𝜂), to the disutility of labor (𝜑), to the 
steady state debt ratio (𝑏ℎ), to the elasticities of substitution (𝜀𝑝,𝑤), to the endogenous 
component (𝜌𝑏) of the tax path. The results and changes thereof, not shown, appear to 
corroborate the robustness of the qualitative findings presented above. 
  There are, however, two parameters particularly relevant for this analysis: the 
levels of price and wage stickiness (𝜃𝑝 and 𝜃𝑤, respectively). The significant 
differences, both quantitative and qualitative, in the responses to money-financed 
stimuli between the Classical and the New Keynesian setups are essentially explained 
by the presence of nominal frictions in the latter. In fact, by determining a gradual 
increase in prices, it entails a decrease in real rates, thus an increase in real variables, 
while the level of inflation is contained. A positive relationship between welfare (and 
the two other statistics adding regarding consumption and the trade-off ratio between 
consumption and inflation) and nominal rigidities holds. As an example, considering a 
practically frictionless state, say 𝜃𝑝 = 𝜃𝑤 = 0.05, corresponding to changes in prices and 
wages practically every period, it is found out that while the main predictions differ  
from those of the classical economy, they resemble  in qualitative terms. In fact, using, 
for example, an increase in a government spending scheme, the impact on consumption 
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is small (1 percent at the most under money financing in the first period and zero from 
the third period onwards), independently of the financing regime, while the effect on 
inflation under money financing is also frontloaded and quite large (around 25 vs. 30 
percent in a frictionless Classical model). 
  This reveals the relevance of correctly calibrating these parameters. Recall that 
we set as baseline calibrations the values (0.75) advanced by Galí (2014, 2017) who 
argues that these values are consistent with those in the literature. Tsuruga and Wake 
(2016) propose, as well, 0.75, as being consistent with those of Christiano et al (2005). 
However, more recently, Galí and Monacelli (2016) suggest a review to 0.80 striking a 
balance of estimates by several authors between 2001 and 2009; Christoffel et al (2008) 
advance with a domestic price rigidity calibration of 0.92 for the Euro area, which 
implies an average price duration over three years. English et al (2017) suggest that 
nominal price rigidities be set at 0.95, as representative for the USA in the recent 
recession. 
  Strictly for comparison purposes and to get a flavor for the relevance of these 
parameters, we ran two extreme assumptions, one with nominal rigidities set at 1, 
another set at 0.05 (slightly over zero) in order to get a closed solution. “The 
mathematics of the New Keynesian model do not allow that these parameters be set to 
0”. The alternative is to use the Classical setup. The statistics are shown below (no 
graphs are depicted). 
 
  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio  Dynamic Welfare 
Multiplier 
 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
BCa  6.89 16.37 45.89 ∞ ∞ ∞ 2.13 5.07 14.23 
BCs 6.11 15.59 45.11 ∞ ∞ ∞ 1.89 4.83 13.99 
TR 5.33 14.82 44.33 ∞ ∞ ∞ 1.65 4.59 13.75 
G 4.55 14.04 43.56 ∞ ∞ ∞ 0.72 3.66 12.82 
Table 6: Effects of Four Different Money Financed Fiscal Stimuli in the New Keynesian Economy; 
Nominal Rigidities set at 1 
  This hypothesis, equivalent to the Old Keynesian Model, reveals “better” results 
when compared with the baseline calibration. Not only is inflation pinned down to zero, 
but real variables reach a new positive steady state by the 7
th
 period, rather than 
converging to zero. For instance, output and consumption stabilize at 6 percent, 
corresponding to the full amount of the money increase, while nominal and real interest 
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rates exhibit the same motion falling to zero by the 7
th
 period. The only upshot is an 
increase, albeit small, in the net debt ratio attributed to positive real rates in the first few 
periods. 
 Consumption Dynamic 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio Welfare Dynamic 
Multiplier 
 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
BCa 1.13 0.63 0.60 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.36 0.19 0.18 
BCs 0.99 0.56 0.54 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.17 0.16 
TR 0.81 0.49 0.47 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.14 
G -0.14 -0.49 -0.51 -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.74 -0.85 -0.85 
Table 7: Effects of Four Different Money Financed Fiscal Stimuli in the New Keynesian Economy; 
Nominal Rigidities set at 0.05 
The numbers clearly show that money financed fiscal stimuli under very low 
rigidities is not an option worth considering, with the exception maybe, of aiming to 
reduce the net debt ratio that is literally eaten away by a rampant, notwithstanding short-
lived, inflation under these specifications. It also delivers a cautionary message to the 
implementation of such measures. In a long-run perspective these rigidities tend to be 
obliterated and may lead to incorrect perceptions or expectations by the economic 
agents. 
 
6 Monetary policy in a liquidity trap 
In this section we focus on the challenges faced by an optimizing monetary 
policy when confronted with a zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate. 
In order to capture the liquidity trap, I assume, as in Galí (2017) a negative exogenous 
shock to the economy that brings down to negative terrain, on impact, not only the 
values of real variables but also those of monetary variables. There is, however, a limit 
in this scenario to how far can the nominal interest rate fall and that is zero, the so called 
zero lower bound. This description somewhat mimics what happened in the recent 
generalized financial recession. 
Facing this framework how can the central bank react? For now, consider as 
shown by Jung et al (2005) that the traditional monetary policy without commitment is 
available and can be derived as a minimization process, leading to the following 
discretionary Taylor rule 
𝑖𝑡 = max (log (β) + ρ, 𝜙 𝜋𝑡 + ρ + 𝑧𝑡)   (74), where 𝑧𝑡 stands for the shock 
117 
 
As an alternative, the optimal monetary policy under commitment assumes that 
the central bank can pursue a state contingent policy plan, which generally consists of 
actions that may be suboptimal ex-post, but whose anticipation may lead to a better 
policy tradeoff and welfare. This can be solved as a minimization process of a loss 
function by the central bank subject to the aggregate demand and Philips curves 
describing the economy, specifically the Central Bank seeks to minimize 
Min ∑ 𝛽𝑡∞𝑡=0 (𝜋𝑡
2 + 𝜈  ?̃?𝑡
2)   (75), where 𝜈 stands for the relative weight attributed to the 
output gap, subject to the sequence of constraints 
𝜋𝑡 = β 𝜋𝑡+1 + k ?̃?𝑡  (76) and ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡+1  - 
1
𝜎
 (𝑖?̂?- 𝜋𝑡+1 - 𝑟𝑡
𝑛) (77) 
where k = 𝜆 (σ + 
𝜑+𝛼
1−𝛼
 ) and 𝜆 = (
1− 𝜃𝑝
𝜃𝑝
) (1 −  𝜃𝑝) (
1− 𝛼
1− 𝛼+ 𝛼 𝜀𝑝
 ) 
The solution to the associated Lagrangian is given by the following first order 
conditions 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖_1𝑡 - 𝑥𝑖_1𝑡−1 - 
1
𝛽𝜎
 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡−1 = 0 (78),  where 𝑥𝑖_1𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡 are the Lagrangian 
multipliers 
𝜈𝑥?̂?– k 𝑥𝑖_1𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡 - 
1
𝛽
 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡−1 = 0 (79) and 𝑖?̂? ≥ 0 (80), and slackness conditions 
𝑥𝑖_2𝑡 ≥ 0; 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡 𝑖?̂? = 0, as well as initial conditions 𝑥𝑖_1𝑡−1 = 𝑥𝑖_2𝑡−1 = 0 
For additional details see Jung et al (2005). 
For convenience purposes we label the set of the equations and conditions right above 
as describing a Taylor rule under commitment (TRC), while equation (74) is designated 
as a Taylor rule under discretion (TRD). 
 In addition to these rules, we will consider a possible coordination with fiscal 
authorities, covering possible fiscal stimuli in the form of a tax cut, an increase in 
government expenditures, including the issuance of “bonus checks”. They all take the 
form of a 1 percent unanticipated deterministic shock, if implemented, starting when the 
fall in the natural rate has occurred and lasting the same number of periods. 
The results under a tax cut for some selected variables are shown below in 
Figure 8. Four possible scenarios are considered by combining the two alternative 
monetary policies (TRC and TRD) with the implementation or not of a tax cut, 
respectively 1 and 0. It is clear that this last hypothesis is irrelevant when implementing 
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the discretionary rule, as a tax cut, under this definition affects no variables, other than 
the net debt ratio and the tax path. Hence, real variables and inflation fall significantly 
into a negative domain following the exogenous shock, tapering off to zero, which is 
reached when the shock terminates. The nominal interest rate, expressed in levels, 
reflects the zero lower bound constraint. It remains at zero during the first six periods 
and then reverts to 2 percent, its steady state. The real interest rate in levels can be 
explained by the Fischer relation; it starts at a whopping +7 percent and stabilizes at 2 
percent by the seventh period. This explains the path of the net debt ratio, which 
increases, even if there are no tax cuts. The path of the natural rate reflects the sequence 
of shocks; it falls to -2 percent for the first six periods and then jumps up to +2 percent. 
 A different whole story occurs under TRC, though, as before the values under 
TRC1 and TRC0 are identical. The behavior of real variables and inflation exhibit a 
smoother pattern and are contained, actually reaching positive ground before reaching a 
steady state at zero. Note that both money and prices move up and stabilize at around +1 
percent, hence, money demand steady state converges to zero. However, money remains 
for the most part above the level of prices; this may suggest that some sort of money 
financed fiscal stimulus is in place. The explanation for the described behaviors falls 
upon the monetary policy under commitment, which is patent in the path of the nominal 
interest rate which remains at zero for a period longer than the duration of the shock; it 
then spikes up for one period before reaching the steady state at 2 percent in levels. This 
may be interpreted as forward guidance, as described by numerous authors, such as 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2013). This policy was pursued by several central banks in 
the recent past, as part of the unconventional monetary policies implemented under (or 
near) the liquidity trap. In practical terms, recall that forward guidance is a public 
commitment  announced by the central bank to maintain short term interest rates low 
even after the end of the negative shock. The longer term spectrum of the interest rates 
can also be pursued through this commitment or the commitment to purchase (and/or 
actually purchase) long term securities. This is the other main tool of unconventional 
monetary policy (quantitative easing) still being implemented, at the time of writing, by 
some central banks. 
 If one were to select among these alternatives, the indicators obtained suggest 
that the adequate option might be TRC0; that is forward guidance without tax cuts, 
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based on the behavior of the net debt ratio. The absence of tax cuts and the negative 
values of the real interest rate expressed in deviation from the steady state (not shown) 
permit the net debt ratio to fall. 
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Figure 8:  Effects of a Tax Cut under ZLB 
 Considering now an increase in government expenditures, figure 9 depicts the 
dynamics of several variables. As before, four different scenarios are presented. 
 Under TRD0 there are no differences between tax cut and government 
expenditures, simply because they do not occur. Under a TRD1, the outcome differs 
significantly as government expenditures enter in the equilibrium definition of the 
output. Thus, they do have an impact. Moreover, as there are no dampening effects by 
the monetary policy rule (the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero for the duration of the 
shock) real variables and inflation, though negative, reveal a behavior not far apart from 
those obtained with TRC. 
 If implementing a monetary policy under commitment, one arrives at slightly 
better outcomes, namely in terms of consumption and welfare (TRC1), which can be 
accounted from the equilibrium equation of output. The key explanation lies in the path 
of nominal interest rate. Again it remains at zero after the end of the shock, particularly 
if no expenditures take place. The overall graphs seem to indicate that the more 
appropriate choice might be TRC0, which combines a higher welfare and a lower debt 
ratio. 
0 5 10 15
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Time in Quarters
V
a
lu
e
s
 i
n
 L
e
v
e
ls
Natural Interest Rate  Annualized
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Welfare
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Money
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Prices
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 5 10 15
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Output
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Inflation  Annualized
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Debt Ratio
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Consumption
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Time in Quarters
V
a
lu
e
s
 i
n
 L
e
v
e
ls
Real Interest Rate  Annualized
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Time in Quarters
V
a
lu
e
s
 i
n
 L
e
v
e
ls
Nominal Interest Rate  Annualized
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Time in Quarters
V
a
lu
e
s
 i
n
 L
e
v
e
ls
Natural Interest Rate  Annualized
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
0 5 10 15
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Time in Quarters
D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
te
a
d
y
 S
ta
te
Welfare
 
 
TRC1
TRC0
TRD1
TRD0
122 
 
 
Figure 9: Effects of an increase in G under ZLB  
 
 Switching to the case of issuing “bonus checks”, please see Figure 10. Again we 
arrive at the same results with TRD0. However, under TRD1 the outcome is 
significantly different, the reason being that by definition both the “bonus checks” and 
the negative shock not only exhibit the same values with opposite signs, but also are 
specified as shifters to the utility function. Therefore, one is confronted with positive 
values for the real variables and inflation, though the tradeoff ratio statistic is clearly 
unfavorable. Additionally, the nominal interest rate is not bounded by the zero lower 
bound, as it designed to bring down inflation. It starts at 7 percent, and then falls down 
throughout the shock period, before converging to 2 percent. Another positive sign is 
the path of the net debt ratio explained by the increase in output and the negative values 
of the real interest rate, when expressed as a deviation from the steady state. 
 Under TRC, the results are somewhat in line with those obtained with an 
increase in government expenditures. When coupled with the issuance of “bonus 
checks” the negative effects of the exogenous shock are totally offset, with output, 
consumption, and welfare pinned down to zero right from the beginning. The cost is an 
increase in the net debt ratio. It would appear, considering this variable, as well as, the 
tradeoff ratio, and welfare that choosing TRC0 might be appropriate. 
 Reviewing the possibilities analyzed with respect to tax cuts, increase in 
government expenditures, and the issuance of “bonus checks”, one is tempted to argue 
that under a liquidity trap, the implementation of forward guidance as a package of 
unconventional monetary policy might have been the adequate solution, at least the 
second best, as advanced further ahead. In terms of sensitivity analysis, the model 
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appears to be robust. It is particularly sensitive to the size and duration of shocks and to 
the calibration of the nominal price rigidities, as it was the case outside the liquidity 
trap. Note that the baseline calibration (0.75) was used in this section. 
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Figure 10:  Effects of Issuing “Bonus Checks” under ZLB  
 
7 Beyond the liquidity trap 
In this section, following Goodfriend (2016) we advance the case for negative 
nominal interest rates in a framework where these rates are stuck at the zero lower 
bound. The study is complemented with the inclusion of fiscal stimuli. Additionally, we 
extend Galí´s (2017) analysis by incorporating money-financed stimuli under a zero 
lower bound constraint. 
 
7.1 The case for nominal negative interest rates 
In the previous section we postulated that either a TRC or TRD lead to a second 
best solution, as the nominal interest rate was constrained by the zero lower bound. The 
idea that the first best would require nominal interest rates to track the path of the 
natural rate goes back many years ago and was advocated by Wicksell (1898). More 
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recently several authors, such as Goodfriend (2000, 2016), resuscitated this concern in 
an environment of secular stagnation advanced by academics like Summers (2016), who 
presents significant data to support this argument. For a more comprehensive survey 
and empirical evidence on this subject see Rachel and Smith’s (2015) paper on the 
secular drivers of the global interest rate. They show that long term real interest rates in 
the developed world have fallen by some 450 basis points over the last three decades 
into near zero values and argue that the common driver is likely a fall in the natural real 
interest rate. This accounts for some 400 basis points of the downfall and they attribute 
it not only to a slower growth path, but particularly to shifts in savings and investment 
preferences. The former, so they say, is explained by demographic forces, shifts in 
income inequality and a glut of precautionary savings in emerging economies, while the 
latter may likely reflect a downward trend in the relative price of capital, lower public 
investment, and an increase in the spread between risk-free and actual interest rates. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest that these drivers may likely persist for a long period 
of time, thus, leading to a neutral real rate settling at or below the 1 percent level in the 
medium to long run. The consequences for the management of the business cycle may, 
therefore, be hampered, as they spell out, by the zero lower-bound. 
Whether this hypothesis will prevail, remains to be seen. On the bright side and 
suggesting a possible different perspective see, for instance, Davies’ (2018) article “Can 
secular stagnation morph into secular expansion?” in the Financial Times. 
Consider for instance, as described by Reifscheneider (2016), the following 
monetary policy rule: 
R (t) = 𝑅∗ + π(t) + 0,5 [π(t) - 𝜋∗] – 2.0[U (t) - 𝑈∗]   (81) 
where R is the federal funds rate, 𝑅∗ is the longer-run normal value of the federal funds 
rate adjusted for inflation, π is the four quarter moving average of core PCE (personal 
consumption expenditures) inflation, 𝜋∗ is the FOMC target for inflation (2 percent), U 
is the unemployment rate, and 𝑈∗ is the longer-run normal rate of unemployment. Based 
on the median longer-run projections (March 2017) by the FOMC members, 𝑅∗  is 1.4 
percent and 𝑈∗ is 4.8 percent. Therefore, with the unemployment rate reaching 10 
percent and core PCE inflation falling to 1 percent in early 2009, the zenith of the US 
crisis, this rule would have called upon lowering the federal funds rate by over 8 
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percent, a practical (and Fed legal issues aside) impossibility. According to the author 
this aggressive rule does a reasonably good job of accounting for the movements in the 
federal funds rate in the decade preceding its falling to its effective lower bound in 
December 2008. If instead, one uses the standard Taylor rule, which is half as 
responsive to gaps in resource utilization, the prescription would have been cutting the 
federal funds rate by a more modest, but still unfeasible, 3 to 4 percent below zero. 
This raises the question: why not unencumber the interest rate zero lower-bound, 
in a similar way as the gold standard and the fixed exchange rate regimes were 
discontinued not that long ago, in order to better accommodate an independent 
monetary policy? 
This is precisely the experiment that we will undertake, in a liquidity trap 
framework. Any advanced reference text book on monetary policy and the business 
cycle, such as Galí (2008), will clearly show that a negative shock to an interest rate 
Taylor rule under the dynamics associated will unambiguously translate into an increase 
in the real variables and inflation. The results are shown in Figure 11, which 
incorporates the usual negative shock (-1 percent) to the economy lasting for six periods 
associated with a negative shock to a simple Taylor rule (-1.5 percent) also lasting for 
six periods. In addition it is assumed a deterministic fiscal boost that may (or not) occur. 
Hence, we are dealing with four possible combinations that we label C (bonus check), T 
(tax cut), G (government expenditure) and 0 (no fiscal stimulus). 
A quick glance at the graphs reveals that the variables display a rather linear 
behavior. This is explained by the existence of up to three simultaneous deterministic 
shocks. Furthermore, the outcomes in terms of real variables, inflation, net debt ratio, 
and the tradeoff ratio statistic appear to be desirable, particularly, by construction, with 
the issuance of “bonus checks”, followed by the increase of government expenditures. 
Under a tax cut, the outcomes are identical, as expected, to the one consisting simply of 
a reduction in the interest rate to a negative domain, the exception being, of course, the 
net debt ratio. Interest rates in levels, both nominal and real, fall to around -4 percent, as 
mentioned above and suggested by Reifschneider (2016) for the US in 2008-9, before 
returning to +2 percent. Mind you, that one is more interested in capturing the flavor of 
the relative dynamics, rather than the actual values; reality is far too complex to be 
represented by such a simple model. 
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The calibration used is the baseline, with the exception of nominal price 
rigidities. In this example we set it at 0.95, as recommended by English et al (2017) for 
a zero lower bound scenario. Should we use the baseline value (0.75), then the statistic 
tradeoff ratio would fall below unity, accompanied by a spike in inflation and the 
overall outcome would probably not be acceptable (graphs not shown). 
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Figure 11: Effects of using a Taylor Rule coupled with fiscal stimuli to overcome a ZLB 
 
Obviously, the implementation of these measures would call upon the 
unencumbering of the zero lower bound. Existing institutional arrangements, in which 
central banks accommodate the demand for paper currency at par for bank reserves and 
bank deposits, limit the extent to which a central bank can undertake negative interest 
rate policy. A sustained attempt to push short-term rates considerably negative would 
likely lead financial institutions and the public at large to exercise their option to 
exchange reserves and deposits for paper currency with severe consequences to the 
financial system. Handling and storage costs may deter such a switch provided that rates 
are slightly negative. Bernanke (2016) refers to studies by the Fed that place those costs 
in the vicinity of 35 basis points, somewhat above reference short-term rates in the Euro 
area, Switzerland, and Sweden, prevailing at that time. 
  Some solutions to bypass this state of affairs include the introduction of a tax on 
currency whenever paper currency is paid or received (Humphrey, 2016) or, 
alternatively, simply phasing out paper currency as studied by Rogoff (2014). True, 
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there are many arguments for not interfering with the status quo, ranging from the 
relevance of seignorage revenues to civil liberties arguments precluding “hopefully” tax 
evasion and illegal activity. But the fact is that the demand for cash currency continues 
to exhibit a large upwards trend in the two major currencies. See for instance Table 8 
 
 US Total US $100 Euro Total Euro > €50 
2016 1463 1155 1126 1022 
2015 1380 1082 1083 983 
2014 1299 1014 1016 921 
2013 1198 925 956 864 
2012 1127 863 913 823 
2011 1035 783 889 792 
2010 942 705 839 756 
2002 655 459 297 358 
∆ % 2002/16 5.90 6.81 9.98 7.78 
Table 8: Currency in circulation ($ and €) as of year-end in billions. Source Fed and ECB 
 
  In the same period, nominal GDP grew on average by some 3.5 percent in the 
US and by 2.5 in the Euro area on an annual basis. Total currency as a fraction of GDP 
stood at 8 percent in the US and around 10 percent in the Euro area at the end of 2016. 
This may entail an eventual repudiation should a decision to abolish paper currency be 
contemplated. There are, however, alternatives to maintain paper money flowing while, 
simultaneously, bypass the problem of the zero bound on nominal rates. 
  Consider, for instance, setting up a flexible deposit (bank reserves) price of 
paper currency, where the central bank is available to exchange at par deposits and bank 
reserves; however, it would no longer print currency in order to allow the stock of cash 
currency to vary elastically to allow deposit (bank reserves) to be traded at par with 
paper currency. Furthermore, admit that in an environment of negative nominal interest 
rate policy actions, banks also pass the negative market interest rate to deposit rates; 
then, the deposit (bank reserves) price of paper currency would be driven above par to 
an equilibrium where this price is expected to fall back to par at a pace equal to the 
negative nominal market interest rate. Along this path, cash currency holders would be 
indifferent between holding deposits subject to a negative nominal interest rate, and 
holding physical currency whose value is expected to depreciate at an equivalent rate in 
terms of deposits (Goodfriend, 2016). 
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  In practice, the deposit (bank reserves) price of paper currency would adjust 
flexibly in a similar pattern as floating exchange rates adjust according to a differential 
between domestic and foreign interest rates or, should one wish to eliminate other 
factors affecting exchange rates, as the forward exchange rate markets operate strictly 
dependent in the normal course of business upon the difference in interest rates. Authors 
such as Agarwal and Kimball (2015), Buiter (2010), and Kimball (2015) write at length 
in favor of a time varying exchange rate between deposits and cash currency; they 
actually move one step forward by advocating the implementation of a crawling peg 
policy by the central bank to prevent possible disruptions and ensure that the path of the 
exchange rate is coherent with the central bank’s planned interest rate policy. 
  That said, it would appear that the conditions required for eliminating the zero 
lower-bound while maintaining the option to hold “hard” paper currency could possibly 
be met. Legal issues aside, such as allowing the payment of negative rates on bank 
reserves in the US or that contracts would henceforth be expressed in terms of deposit 
(electronic) currency, technology is to be made available to allow the smooth 
inexpensive flow of electronic currency. Rogoff (2014), in this regard, says that given 
the relentless technological progress we may already live in the twilight of the paper 
currency. 
 
7.2- The case for money-financed stimuli in a liquidity trap 
An alternative to the implementation of negative interest rates under a liquidity 
trap that may be worth considering is money-financed fiscal stimuli where money 
growth is a multiple of the stimulus. As in section 6, the unanticipated shocks once 
materialized follow a deterministic path (1 percent lasting for six periods, t = 0, 1…). 
The results shown in Table 9 and Figure 11 below, suggest as well interesting effects. 
The increase in real variables is accompanied by a higher level of inflation (4.5 percent 
in the very first period), but the tradeoff ratio is significantly higher than unity. As in 
money financing without specifying a liquidity trap, the paths of money and prices are 
determinant for this evolution. Key for a more subdued growth in prices is the nominal 
prices rigidity set at 0.95. Again, if we simulate the nominal rigidity at 0.75, one is 
confronted with a whopping inflation rate in excess of 15 percent (annualized), the main 
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positive effect being the net debt ratio, which falls significantly. But, overall this would 
not likely be acceptable at all, at least for a central bank. 
  Dynamic Consumption 
Multiplier 
Tradeoff Ratio  Dynamic Welfare 
Multiplier 
 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 k = 0 k = 4 k = 14 
BC 12.01 12.28 24.52 9.86 11.28 12.28 3.71 3.80 7.60 
TR 8.65 10.15 22.86 7.42 9.51 11.50 2.67 3.14 7.09 
G 8.20 9.53 22.18 6.97 8.90 11.14 1.84 2.26 6.19 
Table 9: Effects of Three Different Money Financed Fiscal Stimuli in the New Keynesian Economy 
under a Liquidity Trap; Nominal Rigidities set at 0.95 
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Figure 12:  Effects of Money Financed Stimuli under a Liquidity Trap  
 
7.3 The case for caution in a liquidity trap 
In the previous two sub-sections, it was shown and particularly underlined that 
the success of the policies under analysis, hinges upon the level of nominal rigidities. 
  As money-financed fiscal program involves a large shift in the central bank’s 
normal reaction function, achieving near-term output stimulus may be contingent on the 
public understanding the new strategy and accepting it as credible. It may likely be 
difficult to communicate the new strategy, which may possibly be perceived at variance 
with the objective of low and stable inflation that many central banks have adopted over 
the last three to four decades. 
  Moreover, in the presence of an increased money supply as well as of prices, the 
public may react by adjusting prices more frequently, in which case the main effect is a 
dramatic increase in inflation and a milder boost to output. In order to replicate this last 
hypothesis, the “neatest way” is simply consider alternative calibrations to nominal 
rigidities. Other authors call upon the concept of time varying parameters (see for 
example, Albertini and Lan, 2016). Indeed, parameters are subject to changes over time 
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and may actually suffer sudden structural shocks. The recent financial crisis is an 
example. One may consider as another example that following a significant negative 
disturbance with looming declines in output and prices, a representative agent may want 
to defer consumption in order to maximize utility, thus a higher beta, eventually larger 
than unity, conducive to a self-fulfilling prophecy of spiraling deflation. 
There is a catch, however. In the process of linearization / Taylor approximation 
of the DSGE or DDSE model, parameters are assumed to be constant. Notwithstanding 
this caveat, it is depicted, for illustrative purposes only, in Figure 13, the graphs of some 
variables following the issuance of money financed bonus checks, with nominal 
rigidities set respectively at 0.95, 0.75 and finally exhibiting a time varying path: 0.95 
for two periods, 0.50 for the next two periods, and henceforth 0.75. These different 
hypotheses are labeled PH, PL, and PV. 
The visualization of the graphs, confirms that real variables still exhibit desirable 
growth, however not as high, under lower and time varying parameters; this comes at a 
high cost in terms of inflation reaching approximately the 20 percent platform, as the 
level of prices inch up faster. Again, one is faced with an interesting reduction in the net 
debt ratio accounted for a negative real interest rate. Similar dynamics take place (not 
shown), should one consider unencumbering the zero lower bound and use a possible 
less intrusive Taylor rule. 
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Figure 13:  Effects of a Money Financed Stimulus under a  
Liquidity Trap and Different Nominal Rigidities   
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8 Final remarks and main conclusions 
 Early in the introduction, we mention Janet Yellen’s (2016) intervention at a 
symposium on the subject “Designing Resilient Monetary Policy Frameworks for the 
Future”, held in Wyoming in the United States on August 26th 2016. Indeed, what is at 
stake in this paper is to address how to possibly conduct monetary policy in the future. 
Though, following the Great Recession, unconventional monetary policy appears to 
have played, somewhat, a meaningful role in the process of economic recovery, though 
prospects by now appear to be generically brighter, some developed countries are still 
confronted with sputtering economies and levels of inflation below targeting.  
Moreover, ensuing the recession, many developed countries are also challenged with 
high levels of debt and an apparent irreconcilable path of loose money measures, in 
simultaneity with contractionary fiscal policy. 
 Consider as a hypothesis that a recession strikes again; after all, more than a 
decade is gone since the inception of the 2007 financial recession. What can monetary 
policy do in a scenario of low or relatively low interest rates, when there is no 
maneuverability space to bring them down? A possibility, as Yellen (2016) and 
Reifscheneider (2016) advance is the continuation of the recently acquired policy tools. 
Another, as some authors argue, e.g., Goodfriend (2016) and Rogoff (2014), is 
bypassing the interest rate zero lower-bound calling upon the end of physical currency. 
One can also think of long-term interest rates capping, a practice followed after the 
World War II by the Fed and studied by Eichengreen and Garber (1991). This last 
hypothesis is not inside this paper’s scope.  
 Instead, in this paper, we attempt to complement Buitter (2014) and particularly 
Galí’s (2014) proposals of money financed fiscal stimuli by extending the types of 
stimuli (under a DSGE model) to encompass the issuance of “bonus checks” designed 
strictly to promote consumption under very specific conditions. It is my belief that this 
unorthodox proposition puts-off many authors and politicians, at least for the fear of 
inflation and a possible uncontrolled use of these measures; anyway, note that the 
implementation of quantitative easing and the massive injection of money into the 
economy generated some controversy and also putted-off many people. The main 
conclusions are the following. 
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  a) A very stylized model was used in an attempt to capture the main drivers of a 
rather complex environment. Therefore, rather than to offer quantitative results, the 
intention rests upon eliciting a reasonable description of the dynamics involved. The 
main conclusion suggests that under adequate calibration of nominal rigidities, 
unanticipated money-financed stimuli, using any of the fiscal instruments coupled, 
obviously, with an agenda of cooperation between political (fiscal) and monetary 
authorities may lead to positive economic outcomes. Not only there is a boost to real 
variables, such as, consumption, output, employment, and welfare, but the associated 
cost represented by inflation is fairly contained and quite mild, while there may be a 
reduction of the net debt ratio. The effects appear to be more suitable in early stages, 
implementing additional consumption enhancing instruments. In the case of debt 
financing, it was shown that a central bank intervention under a mandate of economic 
stabilization literally eliminates the effects of a boost, but at cost of, generally, raising 
the net debt output ratio, with or without rigidities. 
  b) The choice of the values of nominal rigidities (or for that matter, ideally if 
possible, the actual values permeating the economy) is paramount in determining the 
level of success in implementing these measures. Indeed, there is a positive correlation 
between nominal rigidities and the level of success. 
  c) An experiment was performed, where nominal rigidities were considered to 
be unity, a limit hypothesis, conceivable in a very dire economic situation and large 
initial distortions. The results showed real variables reaching reasonably quickly a new 
steady state significantly above the initial zero steady state value. The price, however, is 
an increase in the net debt ratio. Lowering, even marginally, the level of rigidities 
annuls this cost and also leads to positive outcomes. High debt ratios may indeed be a 
major restraint in many developed economies. Hence, it may be advantageous (and 
possibly more realistic) to consider lower nominal rigidities, say in the 0.75 (the 
baseline calibration) to 0.95 range.  
  d) At the other extreme, considering an unlikely scenario of almost nonexistence 
of rigidities, under money financing the end result is a front-loaded spike in inflation 
bringing down, however, the net debt ratio through erosion; literally inflation eating 
away the debt overhang, if expressed in a currency controlled by the national central 
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bank. This hypothesis proxy the scenarios presented with a frictionless classical 
framework. 
  e) An experiment was conducted, following Gali (2017) and Jung et al (2005) to 
replicate a zero lower bound constraint following a negative shock to the economy. For 
this purpose the DSGE model was modified into a DDGE model incorporating 
unanticipated deterministic shocks. Should a central bank be restricted to interest rate 
rule it was argued that the use of a Taylor rule under commitment, which can be 
interpreted as forward guidance, delivered the best results, particularly, if one values the 
level of the net debt, without fiscal stimuli. This apparently is consistent with the 
unconventional monetary policies undertaken by central banks following the financial 
aftermath. 
  f) In addition, it was advanced that unencumbering the zero lower bound and 
implementing negative nominal interest rates associated with fiscal stimuli, namely in 
the form of “bonus checks” may lead to positive results and a low tradeoff ratio, 
provided that nominal rigidities remain high (in the vicinity of 0.90). 
  g) Considering money financed fiscal stimuli, as in the case of no zero lower 
bound restrictions, it leads as well to positive outcomes, particularly with “bonus 
checks”. To counter the effects of the negative shock, it is also needed a high level of 
rigidities; otherwise inflation may skyrocket.  
  h) This suggests that these measures, particularly in a liquidity trap, should be 
undertaken with caution. A comparison is made covering three possible scenarios. One 
consists of “high” frictions, another of “lower” frictions, and finally a time varying 
calibration of frictions, trying to capture the possibility that agents misunderstand the 
policies pursued and behave with fear of inflation, which eventually would be the end 
result. A possible alternative to counter the last two scenarios is the implementation of a 
prices and income policy.  
     Aside legal issues, the implementation of money financed fiscal programs, in 
practice, requires a close coordination between political and monetary authorities, 
which, in the long run, may eventually put at risk (or fear thereof) the central bank 
independence. Politicians may be tempted to use these instruments, when these actions 
are no longer adequate in macroeconomic terms. A possible setup is that through 
coordination, the creation and control of the funds, would be maintained under the 
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central bank jurisdiction; they would be made available when the monetary authority 
considered it necessary in order to achieve its goals in terms of employment (or output 
gap) and inflation. This may suggest that a central bank traditional reaction function that 
brings down nominal interest rate to negative domain may prove to be less intrusive, 
allowing it to trail negative natural rates, but also safeguard its independence. 
   Nevertheless, bear in mind that regular use of money financed policies, may 
quite possibly lead to an inflation bias and eventually be conducive to a human behavior 
that undercuts their effectiveness by lowering the nominal rigidities; on the other hand 
agents may simply refuse the elimination of paper money needed to pursue negative 
nominal interest rates, thus becoming a political issue. 
  A possible next venue of research in this area may focus on the possible 
restraints imposed by the financial system (in particular, Europe, where the bulk of 
financing is carried out by the banking sector as opposed to the US). Indeed, the 
aftermath of the Great Recession is still felt, at the time of writing, in the banking 
industry (for instance, in some European countries) in terms of a significant portfolio of 
non-performing assets and equity constraints. This may possibly explain the 
conceivable limitations in circulating money (lending rationing?), in spite of massive 
injections of money by the central bank. Should this be the case, then it may uphold the 
relevance of money financed stimuli in extreme circumstances. In the Euro area, 
however, such a policy may likely require the existence of a federal government in 
order to allow an agenda between the legislature and the monetary policy makers. 
 In a final analysis, what actually matters is the real fundamentals of an economy. 
But it is good to know that in (future) dire straits of economic duress, the monetary 
authority holds instruments that may be implemented. One may also consider in 
anticipation, the end of paper money. 
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Final remarks 
 
 In Chapter 2, the main purpose was to advance with a simple relation to capture 
simultaneously the joint dynamics of the main unconventional tools used by the Fed. 
These policies were followed by an unprecedented increase in the Fed’s balance sheet 
from some US$900 million before the financial crisis to US $4.5 trillion by the end of 
the large-scale asset purchases programs in October 2014. It was also shown that the 
change in assets, comprising mostly US Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities was 
matched by an increase in the liability side by base money, consisting of currency in 
circulation and, mainly, reserves. This explains why, in spite of reservations and fears 
aroused, the huge increase of base money did not materialize into inflation, quite the 
opposite. Fears of deflation, not only in the US, but also in the Euro area and in Japan 
loomed in the horizon. The answer, at least in the early stages, lies on the legacy of the 
1970s and 1980s (Smith, 2016). The Great Inflation left scars on the psyches of those 
who experienced it; these people were in power during the Great Recession. As a 
curiosity, note that Ben Bernanke, who was at the helm of the Fed, between 2006 and 
2014, is particularly interested in the study of the Great Depression. See, e.g. Smith 
(2016). 
 Reserves, indeed, are not included in standard measures of the money supply 
like M1 or M2 because unlike those measures, reserves are not directly available to the 
non-banking sector, and so are presumed not to affect economic activity. Reserves in 
excess of the regulatory requirements – excess reserves – may be lent out. To the extent 
that banks do lend out their excess reserves, they create deposits that add to the money 
supply and affect economic activity. If, as in the last few years, the financial system 
decides instead to sit on (some) those reserves and collect the interest that the Fed pays 
on excessive reserves, those funds will have no impact on the behavior of non-bank 
agents. While the financial system was severely hit by the Great Recession, this begs as 
a venue for further research, the study of possible motives that led to this particular 
behavior (consider, for instance, some European Union countries, nowadays), beyond 
the introduction of stricter capital and liquidity regulations. After all, more than a 
decade has gone by since the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. 
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From another perspective, the large amount of excess reserves and the 
possibility to remunerate them (the effective date of this authority in the US was 
October 1, 2008) introduced a new monetary tool made available to the Fed; similar 
powers have been granted to other major central banks. Traditionally, the Fed purchased 
or sold short-term Treasury securities in the open market to set its policy rate. This 
procedure is no longer required and was, in practical terms, replaced by the interest rate 
on excessive reserves (IOER) set by the Board of Governors, a more expedited process. 
The IOER is set to equal the top of the target range for the federal funds rate, as shown 
in Figure 1. Most likely, this new policy tool will be used for an extended period of 
time; but it requires a sizeable balance sheet. 
 
 
Figure 1: Interest rate on excess reserves (IOER). Source: Fred 
 
More recently, Debortoli et al (2018) corroborate the idea that both conventional 
and unconventional monetary share common goals and mechanisms. The title of the 
paper is fairly elucidative: “On the Empirical (Ir) Relevance of the Zero-Lower Bound 
Constraint”. 
 Chapter 3 presents an empirical essay, whose results appear to support the 
concept widely accepted by now that unconventional monetary policy has somehow 
fulfilled its objective. It is also broached the issue of downsizing the Fed´s balance sheet 
and entering into unchartered waters. Indeed, such a process has never been tried before 
by a central bank. The Fed stopped its buying spree in late 2014, but purposely refrained 
from shrinking its balance sheet until it was reasonably sure that the economy was good 
and ready. In this regard, Bernanke (2017) argues that there was no need to rush into 
initiating the unwinding process, until the policy rate was comfortably above the zero- 
floor, in order to counter possible misinterpretations by the markets, such as the 
significant fallout of May 2013, which earned the sobriquet in the financial markets: 
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“the taper tantrum”.   That occasion occurred on September 20, 2017, when the Fed 
Chair, Janet Yellen and the rest of the FOMC decided to start reducing the Fed’s bond 
portfolio by starting off with small, monthly reductions of US $6 billion of Treasury 
debt and $4 billion of mortgage-backed securities. It was also decided to gradually 
increase that to a maximum of $30 billion and $20 billion, respectively. Rather than 
selling securities outright, bonds, as opposed to what had been the practice, will be 
allowed simply to “roll off”. The results of these decisions can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Fed total assets in millions of dollars. Source Fred 
  
 After the announcement, prices for shares and Treasuries’ yields rose slightly, 
but in retrospect, the reactions were seen as subdued; considering the enormous 
challenges that the Fed faces ahead. A possible interpretation is that the Fed’s 
unwinding had been widely signaled and expected to be very gradual. Furthermore, 
quantitative-easing programs were still being implemented by central banks in the Euro 
area and Japan; thus, the respective balance sheets continue to grow (not shown). 
 In respect to the question of how large should the Fed’s balance sheet be in the 
long run, Bernanke (2017) advances that there are reasonable arguments for keeping it 
large indefinitely, including the transmission of monetary policy to money markets, 
increasing the supply of safe short-term assets to market participants, and improving the 
central bank´s ability to provide liquidity during a crisis. He estimates that the optimal 
size of the Fed’s balance sheet is currently greater than $2.5 trillion and may reach $4 
trillion or more over the next decade. 
 Quarles (2018), Fed’s Vice Chairman for Supervision, notes that there is not yet 
a decision by the FOMC as to the size of the balance sheet. A wide band is possible and 
he claims that this issue will not need to be decided for some time, and is dependent 
upon, e.g., the experience acquired through the gradual decrease in course and the 
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behavior of the economy. Figure 3 reproduces a graph in Quarles (2018), where 
liabilities stand for reserves held by the financial system, in order to meet the liquidity 
requirements in high-quality assets, which can consist (namely) of interchangeable US 
Treasuries and interest bearing deposits in the Fed. Thus, it is up to the management of 
each financial institution to decide its composition. Hence, Quale’s uncertainty, about 
the level, in the future, of the Fed’s balance sheet. 
 
 
Figure 3: Projected SOMA (System Open Market Account) domestic securities holdings: Alternative 
Liabilities Scenarios. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
 
Note: Values are as of year-end and the shaded area represents actual figures. Smaller and larger liabilities are based, 
respectively, on the 25th percentile and 75th percentile responses to a question about the size and composition of the 
Fed’s long-run balance sheet in Fed’s (New York) survey of primary dealers and survey of market participants.   
 
Harker (2018), President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
stated that the most important issue (in monetary policy) at the moment is that the new 
economic world we are entering may force policymakers to reevaluate their targets. 
Market interest rates have been trending downwards for years (secular stagnation 
hypothesis), starting long before the Great Recession and apparently continuing through 
the crisis and the current expansion. If it is the case that we are, in a low natural rate 
environment puts the Fed in something of a bind because it means that it is closer to the 
zero-lower bound. That is, the Fed cannot lower the policy rate much further than zero. 
So, if the natural rate is lower, the Fed has a smaller window in which to deploy rate 
moves. That, in turn, translates into less policy ammunition in the event of an expected 
turn of events, or, worse, a full-blown crisis. In the event that the hypothesis of a low 
natural rate proves to be correct it could be difficult to meet the inflation target, 
currently set at 2 percent. This may impact on inflation expectations and lead to one of 
Economics’ idiosyncrasies: market expectations of low inflation can actually contribute 
to make it happen. 
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In such a scenario, we “… would expect that the economics profession in 
general, and the Fed in particular, would debate them fully and equally (the 
rethinking of monetary policy options). Ultimately it is a question for the economics 
profession, and, if nothing else, I hope that the already substantial body of academic 
work gets even more robust.” Harker, 2018, p. 5. 
This is precisely what the essay in Chapter 4 tries to address. Admittedly, it is an 
unorthodox subject that may face serious reservations by policymakers and technocrats. 
Moreover, it should be approached with caution. But, as we have seen, so was 
unconventional monetary policy (Smith, 2016). However, one cannot say that money-
financed fiscal stimuli have not been tried in the past. According to Lord Turner (2017), 
a staunch supporter of these policies, the US Union government printed greenbacks to 
pay for the war without generating dangerous inflationary side-effects during the 
American Civil War. In a similar fashion, the Japanese finance minister Takehashi used 
central bank funded deficits to pull successfully Japan’s economy out of depression in 
the early 1930s. There are, however, counterexamples, such as Weimar Germany, and 
modern Zimbabwe, which illustrate the dangers that once the option of printing money 
is first allowed, governments may print so much that they trigger hyperinflation. 
The subject of money-financed stimuli calls for additional research, such as, 
exploring further the secular stagnation hypothesis and answer the questions: Are the 
technological innovations, over the last three to four decades, so deflationary that they 
may account for the decrease in interest rates? Do they generate income inequality and 
henceforth, a reduction in aggregate demand? 
To conclude, we find it appropriate to quote Ben Bernanke. 
“The deflation speech saddled me with the nickname ‘Helicopter Ben.’ In a 
discussion of hypothetical possibilities for combating deflation I mentioned an 
extreme tactic – a broad-based tax cut combined with money creation by the central 
bank to finance the cut. Milton Friedman had dubbed the approach a ‘helicopter 
drop’ of money. Dave Skidmore, the media relations officer…had advised me to 
delete the helicopter-drop metaphor…’It’s just not the sort of thing a central banker 
says,’ he told me. I replied, ‘Everybody knows Milton Friedman said it.’ As it turned 
out, many Wall Street bond traders had apparently not delved deeply into Milton’s 
oeuvre.” (Ben Bernanke, 2015, p. 64). 
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